* A Project Gutenberg Canada Ebook * This ebook is made available at no cost and with very few restrictions. These restrictions apply only if (1) you make a change in the ebook (other than alteration for different display devices), or (2) you are making commercial use of the ebook. If either of these conditions applies, please check gutenberg.ca/links/licence.html before proceeding. This work is in the Canadian public domain, but may be under copyright in some countries. If you live outside Canada, check your country's copyright laws. IF THE BOOK IS UNDER COPYRIGHT IN YOUR COUNTRY, DO NOT DOWNLOAD OR REDISTRIBUTE THIS FILE. Title: An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, In Two Treatises Author: Hutcheson, Francis (1694-1746) Date of first publication: 1725 Edition used as base for this ebook: London: D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and C. Hitch, J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward, J. and P. Knapto, T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood, 1738 (fourth edition) Date first posted: 23 March 2010 Date last updated: 23 March 2010 Project Gutenberg Canada ebook #507 This ebook was produced by: David T. Jones & the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net This file was produced from images generously made available by the Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL of our IDEAS OF BEAUTY _and_ VIRTUE, In TWO TREATISES. I. Concerning BEAUTY, ORDER, HARMONY, DESIGN. II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and EVIL. * * * * * The Fourth Edition, Corrected. * * * * * Itaque eorum ipsorum quæ aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantium, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur & efficitur id quod quærimus honestum: Quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit: quodque etiamsi à nullo laudetur, naturâ est laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam & tanquam faciem honesti vides, quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret sapientiæ. _Cic. de Off. lib. 1. c. 4._ * * * * * _LONDON_: Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and C. Hitch, J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward, J. and P. Knapto, T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood. X.DCC XXXVIII. [Illustration: LOYAL DEVOIR] TO His EXCELLENCY _JOHN_, Lord _CARTERET_, Lord Lieutenant of _IRELAND_. _May it please your Excellency_, When I publish'd these Papers, I had so little Confidence of their Success, that I was unwilling to own them; and what I was unwilling myself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name. Your Excellency's favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of all Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World; and since this has given me Assurance to own them, I humbly presume to inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that I may have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for the Notice you were pleas'd to take of me, and have the Pleasure also of letting the World know, that this small Work has your Excellency's Approbation. The Praise bestow'd by Persons of real Merit and Discernment, is allow'd by all to give a noble and rational Pleasure. Your Excellency first made me feel this in the most lively manner; and it will be a Pleasure as lasting as it is great: 'twill ever be matter of the highest Joy and Satisfaction to me, that I am Author of a Book my Lord Carteret approves. I know, my Lord, that much of your Commendation is to be attributed to your own Humanity: You can intirely approve the Works of those alone, who can think and speak on these Subjects as justly as Yourself; and that is what few, if any, even of those who spend their Lives in such Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, with which your Excellency has been pleas'd to honour me, I could not, I own, without the utmost surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintance with the most valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient and Modern, so just a Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, in so young a Man, amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that mention this Part of your Character: 'tis so uncommon, that it deserves the highest Admiration; and 'tis the only one which an obscure Philosopher, who has receiv'd the greatest Obligations from your Excellency, can with any Propriety take notice of. Those other great Endowments which have enabled You, even in Youth, to discharge the most difficult Employments, with the highest Honour to Yourself, and Advantage to your Country, I dare not presume to describe. He who attempts to do Justice to so great and good a Character, ought himself to be one of uncommon Merit and Distinction: And yet the ablest Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any thing to your Excellency's Fame. The Voices of Nations proclaim your Worth. I am, _May it please your Excellency_, _Your most obliged_, _Most obedient, and_ _Most devoted humble Servant_, Dublin, _June 19_. 1725. Francis Hutcheson. * * * * * THE PREFACE. _There no Part of_ Philosophy _of more Importance, than a_ just Knowledge _of_ Human Nature, _and its various Powers and Dispositions. Our late Inquirys have been very much employ'd about our_ Understanding, _and the several Methods of obtaining_ Truth. _We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and_ Wisdom _denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest Importance, to have distinct Conceptions of this End itself, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that most of our Studys, without this Inquiry, will be of very little Use to us; for they seem to have scarce any other Tendency than to lead us into speculative_ Knowledge _itself. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that_ Knowledge _or_ Truth _is pleasant to us._ _This Consideration put the_ Author _ of the following Papers upon inquiring into the various Pleasures which_ Human Nature _is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick Writings, nothing farther on this Head, than some bare Division of them into_ Sensible, _ and_ Rational, _and some trite Common-place Arguments to prove the_ latter _ more valuable than the_ former._ Our_ sensible Pleasures _are slightly pass'd over, and explained only by some Instances in_ Tastes, Smells, Sounds, _or such-like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfactions. Our_ rational Pleasures _have had much the same kind of Treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession of Claim to those Objects, which may be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we call_ advantageous;_but_ Advantage,_ or_ Interest, _cannot be distinctly conceiv'd, till we know what those Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have with respect to such Objects. We may perhaps find such an Inquiry of more Importance in_ Morals,_to prove what we call the_ Reality of Virtue,_or that it is the_ surest Happiness _of the_ Agent,_ than one would at first imagine._ _In reflecting upon our_ external Senses, _we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain do not depend directly on our_ Will. _Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The Presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the Presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we, by our_ Will, _any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very_ Frame _of our_ Nature _the one is made the Occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction._ _The same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains. For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us as necessarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our Organs of Sense. There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary Occasion of some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we find ourselves pleas'd with a_ regular Form, _a Piece of_ Architecture _or_ Painting, _a Composition of_ Notes, _a_ Theorem, _an_ Action, _ an_ Affection, _a_ Character. _And we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present to our Minds, with all its Circumstances, altho' some of these Ideas have nothing of what we commonly call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some_ Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; _and not from the simple Ideas of_ Colour, _or_ Sound, _or Mode of_ Extension _ separately consider'd._ _These_ Determinations _to be pleas'd with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the_ Author _chooses to call_ Senses; _distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the_ Beauty _of_ Regularity, Order, Harmony, _ an_ Internal Sense; _and,/i> that Determination _to approve_ Affections, Actions, _or_ Characters _of_ rational Agents, _which we call_ virtuous, _ he marks by the Name of a_ Moral Sense. _His principal Design is to shew, "That_ Human Nature _was not left quite indifferent in the Affair of_ Virtue, _to form to itself Observations concerning the_ Advantage, _or_ Disadvantage _of Actions, and accordingly to regulate its Conduct." The Weakness of our Reason, and the Avocations arising from the Infirmities and Necessitys of our Nature, are so great, that very few Men could ever have form'd those long Deductions of Reason, which shew some Actions to be in the whole_ advantageous _to the_ Agent, _and their Contrarys_ pernicious._ The_ Author _of_ Nature _has much better furnish'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than our_ Moralists _seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the Preservation of our Bodys. He has given us_ strong Affections _to be the Springs of each virtuous Action; and made Virtue a lovely Form, that we might easily distinguish it from its Contrary, and be made happy by the Pursuit of it._ _This_ Moral Sense _of_ Beauty _in_ Actions _and_ Affections, _may appear strange at first View. Some of our_ Moralists _themselves are offended at it in my_ Lord Shaftesbury; _so much are they accustomed to deduce every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of private_ Interest, (_except it be merely in the Simple Ideas of the external Senses) and have such a Horror at_ innate Ideas, _which they imagine this borders upon. But this_ moral Sense _has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the second Treatise. Our Gentlemen of_ good Taste, _can tell us of a great many_ Senses, Tastes, _and_ Relishes _for_ Beauty, Harmony, _ Imitation in_ Painting _and_ Poetry; _and may not we find too in Mankind a_ Relish _ for a_ Beauty _in_ Characters, _in_ Manners? I doubt we have made_ Philosophy, _ as well as_ Religion, _by our foolish management of it, so austere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself to like it; and those who are strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our Description of it. So much it is changed from what was once the delight of the finest Gentlemen among the_ Antients, _and their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!_ _In the first Treatise, the_ Author _ perhaps in some Instances has gone too far, in supposing a greater Agreement of Mankind in their_ Sense _of_ Beauty, _ than Experience will confirm; but all he is sollititous about is to shew, "That there is some_ Sense _of_ Beauty natural _ to Men; that we find as great an Agreement of Men in their Relishes of_ Forms, _as in their external Senses, which all agree to be_ natural; _ and that Pleasure or Pain, Delight or Aversion, are_ naturally _ join'd to their Perceptions." If the Reader be convinc'd of such_ Determinations _of the Mind to be pleas'd with_ Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, Theorems; _it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another _ superior Sense, natural _also to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with _ Actions, Characters, Affections. _This is the_ moral Sense, _which makes the Subject of the second Treatise._ _The proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to us as soon as we come into the World; whence perhaps we easily look upon these Senses to be_ natural: _but the Objects of the superior Senses of_ Beauty _ and_ Virtue _generally do not. It is probably some little time before Children reflect, or at least let us know that they reflect upon_ Proportion _and _ Similitude; _upon_ Affections, Characters, Tempers; _or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them. Hence we imagine that their _ Sense _of_ Beauty, _and their_ moral Sentiments _ of Actions, must be entirely owing to_ Instruction _and_ Education; _ whereas it is as easy to conceive, how a_ Character, _a_ Temper, _as soon as they are observ'd, may be constituted by_ Nature _the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a_ Taste _or a_ Sound; _tho' these Objects present themselves to our Observation sooner than the other._ _The first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv'd, that the_ Author _hopes it will be no Offence to any who are concern'd in the_ Memory _of the late_ Lord Viscount Molesworth, _if he lets his Readers know that he was the Noble Person mention'd in the Preface to the first Edition, and that their being publish'd was owing to his Approbation of them. It was from him he had that shrewd Objection, which the Reader may find in the_ first Treatise[1]; _besides many other Remarks in the frequent Conversations with which he honour'd the_ Author; _by which _ that Treatise _was very much improv'd beyond what it was in the Draught presented to him. The_ Author _retains the most grateful Sense of his singular Civilities, and of the Pleasure and Improvement he receiv'd in his Conversation; and is still fond of expressing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,_ Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare sepultos? _To be concern'd in this Book can be no Honour to a Person so justly celebrated for the most generous Sentiments of_ Virtue _and_ Religion, _deliver'd with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would not be just toward the World, should the_ Author _conceal his Obligations to the Reverend Mr._ Edward Syng; _not only for revising these Papers, when they stood in great need of an accurate Review, but for suggesting several just Amendments in the general Scheme of_ Morality. _The_ Author _was much confirm'd in his Opinion of the Justness of these Thoughts, upon finding that this Gentleman had fallen into the same way of Thinking before him; and will ever look upon his Friendship as one of the greatest Advantages and Pleasures of his Life._ [Footnote 1: _Sect. 5. Art. 2. the last Paragraph._] _To recommend the_ Lord Shaftesbury's _Writings to the World, is a very needless Attempt. They will be esteem'd while any_ Reflection _remains among Men. It is indeed to be wish'd, that he had abstain'd from mixing with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had receiv'd against _ Christianity; _a_ Religion _which gives us the truest Idea of_ Virtue, _and recommends the_ Love _of_ God, _and of _ Mankind, _as the Sum of all_true Religion. _How would it have moved the Indignation of that_ ingenious Nobleman, _ to have found a dissolute Set of Men, who relish nothing in Life but the lowest and most sordid Pleasures, searching into his_ Writings _for those Insinuations against_ Christianity, _that they might be the less restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time their low Minds are incapable of relishing those noble Sentiments of_ Virtue _ and_ Honour, _which he has placed in so lovely a Light!_ _Whatever Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the_ Author _hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to_ Religion, _or_ good Manners: _and he shall be well pleased, if he gives the learned World an Occasion of examining more thoroughly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first hints of them from some of the_ greatest Writers _of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments._ _In the later Editions, what Alterations are made, are partly owing to the Objections of some Gentlemen, who wrote very keenly against several Principles in this Book. The_ Author _was convinc'd of some inaccurate Expressions, which are now alter'd; and some Arguments, he hopes, are now made clearer: but he has not yet seen Cause to renounce any of the Principles maintain'd in it. Nor is there any thing of Consequence added, except in_ Sect. II. _of_ Treatise 2d; _ and the same Reasoning is found in _ Sect. I. _of_ the Essay on the Passions. _In this 4th Edition there are Additions interspersed, to prevent Objections which have been published against this Scheme by several Authors; and some Mathematical Expressions are left out, which, upon second Thoughts, appear'd useless, and were disagreeable to some Readers._ * * * * * THE CONTENTS. TREATISE I. Sect. I. _Concerning some_ Powers _of_ Perception _ distinct from what is generally understood by_ Sensation. Page 1 Sect. II. _Of_ original _or_ absolute Beauty. 16 Sect. III. _Of the_ Beauty _of_ Theorems. 30 Sect. IV. _Of_ relative _or_ comparative Beauty. 39 Sect. V. _Concerning our Reasonings about_ Design _and_ Wisdom _in the_ Cause, _from the_Beauty _or_ Regularity _of_ Effects. 46 Sect. VI. _Concerning the_ Universality _of our _ Sense _of_ Beauty. 70 Sect. VII. _Concerning the Power of_ Custom, Education _and_ Example, _as to our_ internal Senses. 84 Sect. VIII. _Of the_ Importance _of the_ internal Senses _in Life, and the_ final Causes _of them._ 93 TREATISE II. Introduction. 105 Sect. I. _Of the_ Moral Sense, _by which we perceive _ Virtue _and_ Vice, _and approve, or disapprove them in others._ 111 Sect. II. _Concerning the_ immediate Motive _to _ virtuous Actions. 132 Sect III. _The_ Sense of Virtue, _and the_ various Opinions _about it, reducible to_ one general Foundation. _The Manner of computeing the_ Morality of Actions. 166 Sect. IV. _All Mankind agree in this_ general Foundation _of their Approbation of_ moral Actions. _The Grounds of_ different Opinions _about_ Morals. 200 Sect. V. _A farther Confirmation that we have_ practical Dispositions _to_ Virtue _implanted in our_ Nature: _with a farther Explication of our_ Instinct _to_ Benevolence _in its various Degrees; with the_ additional Motives _of_ Interest, _viz._ Honour, Shame, Pity. 218 Sect. VI. _Concerning the_ Importance _of this_ moral Sense _to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its_ Influence _on human Affairs._ 244 Sect. VII. _A Deduction of some_ complex moral Ideas, _viz. of_ Obligation, _and_ Right, Perfect, Imperfect, _and_ External; Alienable _and_ Unalienable _from this_ moral Sense. 267 AN INQUIRY into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty _and_ Virtue. * * * * * Treatise I. _Of_ Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design. * * * * * SECT. I. _Concerning some_ Powers _of_ Perception, _distinct from what is generally understood by_ Sensation. To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some _Definitions_, and _Observations_, either universally acknowledg'd, or sufficiently prov'd by many Writers both antient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called _Sensations_, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them. [Sidenote: _Sensation._] _Art._ I. Those _Ideas_ which are rais'd in the Mind upon the Presence of external Objects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call'd _Sensations_. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a State fit to be acted upon by the external Object. [Sidenote: _Different Senses._] II. When two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of _Sensation_, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, _different Senses_. Thus _Seeing_ and _Hearing_ denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho' Colours have great Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except _Feeling_, which is in some degree diffus'd over the whole Body. [Sidenote: _The Mind how active._] III. The Mind has a Power of _compounding_ Ideas, which were receiv'd separately; of _comparing_ Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their _Relations_ and _Proportions_; of _enlarging_ and _diminishing_ its Ideas at Pleasure, or in any certain _Ratio_, or Degree; and of considering _separately_ each of the simple Ideas, which might perhaps have been impress'd jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation we commonly call _Abstraction_. [Sidenote: _Substances._] IV. The Ideas of _Substances_ are compounded of the various simple Ideas jointly impress'd, when they presented themselves to our Senses. We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas. And such Definitions may raise an Idea clear enough of the Substance in the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv'd the Substance; provided he has separately receiv'd by his Senses all the simple Ideas which are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance defin'd: But if there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv'd, or if he wants any of the _Senses_ necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can raise any simple Idea which has not been before perceiv'd by the _Senses_. [Sidenote: _Education. Instruction._] V. Hence it follows, "That when _Instruction_, _Education_, or _Prejudice_ of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those _Qualitys_, for Perception of which we have the proper Senses." Thus, if _Beauty_ be desir'd by one who has not the Sense of _Sight_, the Desire must be rais'd by some apprehended Regularity of _Figure, Sweetness_ of _Voice, Smoothness_, or _Softness_, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of _Colour_. [Sidenote: _Pleasure, Pain._] VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant and many painful, immediately, and that without any Knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what farther Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from a Prospect of farther Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from an Apprehension of Evil. [Sidenote: _Different Ideas._] VII. The _simple Ideas_ rais'd in different Persons by the same Object, are probably some way different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his _Fancy_ at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho' they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental _Conjunction_ of a disagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object; as in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation, we are conscious that the _Idea_ is alter'd from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of _Idea_ may be insensibly made by the Change of our Bodys as we advance in Years, or when we are accustomed to any Object, which may occasion an Indifference toward Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our first use of them. Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only thro' the too great _Intenseness_ of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the _Intenseness_ of the Perception at least; nay, sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold Hand shall feel warm. We shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of Fancy about more _complex Ideas_ of Objects, in which we regard many Ideas of different Senses at once; as some Perceptions of those call'd _primary Qualitys_, and some _secondary_, as explain'd by Mr. Locke: for instance, in the different Fancys about _Architecture_, Gardening, Dress_. Of the two former we shall offer something in Sect. VI. As to _Dress_, we may generally account for the Diversity of Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fansying of _glaring Colours_ be look'd upon as an Evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any _Colour or Fashion_ be commonly us'd by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantly with that of the _Colour_ or _Fashion_, and cause a constant Dislike to them in those who join the additional Ideas, altho' the Colour or Form be no way disagreeable of themselves, and actually do please others who join no such Ideas to them. But there does not seem to be any Ground to believe such a Diversity in human Minds, as that the same simple Idea or Perception should give Pleasure to one and Pain to another, or to the same Person at different times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same simple Idea should do so. [Sidenote: _Complex Ideas._] VIII. The only Pleasure of Sense, which many Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are far greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of _Beautiful_, _Regular_, _Harmonious_. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun arising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversified by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite _simple_. So in Musick, the Pleasure of _fine Composition_ is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever. [Sidenote: _Beauty._] IX.Let it be observ'd, that in the following Papers, the Word _Beauty_ is taken for _the Idea rais'd in us_, and a _Sense_ of Beauty for _our Power of receiving this Idea_. [Sidenote: _Harmony_.] _Harmony_ also denotes _our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds_, and a _good Ear_ (as it is generally taken) a _Power of perceiving this Pleasure_. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to discover "what is the _immediate Occasion_ of these pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them." [Sidenote: _Internal Sense._] X. It is of no Consequence whether we call these Ideas of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_, Perceptions of the _External Senses_ of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather choose to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an Internal Sense, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which Men may have without Perception of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have, in the common Meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the _simple Ideas_ separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour, when they are plac'd beside each other, altho' they may often confound their _Names_ when they occur apart from each other, as some do the Names of _Green_ and _Blue_: they can tell in separate Notes the _higher_, _lower_, _sharper_ or _flatter_, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the _Length_, _Breadth_, _Wideness_ of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great Distances as any Men whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall find no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a _fine Genius_ or _Taste_: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a _good Ear_; and the like Distinction we should probably acknowledge in other Objects, had we also got distinct Names to denote these _Powers_ of Perception by. [Sidenote: _Different from External._] XI. We generally imagine the brute Animals endowed with the same sort of Powers of Perception as our _External Senses_, and having sometimes greater Acuteness in them: but we conceive few or none of them with any of these sublimer Powers of Perception here call'd _Internal Senses_; or at least if some of them have them, it is in a Degree much inferior to ours. There will appear another Reason perhaps hereafter, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of _Beauty_, an _Internal Sense_, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our _External Senses_ are not much concern'd, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many Respects, to that observ'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd with like Pleasure: Such is that _Beauty_ perceiv'd in _Theorems_, or universal Truths, in _general Causes_, and in some _extensive Principles_ of Action. XII. Let one consider, first, That 'tis probable a Being may have the full Power of External Sensation, which we enjoy, so as to perceive each Colour, Line, Surface, as we do; yet, without the Power of _comparing_, or of discerning the _Similitudes_ or Proportions: Again, It might discern these also, and yet have no _Pleasure_ or Delight accompanying these Perceptions. The bare Idea of the Form is something separable from Pleasure, as may appear from the different _Tastes_ of Men about the Beauty of Forms, where we don't imagine that they differ in any Ideas, either of the Primary or Secundary Qualities. _Similitude_, _Proportion_, _Analogy_, or _Equality_ of Proportion, are Objects of the Understanding, and must be actually known before we know the natural Causes of our Pleasure. But _Pleasure_ perhaps is not necessarily connected with the Perception of them: and may be felt where the Proportion is not known or attended to: and may not be felt where the Proportion is observed. Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the _External Senses_ are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, may often not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a _good Taste_ will enjoy at once without much _Knowledge_; we may justly use another Name for these higher and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the _Power_ of receiving such Impressions, an _Internal Sense_: The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name, especially when we are told in what Meaning the Word is applied. [Sidenote: _Its Pleasures necessary and immediate._] This superior Power of Perception is justly called _a Sense_, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure is different from any _Knowledge_ of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; we are struck at the first with the Beauty: nor does the most accurate _Knowledge_ increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it may superadd a distinct rational Pleasure from Prospects of _Advantage_, or may bring along that peculiar kind of Pleasure, which attends the Increase of Knowledge[2]. XIII. And farther, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are _necessarily_ pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any _Prospect_ of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of _Interest_ will make an Object grateful, nor View of _Detriment_, distinct from immediate _Pain_ in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a _Reward_, or _threaten_ the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any _Pursuit_ of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform'd; but our _Sentiments_ of the Forms, and our _Perceptions_, would continue invariably the same. [Footnote 2: See above, _Art._ 6.] [Sidenote: _This Sense antecedent to, and distinct from Prospects of Interest._] XIV. Hence it plainly appears, "that some Objects are _immediately_ the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that _Joy_ which arises upon Prospect of Advantage." Nay, do not we often see Convenience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other Prospect of _Advantage_ in the beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may _pursue_ beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a View to obtain the Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs, yet there must be a _Sense_ of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects even of this Advantage, without which Sense these Objects would not be thus _advantageous_, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our _Sense_ of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our _Desire_ of them when they are thus constituted: Our _Desire_ of Beauty may be counter-balanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our _Sense_ of it; even as Fear of Death may make us desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the _Sense_ of Taste would recommend as pleasant; but cannot make that Potion agreeable to the _Sense_, or Meat disagreeable to it, which was not so antecedently to this Prospect. The same holds true of the Sense of Beauty and Harmony; that the _Pursuit_ of such Objects is frequently neglected, from Prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of Interest, does not prove that we have no _Sense_ of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-balanc'd by a stronger Desire. XV. Had we no such _Sense_ of Beauty and Harmony, Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as _beautiful_: And yet nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different _Views_ on many Occasions: 'Tis true, what chiefly pleases in the Countenance, are the Indications of _Moral Dispositions_; and yet were we by the longest Acquaintance fully convinc'd of the best Moral Dispositions in any Person, with that Countenance we now think deform'd, this would never hinder our immediate Dislike of the Form, or our liking other Forms more: And Custom, Education, or Example, could never give us _Perceptions_ distinct from those of the Senses which we had the Use of before, or recommend Objects under another _Conception_ than grateful to[3] them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below[4]. [Sidenote: _Beauty Original or Comparative._] XVI. Beauty, in Corporeal Forms, is either _Original_ or _Comparative_; or, if any like the Terms better, _Absolute_, or _Relative_: Only let it be observ'd, that by _Absolute_ or _Original_ Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the _Perception_ of some Mind; so _Cold_, _Hot_, _Sweet_, _Bitter_, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no Resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine otherwise. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our _Perception_ of some _primary Quality_, and having relation to _Figure_ and _Time_, may indeed have a nearer Resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, which seem not so much any _Pictures_ of Objects, as _Modifications_ of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a _Sense_ of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call'd _Beautiful_. We therefore by [5]_Absolute_ Beauty understand only that Beauty which we perceive in Objects without _Comparison_ to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the _Works of Nature_, _artificial Forms_, _Figures_. _Comparative_ or _Relative_ Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as _Imitations_ or _Resemblances_ of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections. [Footnote 3: _See Art. 5._] [Footnote 4: _Sect. 7._] [Footnote 5: _This Division of_ Beauty _is taken from the different_ Foundations _of Pleasure to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: for most of the following Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two_ Fountains _of Pleasure, _ Uniformity _in the Object itself, and_ Resemblance _to some Original._] SECT. II. _Of_ Original _or_ Absolute Beauty. [Sidenote: _Sense of Men._] I. Since it is certain that we have _Ideas_ of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what _Quality_ in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the Occasion of them. And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the _Qualitys_ which are beautiful to _Men_; or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the _Sense_ of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us are _beautiful_, we mean, that such Objects are agreeable to the Sense of _Men_: for there are many Objects which seem no way beautiful to Men, and yet other _Animals_ seem delighted with them; they may have _Senses_ otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsome, may be to them a _Paradise_. II. That we may more distinctly discover the general _Foundation_ or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary to consider it first in its _simpler_ Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it. [Sidenote: _Uniformity with Variety._] III. The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is _Uniformity amidst Variety_. There are many Conceptions of Objects which are agreeable upon other accounts, such as _Grandeur_, _Novelty_, _Sanctity_ and some others, which shall be mention'd hereafter[6]. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound _Ratio_ of _Uniformity_ and _Variety_: so that where the _Uniformity_ of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the _Variety_; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the _Uniformity_. This will be plain from Examples. [Sidenote: _Variety._] First, the _Variety_ increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Beauty of an _equilateral Triangle_ is less than that of the _Square_; which is less than that of a _Pentagon_; and this again is surpass'd by the _Hexagon_. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd, the Proportion of them to the _Radius_, or _Diameter_ of the Figure, or of the _Circle_, to which regular _Polygons_ have an obvious Relation, is so much lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of _Heptagons_, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their Beauty. So in _Solids_, the _Eicosiedron_ surpasses the _Dodecaedron_, and thus the _Octaedron_, which is still more beautiful than the _Cube_; and this again surpasses the regular _Pyramid_: The obvious Ground of this, is greater _Variety_ with equal _Uniformity_. [Footnote 6: _See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13._] [Sidenote: _Uniformity._] The greater _Uniformity_ increases the _Beauty_ amidst equal _Variety_, in these Instances: An Equilateral _Triangle_, or even an _Isosceles_, surpasses the _Scalenum_: A _Square_ surpasses the _Rhombus_ or _Lozenge_, and this again the _Rhomboides_, which is still more beautiful than the _Trapezium_, or any Figure with irregular curve Sides. So the _regular_ Solids surpass all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the same is observable not only in the Five perfectly _regular_ Solids, but in all those which have any considerable _Uniformity_, as _Cylinders_, _Prisms_, _Pyramids_, _Obelisks_; which please every Eye more than any rude Figures, where there is no _Unity_ or Resemblance among the Parts. [Sidenote: _Compound Ratio._] Instances of the compound _Ratio_ we have in comparing _Circles_ or _Spheres_, with _Ellipses_ or _Spheroides_ not very eccentric; and in comparing the _compound_ Solids, the _Exoctaedron_, and _Eicosidodecaedron_, with the perfectly _regular_ ones of which they are compounded: and we shall find, that the want of that most perfect _Uniformity_ observable in the latter, is compensated by the greater _Variety_ in the former, so that the _Beauty_ is nearly equal. IV. These Observations would probably hold true for the most part, and might be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children in the _simpler_ Figures, where the _Variety_ is not too great for their Comprehension. And however uncertain some of the particular aforesaid Instances may seem, yet this is perpetually to be observ'd, that Children are fond of all _regular_ Figures in their little Diversions, altho' they be no more convenient, or useful for them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We see how early they discover a _Taste_ or Sense of _Beauty_, in desiring to see Buildings, regular Gardens, or even Representations of them in Pictures of any kind. [Sidenote: _Beauty of_ Nature.] V. The same Foundation we have for our Sense of _Beauty_, in the Works of Nature. In every Part of the World which we call _Beautiful_, there is a surprizing _Uniformity_ amidst an almost infinite _Variety_. Many Parts of the Universe seem not at all design'd for the Use of Man; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any Acquaintance. The _Figures_ and _Motions_ of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by _Reasoning_ enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find their Structure, Order, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of _Beauty_. Every particular Object in _Nature_ does not indeed appear _beautiful_ to us; but there is a great Profusion of _Beauty_ over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Observation: For, not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning Distances; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly _Spherical_; the _Orbits_ of their Revolutions generally _Elliptick_, and without great Eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our Observation: now these are Figures of great _Uniformity_, and therefore pleasing to us. Further, to pass by the less obvious _Uniformity_ in the Proportion of their _Quantitys_ of Matter, _Distances_, _Times_, of revolving, to each other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of _Uniformity, amidst Variety_, than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each _Planet_, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun, thro' all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit? Thus after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are again renew'd; the alternate Successions of _Light_ and _Shade_, or _Day_ and _Night_, constantly pursuing each other around each _Planet_, with an agreeable and regular Diversity in the Times they possess the several Hemispheres, in the _Summer_, _Harvest_, _Winter_, and _Spring_; and the various _Phases_, _Aspects_, and _Situations_, of the _Planets_ to each other, their _Conjunctions_ and _Oppositions_, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable Constancy: These are the _Beautys_ which charm the _Astronomer_, and make his tedious Calculations pleasant. _Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem._[7] [Footnote 7: Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.] [Sidenote: _Earth._] VI. Again, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which is cover'd with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how _beautifully_ is it diversify'd with various Degrees of _Light_ and _Shade_, according to the different Situations of the the Parts of its Surface, in _Mountains_, _Valleys_, _Hills_, and open _Plains_, which are variously inclin'd toward the great Luminary! [Sidenote: _Plants._] VII. If we descend to the minuter Works of Nature, what great _Uniformity_ among all the Species of _Plants_ and _Vegetables_ in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! how near the Resemblance among all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this _Uniformity_ is not only observable in the Form in gross; (nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances) but in the Structure of their minutest Parts, which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of _Leaves_, _Fruit_, _Seed_, _Flowers_ of any one Species, we often see a very great _Uniformity_ in the Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the _Beauty_ which charms an ingenious _Botanist_. Nay, what great _Uniformity_ and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular _Plant_, _Leaf_, or _Flower_! In all Trees and most of the smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either _Cylinders_ nearly, or regular _Prisms_; the Branches similar to their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one _Species_ the Branches arise in Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another _Species_, the Branches spring singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances: And the Branches in other _Species_ sprout all in Knots around the Trunk, one for each Year. And in each _Species_, all the Branches in the first Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they again sprout out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that great _Unity_ of Colours which we often see in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and often of a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many shaded Transitions into opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the same Plant generally agree, nay, often all the Flowers of a Species. [Sidenote: _Animals._] VIII. Again, as to the _Beauty_ of _Animals_, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Observation, or their outward Form, we shall find surprizing _Uniformity_ among all the Species which are known to us, in the Structure of those Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the _Unity_ of Mechanism, when we shall find an almost infinite Diversity of Motions, all their Actions in _walking_, _running_, _flying_, _swimming_; all their serious Efforts for _Self-preservation_, all their freakish _Contortions_ when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one simple Contrivance of a contracting _Muscle_, apply'd with inconceivable Diversitys to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the same Ends; but then there had been less _Uniformity_, and the _Beauty_ of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprizing _Unity_ of Mechanism had been remov'd from them. IX. Among Animals of the same Species, the _Unity_ is very obvious, and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such _Classes_ or _Species_, notwithstanding the great Diversitys in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are observ'd even in those call'd of the same Species. And then in each Individual, how universal is that _Beauty_ which arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of Nature, when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an Imperfection, and Want of _Beauty_, tho' no other Inconvenience ensues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its fellow. As to that most powerful Beauty in _Countenances_, _Airs_, _Gestures_, _Motion_, we shall shew in the second Treatise[8], that it arises from some imagin'd _Indication_ of morally good Dispositions of Mind. In Motion there is also a natural Beauty, when at fixed Periods like Gestures and Steps are regularly repeated, suiting the Time and Air of Music, which is observed in regular Dancing. [Footnote 8: _Sect. vi. _Art. 3._] [Sidenote: _Proportion._] X. There is a farther _Beauty_ in Animals, arising from a certain _Proportion_ of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense of Spectators, tho' they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a _Statuary_. The _Statuary_ knows what Proportion of each Part of the _Face_ to the whole _Face_ is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the Proportion of the _Face_ to the _Body_, or any Parts of it; and between the _Diameters_ and _Lengths_ of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we shall have a _Giant_ or a _Dwarf_. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in _Miniature_, without relation to any external Object, by observing how the Body surpasses the Proportion it should have to the Head in _Giants_, and falls below it in _Dwarfs_. There is a farther _Beauty_ arising from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of _Strength_; but this may be pass'd over, because probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from an Opinion of _Advantage_, and not from the Form it self. The _Beauty_ arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Necessities and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho' there be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider'd under the Head of _Relative Beauty_, or _Design_.[9] [Footnote 9: _See Sect. iv. Art. 7._] [Sidenote: _Fowls._] XI. The peculiar _Beauty_ of _Fowls_ can scarce be omitted, which arises from the great _Variety_ of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a considerable Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species; and a perfect _Uniformity_ in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; besides all the _Beauty_ of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one Feather separately. [Sidenote: _Fluids._] XII. If our Reasonings about the _Nature_ of _Fluids_ be just, the vast Stores of _Water_ will give us an Instance of _Uniformity_ in _Nature_ above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd form'd in all the Parts of this Globe. The same _Uniformity_ there is probably among the Parts of other _Fluids_ as well as Water; and the like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as _Salts_, _Sulphurs_, and such like; whose uniform Propertys do probably depend upon an _Uniformity_ in the Figures of their Parts. [Sidenote: _Harmony._] XIII. Under _Original Beauty_ we may include _Harmony_, or _Beauty of Sound_, if that Expression can be allow'd, because _Harmony_ is not usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing else. _Harmony_ often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of _Uniformity_. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are call'd _Concords_. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in _Time_ with two Vibrations of its _Octave_; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its _Fifth_; and so on in the rest of the _Concords_. Now no _Composition_ can be harmonious, in which the Notes are not, for the most part, dispos'd according to these natural Proportions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the _Key_, which governs the whole, and to the _Time_ and _Humour_, in which the Composition is begun: a frequent and inartificial _Change_ of any of which will produce the greatest, and most unnatural _Discord_. This will appear, by observing the _Dissonance_ which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho' both were separately agreeable. A like _Uniformity_ is also observable among the _Bases_, _Tenors_, _Trebles_ of the same Tune. There is indeed observable, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of _Discords_: They often give as great Pleasure as continu'd Harmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with _Variety_, or by awakening the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other means not yet known: Certain it is, however, that they have their Place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions. Some other Powers of _Musick_ may be consider'd hereafter[10]. [Footnote 10: _See Sect. vi. Art. 12._] XIV. But in all these instances of[11] _Beauty_ let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, "That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is _Uniformity amidst Variety_:" We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's _Taste_ may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the _Forms_ of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him. [Footnote 11: _There is nothing singular in applying the Word_ Beauty _to Sounds. The Antients observe the peculiar Dignity of the Senses of Seeing and Hearing, that in their Objects we discern the [Greek: Kalon], which we don't ascribe to the Objects of the other Senses._] SECT. III. _Of the_ Beauty _of_ Theorems. [Sidenote: _Theorems_.] I. The Beauty of _Theorems_, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, being of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of _Beauty_; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing _Variety_ with _Uniformity_: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any farther Advantage. II. For in one _Theorem_ we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often a Multitude of Infinites: so that altho' the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas, and universal _Theorems_ arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus, for instance, the 47^{_th_} Proposition of the first _Book_ of Euclid's _Elements_ contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible _Sizes_ of right-angled _Triangles_, as you make the _Area_ greater or less; and in each of these _Sizes_ you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar _Triangles_, as you vary the Proportion of the _Base_ to the _Perpendicular_; all which Infinites agree in the general _Theorem_. In _Algebraick_, and _Fluxional Calculations_, we shall find a like _Variety_ of particular _Truths_ included in general _Theorems_; not only in general _Equations_ applicable to all Kinds of _Quantity_, but in more particular Investigations of _Areas_ and _Tangents_: In which one Manner of Operation shall discover _Theorems_ applicable to many _Orders_ or _Species_ of _Curves_, to the infinite _Sizes_ of each Species, and to the infinite _Points_ of the innumerable _Individuals_ of each Size. [Sidenote: _Foundation of their Beauty._] III. That we may the better discern this Agreement, or _Unity_ of an Infinity of Objects, in the general _Theorem_, to be the Foundation of the _Beauty_ or _Pleasure_ attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoveries, with the uneasy State of Mind when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general _Canon_, but are only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or _Beauty_, notwithstanding the _Variety_, till we can discover some sort of _Unity_, or reduce them to some general Canon. [Sidenote: _Little Beauty in Axioms._] IV. Again, Let us take a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, _Every Whole is greater than its Part_; and we shall find no _Beauty_ in the Contemplation. For tho' this Proposition contains many Infinitys of particular Truths; yet the _Unity_ is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of _Whole_ and _Part_, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the _Cylinder_ is greater than the inscrib'd _Sphere_, and this again greater than the _Cone_ of the same Altitude, and Diameter of the Base, we shall find no Pleasure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater and less, without any precise Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve to each other the constant _Ratio_ of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the _Theorem_, and how are we ravish'd with its first Discovery! [Sidenote: _Easy Theorems._] We may likewise observe, that _easy_ or _obvious_ Propositions, even where the _Unity_ is sufficiently distinct and determinate, do not please us so much as those, which being less obvious, give us some _Surprize_ in the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering, that _a Line bisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles Triangle, bisects the Base_, or the _Reverse_; or, that _Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular_. These Truths we almost know _Intuitively_, without Demonstration: They are like common _Goods_, or those which Men have long possessed, which do not give such sensible Joys as much smaller new _Additions_ may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from _Surprize_; for the same _Novelty_ of a single Experiment does not please us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a _new_, or _unexpected_ Advantage, that _Surprize_, or _Novelty_, is the only Pleasure of Life, or the only Ground of Delight in _Truth_. Another kind of Surprize in certain Theorems increases our Pleasure above that we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we discover a _general Truth_, which upon some confused Notion we had reputed false: as that _Asymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve_. This is like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded Evil. But still the _Unity_ of many Particulars in the general Theorem is necessary to give Pleasure in any Theorem. [Sidenote: _Corollarys._] V. There is another _Beauty_ in Propositions, when one _Theorem_ contains a great Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it. Thus there are some leading, or fundamental Propertys, upon which a long Series of Theorems can be naturally built: Such a _Theorem_ is the 35th of the 1st _Book_ of Euclid, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduced, by Resolution into _Triangles_, which are the Halfs of so many _Parallelograms_; and these are each respectively equal to so many _Rectangles_ of the _Base_ into the perpendicular _Altitude_: The 47th of the 1st _Book_ is another of like _Beauty_, and so are many others, in higher Parts of Geometry. In the Search of _Nature_ there is the like _Beauty_ in the Knowledge of some great _Principles_, or universal _Forces_, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is _Gravitation_, in Sir Isaac Newton's Scheme. What is the Aim of our ingenious Geometers? A continual Inlargement of Theorems, or making them extensive, shewing how what was formerly known of one Figure extends to many others, to Figures very unlike the former in Appearance. It is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the _Beauty_ of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one _Genesis_, and demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one _Theorem_ of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other _Advantage_ from such Manner of Deduction, than the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the _Beauty_: nor could Love of _Fame_ excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately, by this _internal Sense_ of their _Beauty_. [Sidenote: _Fantastick Beauty._] It is no less easy to see into what absurd Attempts Men have been led by this Sense of _Beauty_, and an Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the _Mathematicks_. 'Twas this probably which set Descartes on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, _viz._ _Cogito, ergo sum_; while others pleaded, that _Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse_, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of _Principium humanæ Cognitionis absolutè primum_. Mr. Leibnitz had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of _sufficient Reason_ for every thing in _Nature_, and boasts of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance. If we look into particular Sciences, we see the Inconveniences of this Love of _Uniformity_. How aukwardly does Puffendorf deduce the several Dutys of Men to _God_, _themselves_, and their _Neighbours_, from his single fundamental Principle of _Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind_? This Observation is a strong Proof, that Men perceive the _Beauty of Uniformity_ in the Sciences, since they are led into unnatural Deductions by pursuing it too far. VI. This Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal _Theorems_, may really be call'd a kind of _Sensation_; since it necessarily accompanys the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge itself[12], being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the same. And however Knowledge inlarges the _Mind_, and makes us more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in some kinds of Business, whence _Advantage_ may also arise to us; yet we may leave it in the Breast of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleasure without any such Prospect of Advantage from the Discovery of his _Theorem_. All which can thence be inferr'd is only this, that as in our external Senses, so in our _internal_ ones, the pleasant Sensations generally arise from those Objects which calm Reason would have recommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have engag'd our Pursuits from _Self-interest_. [Footnote 12: Aristotle (Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 3.) _justly observes, that we have certain natural Propensitys to certain Actions, or to the Exercise of certain natural Powers, without a View to, or Intention of, obtaining those Pleasures which naturally accompany them._ [Greek: peri polla spoudên poiêsaimetha an, kai ei mêdemian heipheroi êdoên, hoion oran, mnêmoneuein, eidenai, tas aretas echein ei d' ex anagkês epontai toutois êdonai, ouden diapherei eloimetha gar an tauta, kai ei mê genoit an autôn êdonê.] [Translation: "Also there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them."]] [Sidenote: _Works of Art._] VII. As to the Works of Art, were we to run thro' the various artificial Contrivances or Structures, we should constantly find the Foundation of the _Beauty_ which appears in them, to be some kind of _Uniformity_, or _Unity_ of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the Whole. As there is a great Diversity of Proportions possible, and different Kinds of _Uniformity_, so there is room enough for that Diversity of Fancys observable in _Architecture_, _Gardening_, and such-like Arts in different _Nations_; they all may have _Uniformity_, tho' the Parts in one may differ from those in another. The _Chinese_ or _Persian_ Buildings are not like the _Grecian_ and _Roman_, and yet the former has its _Uniformity_ of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the Europeans call _Regular_, the _Uniformity_ of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are _regular Figures_, and either _equal_ or _similar_ at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are _Parallelopipedons_, or square _Prisms_; the Pillars, _Cylinders_ nearly; the Arches _circular_, and all those in the same Row _equal_; there is the same Proportion every-where observ'd in the same Range between the _Diameters_ of Pillars and their _Heights_, their _Capitals_, the _Diameters_ of _Arches_, the _Heights_ of the _Pedestals_, the _Projections_ of the _Cornice_, and all the Ornaments in each of our _five Orders_. And tho' other Countrys do not follow the _Grecian_ or _Roman_ Proportions; yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a _Uniformity_, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one Part from the Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the _Beauty_ of the Whole. VIII. The same might be observ'd thro' all other Works of _Art_, even to the meanest _Utensil_; the _Beauty_ of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of _Uniformity amidst Variety_, without which they appear mean, irregular and deform'd. SECT. IV. _Of_ Relative _or_ Comparative Beauty. [Sidenote: _Comparative Beauty._] I. If the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of _absolute Beauty_ be just, we may easily understand wherein _relative Beauty_ consists. All _Beauty_ is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call _relative_ is that which is apprehended in any _Object_, commonly consider'd as an _Imitation_ of some Original: And this _Beauty_ is founded on a _Conformity_, or a kind of _Unity_ between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either some Object in _Nature_, or some _establish'd Idea_; for if there be any known _Idea_ as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or _Idea_ by, we may make a _beautiful Imitation_. Thus a _Statuary_, _Painter_, or _Poet_, may please us with an Hercules, if his Piece retains that _Grandeur_, and those Marks of _Strength_ and _Courage_, which we imagine in that Hero. And farther, to obtain _comparative Beauty_ alone, it is not necessary that there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of _absolute Beauty_ may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact Imitation shall still be _beautiful_, though the Original were intirely void of it: Thus the _Deformitys_ of old Age in a Picture, the _rudest Rocks_ or _Mountains_ in a _Landskip_, if well represented, shall have abundant _Beauty_, tho' perhaps not so great as if the Original were _absolutely beautiful_, and as well represented: Nay, perhaps the _Novelty_ may make us prefer the Representation of Irregularity. [Sidenote: _Description in Poetry._] II. The same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets either of _natural_ Objects or Persons; and this _relative Beauty_ is what they should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar _Beauty_ of their Works. By the _Moratæ Fabulæ_, or the [**Greek: êthê] of Aristotle, we are not to understand _virtuous Manners_ in a moral Sense, but _just Representation_ of Manners or Characters as they are in _Nature_; and that the _Actions_ and _Sentiments_ be suited to the Characters of the _Persons_ to whom they are ascrib'd in _Epick_ and _Dramatick_ Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our _Passions_, to prove that a Poet should not draw his _Characters_ perfectly _Virtuous_; these Characters indeed, abstractly consider'd, might give more Pleasure, and have more _Beauty_ than the _imperfect_ ones which occur in Life with a Mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of _imperfect Men_ with all their Passions, than of _morally perfect Heroes_, such as really never occur to our Observation; and of which consequently we cannot judge exactly as to their Agreement with the Copy. And farther, thro' Consciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch'd and affected by the _imperfect Characters_; since in them we see represented, in the Persons of others, the _Contrasts_ of Inclinations, and the _Struggles_ between the Passions of _Self-Love_ and those of _Honour_ and _Virtue_, which we often feel in our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of _Beauty_ for which Homer is justly admir'd, as well as for the _Variety_ of his _Characters_. [Sidenote: _Probability, Simile, Metaphor._] III. Many other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc'd under this Class of _relative Beauty_: The _Probability_ is absolutely necessary to make us imagine _Resemblance_; it is by Resemblance that the _Similitudes_, _Metaphors_ and _Allegorys_ are made _beautiful_, whether either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to it have _Beauty_ or not; the _Beauty_ indeed is greater, when both have some _original Beauty_ or Dignity as well as _Resemblance_: and this is the Foundation of the Rule of studying _Decency_ in _Metaphors_ and _Similes_ as well as _Likeness_. The _Measures_ and _Cadence_ are Instances of _Harmony_, and come under the Head of _absolute Beauty_. [Sidenote: _Proneness to compare._] IV. We may here observe a strange Pronenesse in our Minds to make _perpetual Comparisons_ of all things which occur to our Observation, even of those which are very different from each other. There are certain _Resemblances_ in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily found a _Comparison_; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy: _Inanimate Objects_ have often such Positions as resemble those of the _human Body_ in various Circumstances; these Airs or Gestures of the _Body_ are Indications of certain Dispositions in the _Mind_, so that our very _Passions_ and _Affections_, as well as other Circumstances, obtain a Resemblance to _natural inanimate Objects_. Thus a _Tempest_ at Sea is often an Emblem of _Wrath_; a _Plant_ or _Tree_ drooping under the Rain, of a Person in _Sorrow_; a _Poppy_ bending its Stalk, or a _Flower_ withering when cut by the Plow, resembles the Death of a _blooming Hero_; an _aged Oak_ in the Mountains shall represent an _old Empire_, a _Flame_ seizing a Wood shall represent a _War_. In short, every thing in _Nature_, by our strange Inclination to _Resemblance_, shall be brought to represent other things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this, and furnish Instances of it, one need only look into Homer or Virgil. A fruitful Fancy would find in a _Grove_ or a _Wood_, an Emblem of every _Character in a Commonwealth_, and every Turn of _Temper_, or _Station in Life_. [Sidenote: _Intention._] V. Concerning that kind of _comparative Beauty_ which has a necessary relation to some establish'd Idea, we may observe, that some Works of _Art_ acquire a _distinct Beauty_ by their Correspondence to some universally suppos'd _Intention_ in the Artificer, or the Persons who employ'd him: And to obtain this _Beauty_, sometimes they do not form their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of _original Beauty_ separately consider'd; because a Composition of this _relative Beauty_, along with some Degree of the _original_ Kind, may give more Pleasure, than a more _perfect original Beauty_, separately. Thus we see, that strict _Regularity_ in laying out of Gardens in _Parterres_, _Vistas_, _parallel Walks_, is often neglected, to obtain an Imitation of _Nature_ even in some of its _Wildnesses_. And we are more pleas'd with this _Imitation_, especially when the Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin'd Exactness of _regular Works_. So likewise in the _Monuments_ erected in Honour of deceased _Heroes_, altho' a _Cylinder_, or _Prism_ or _regular Solid_, may have more _original Beauty_ than a very acute _Pyramid_ or _Obelisk_, yet the latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos'd Intentions of _Stability_, and being _conspicuous_. For the same reason _Cubes_, or square _Prisms_, are generally chosen for the _Pedestals_ of _Statues_, and not any of the more _beautiful Solids_, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the Reason too, why _Columns_ or _Pillars_ look best when made a little taper from the middle or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy, and in danger of falling. VI. The like Reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of _original Beauty_, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of _Beauty_ being founded, as was above explain'd, on _Uniformity amidst Variety_, but only an Evidence, that our Sense of _Beauty_ of the _Original_ Kind may be vary'd and over-balanc'd by another kind of _Beauty_. VII. This _Beauty_ arising from Correspondence to _Intention_, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of _Beauty_ in the Works of Nature, by considering how the _Mechanism_ of the various Parts known to us, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some _System_ or _Whole_. We generally suppose the Good of the _greatest Whole_, or of _all Beings_, to have been the _Intention_ of the Author of _Nature_; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any Part of this _Design_ executed in the _Systems_ we are acquainted with. The Observations already made on this Subject are in every one's Hand, in the Treatises of our late Improvers of _mechanical Philosophy_. We shall only observe here, that every one has a certain Pleasure in seeing any Design well executed by curious _Mechanism_, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd; and also in discovering the Design to which any complex _Machine_ is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the _Machine_ before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any Design. The Arguments by which we prove _Reason_ and _Design_ in any _Cause_ from the _Beauty_ of the _Effects_, are so frequently us'd in some of the highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to inquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence. SECT. V. _Concerning our Reasonings about_ Design _and_ Wisdom _in the_ Cause, _from the_ Beauty _or_ Regularity _of_ Effects. [Sidenote: _Sense, arbitrary in its Author._] I. THERE seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of _Beauty_ with the _Uniformity_ or _Regularity_ of the Objects, from the _Nature_ of Things, antecedent to some _Constitution_ of the Author of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other _Minds_ may be so fram'd as to receive no Pleasure from _Uniformity_; and we actually find, that the same regular Forms seem not equally to please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear hereafter. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present Argument, _viz._ That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve _Uniformity_, is merely arbitrary in the Author of our Nature; and that there are an Infinity of _Tastes_ or _Relishes_ of _Beauty_ possible; so that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal or other, and appear _beautiful_ to it. And then it is plain, that from the Perception of _Beauty_ in any one Effect, we should have no Reason to conclude _Design_ in the _Cause_: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas'd with such _Irregularity_ as may be the Effect of an _undirected Force_[13]. But then, as there are an Infinity of _Forms_ possible into which any System may be reduc'd, an Infinity of _Places_ in which Animals may be situated, and an Infinity of _Relishes_ or _Senses_ in these Animals is suppos'd possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should by Chance be plac'd in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be improbable as _infinite_ to _one_ at least: And much more unreasonable is it to expect from Chance, that a Multitude of Animals agreeing in their Sense of _Beauty_ should obtain _agreeable Places_. [Footnote 13: _By_ undirected Force, _or_ undesigning Force, _is to be understood, _ That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design or Intention to produce any particular Form. _The_ Conatus ad motum, _without an actual Line of_ Direction, _seems such a gross Absurdity in the_ Cartesian Scheme, _that it is below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it. But Men have so many confus'd Notions of some_ Nature, _or_ Chance _impressing Motions without any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be useful to shew, that even this very absurd_ Postulatum, _tho' it were granted them, is insufficient to answer the Appearances in the_ Regularity _of the World: and this is what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what, to a Man of just Thought, will appear pretty obvious, that there can be no_ Thoughtless Agent, _and that_ Chance _ and_ Nature _are mere empty Names, as they are us'd on this Occasion, relative only to our Ignorance._] [Sidenote: _Undirected Force_.] II. There is also the same Probability, that in any one System of Matter an _Undirected Force_ will produce a _regular Form_, as any one given _irregular_ one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the _irregular Forms_ into which any System may be rang'd, surpass in Multitude the _Regular_, as _Infinite_ does _Unity_; for what holds in _one_ small System, will hold in a _Thousand_, a _Million_, a _Universe_, with more Advantage, _viz_. that the _irregular Forms_ possible infinitely surpass the _Regular_. For Instance, the _Area_ of an Inch _Square_ is capable of an Infinity of _regular Forms_, the _Equilateral Triangle_, the _Square_, the _Pentagon, Hexagon, Heptagon_, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an Infinity of irregular, as an Infinity of _Scalena_ for the one equilateral Triangle, an Infinity of _Trapezia_ for the one Square, of irregular _Pentagons_ for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposeing any one System agitated by _undesigning Force_, it is infinitely more probable that it will resolve itself into an _irregular Form_, than a _regular_. Thus, that a System of _six_ Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular _Hexagon_, is at least _infinite_ to Unity; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the Hazard, from a very obvious Reason. We see this confirm'd by our constant Experience, that _Regularity_ never arises from any _undesign'd Force_ of ours; and from this we conclude, that where-ever there is any _Regularity_ in the Disposition of a System capable of many other Dispositions, there must have been _Design_ in the _Cause_; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the Multiplicity of Parts imploy'd. But this Conclusion is too rash, unless some farther Proof be introduc'd; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of _Beauty_ in _Regularity_, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of _Regularity_, and seldom ever design _Irregularity_: hence we judge the same of other Beings too, _viz_. that they study _Regularity_, and presume upon _Intention_ in the _Cause_ where-ever we see it, making _Irregularity_ always a Presumption of want of _Design_: whereas if other Agents have different Senses of _Beauty_, or if they have no Sense of it at all, _Irregularity_ may as well be design'd as _Regularity_. And then let it be observ'd, that in this Case there is just the same Reason to conclude _Design_ in the Cause from any one irregular Effect, as from a regular one: for since there are an Infinity of other _Forms_ possible as well as this irregular one produc'd; and since to such a Being[14] void of a Sense of _Beauty_, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a Sense of _Beauty_, would equally prove _Design_; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphysical Consideration, that there is no proper Agent without _Design_ and _Intention_, and that every _Effect_ flows from the _Intention_ of some _Cause_. [Sidenote: _Similar Forms by Chance, impossible._] III. This however follows from the above mention'd Considerations, that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a _cubick_ Inch, as _infinite_ of the _first_ Power does _Unity_, and that this whole Mass were some way determin'd from its own Nature without any _Design_ in a _Cause_ (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into Parts whose solid Contents were each a _cubick_ Inch, and into a _prismatick_ Form whose _Base_ should always be ½ of a _square_ Inch; suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to _undirected Force_; all which we could expect from _undirected Force_ in this Case would be one equilateral _Prism_, or two perhaps: because there are an Infinity of Irregular _Prisms_ possible of the same _Base_, and _solid Content_; and when we met with many such _Prisms_, we must probably conclude them produc'd by _Design_, since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of _Hazard_. [Footnote 14: _There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention'd, and a_ Being _which has no_ Intention _for any Reason whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of_ Being, _as to the present Argument, would be the same with_ Chance, _but not the former. For tho' a Being has no Sense of_ Beauty, _he may notwithstanding be capable of_ Design, _and of_ Intention _to produce_ regular Forms; _and the Observation of greater_ Regularity _in any Number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected_ Force, _is a Presumption of_ Design _and_ Intention _in the_ Cause, _even where the_ Cause _is suppos'd to have no Sense of_ Beauty _in such Forms, since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus, supposing the_ Deity _not immediately pleas'd with_ Regularity, Uniformity, _or_ Similarity _in Bodys, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a Sense of_ Beauty _founded on these_ Qualitys. _See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section._] IV. But if this _infinite_ Mass was not determin'd to a _prismatick_ Form, we could only expect from its _casual Concourse_ one _Prism_ of any Kind, since there is an Infinity of other Solids into which the Mass might be resolv'd; and if we found any great Number of _Prisms_, we should have reason to presume _Design_: So that in a Mass of Matter as infinite of the _first_ Power, we could not from any _Concourse_ or _Agitation_ expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension and Form, we should have so much Presumption for _Design_. V. There is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the _crystallizing_ of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming: for in this we frequently see _regular Forms_ arising, tho' there is nothing suppos'd in this Affair but an _undirected Force of Attraction_. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of _Crystalliz'd_ Bodys have fix'd _regular Forms_ given them in the Constitution of _Nature_; and then it is easy to conceive how their _Attractions_ may produce _regular Forms_; but unless we suppose some preceding _Regularity_ in the Figures of _attracting_ Bodys, they can never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of _Matter_, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any _Concourse_ have produc'd any Number of _similar_ Bodys _Regular_ or _Irregular_. [Sidenote: _Combinations by Chance, impossible._] VI. And let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of _Design_ could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of _Chance_ or _undesigned Force_, after an _Infinity_ of Rencounters; even supposing a Dissolution of every Form except the _regular one_, that the Parts might be prepar'd for a new Agitation. Thus supposing we could expect _one_ equilateral _Prism_ of any _given_ Dimensions should be form'd from _undirected Force_, in an Infinity of Matter some way determin'd to resolve itself into Bodys of a _given_ solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since it is _infinite_ to _one_ after the _solid Content_ is obtain'd, that the Body shall not be _Prismatical_; and allowing it _Prismatical_, it is _infinite_ to _one_ that it shall not be _Equilateral_:) And again, supposing another Infinity of Matter determin'd to resolve it self into _Tubes_, of _Orifices_ exactly equal to the _Bases_ of the former _Prisms_, it is again at least as the _second_ Power of _Infinite_ to _Unity_, that not one of these _Tubes_ shall be both _Prismatick_ and _Equiangular_; and then if the _Tube_ were thus form'd, so as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the _Prisms_, and no more, it is _infinite_ to _one_ that they shall never meet in _infinite Space_; and should they meet, it is _infinite_ to _one_ that the _Axes_ of the _Prism_ and _Tube_ shall never happen in the same strait _Line_; and supposing they did, it is again as _infinite_ to _three_, that _Angle_ shall not meet _Angle_, so as to enter. We see then how infinitely improbable it is, "That all the Powers of _Chance_ in _infinite Matter_, agitated thro' _infinite Ages_, could ever effect this small Composition of a _Prism_ entering a _Prismatick Bore_; and, that all our Hazard for it would at most be but as _Three_ is to the _third_ Power of _Infinite_." And yet the smallest _Design_ could easily effect it. VII. May we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an absolute strict _Impossibility_, "That all the Powers of _undirected Force_ should ever effect such a complex Machine as the most imperfect _Plant_, or the meanest _Animal_, even in _one_ Instance?" For the _Improbability_ just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these _natural_ Bodys surpasses that _simple_ Combination above-mention'd. VIII. Let it be here observ'd, "That the preceding Reasoning from the _Frequency_ of _regular Bodys_ of one Form in the _Universe_, and from the _Combinations_ of various Bodys, is intirely independent on any Perception of _Beauty_; and would equally prove _Design_ in the _Cause_, altho' there were no _Being_ which perceiv'd _Beauty_ in any Form whatsoever:" for it is in short this, "_That the recurring of any Effect oftener than the Laws of Hazard determine, gives Presumption of Design; and, That Combinations which no undesign'd Force could give us Reason to expect, must necessarily prove the same; and that with superior Probability, as the Multitude of Cases in which the contrary might happen, surpass all the Cases in which this could happen_:" which appears to be in the simplest Cases at least as _Infinite_ does to _Unity_. And the Frequency of _similar irregular Forms_, or _exact Combinations_ of them, is an equal Argument of _Design_ in the _Cause_, since the _Similarity_, or exact _Combinations_ of _irregular Forms_, are as little to be expected from all the Powers of _undirected Force_, as any sort whatsoever. IX. To bring this nearer to something like a _Theorem_, altho' the _Idea_ of _Infinite_ be troublesom enough to manage in Reasoning: The Powers of _Chance_, with _infinite Matter_ in _infinite Ages_, may answer _Hazards_ as the _fifth_ Power of _Infinite_, and no more: thus the _Quantity_ of Matter may be conceiv'd as the third Power of _Infinite_, and no more, the _various Degrees_ of Force may make _another_ Power of _Infinite_, and the _Number_ of Rencounters may make the _fifth_. But this last only holds on Supposition, that after every Rencounter there is no _Cohesion_, but all is dissolv'd again for a new Concourse, except in _similar Forms_ or _exact Combinations_; which Supposition is intirely groundless, since we see _dissimilar Bodys_ cohering as strongly as any, and _rude Masses_ more than any Combinations. Now to produce any _given_ Body, in a _given_ Place or Situation, and of _given_ Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, _one_ Power of _Infinite_ at least to obtain the _Place_ or Situation; when the _Situation_ is obtain'd, the _Solid Content_ requires _another_ Power of _Infinite_ to obtain it; the _Situation_ and _Solidity_ obtain'd require, for accomplishing the _simplest given_ Shape, at least the other _three_ Powers of _Infinite_. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided _Prism_ or _Parallelopiped_; that the _Surfaces_ should be _Planes_ requires _one_ Power; that they should be _Parallel_ in this Case, or _inclin'd_ in any _given Angle_ in any other Case, requires _another_ Power of _Infinite_; and that they should be in any given _Ratio_ to each other, requires at least the _third_ Power: for in each of these Heads there is still an _Infinity_ at least of other Cases possible beside the one _given_. So that all the Powers of _Chance_ could only produce perhaps _one_ Body of every simpler Shape or Size _at most_, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one _Pyramid_, or _Cube_, or _Prism_ perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions requir'd, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more _complex Figures_, and in all _Combinations_ of Bodys, and in _similar Species_, which we never could reasonably hope from _Chance_; and therefore where we see them, we must certainly ascribe them to _Design_. [Sidenote: _Combinations of irregular Forms, equally impossible._] X. The Combinations of _regular Forms_, or of _irregular ones_ exactly adapted to each other, require such _vast_ Powers of _Infinite_ to effect them, and the Hazards of the _contrary_ Forms are so _infinitely_ numerous, that all _Probability_ or _Possibility_ of their being accomplish'd by _Chance_ seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in _Art._ vi. in this _Section_ about the _Prism_ and _Tube_, to our simplest Machines, such as _a Pair of Wheels_ of our ordinary Carriages; each _Circular_, _Spokes_ equal in _Length, Thickness, Shape_; the _Wheels_ set _parallel_, the _Axle-tree_ fix'd in the _Nave_ of both, and secured from coming out at either End: Now the Cases in which the contrary might have happen'd from _undirected Concourses_, were there no more requir'd than what is just now mention'd, must amount in Multitude to a Power of _Infinites equal_ to every Circumstance requir'd. What shall we say then of a _Plant_, a _Tree_, an _Animal_, a _Man_, with _such Multitudes_ of adapted Vessels, _such Articulations_, _Insertions_ of _Muscles_, _Diffusion_ of _Veins, Arterys, Nerves_? The _Improbability_ that such Machines arising daily in such Numbers in all Parts of the Earth with such Similarity of Structure, should be the Effect of Chance, is beyond all Conception or Expression. XI. Further, were all the former Reasoning from _Similarity_ of Forms and Combinations groundless, and could _Chance_ give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise ourselves _one_ of these Forms among an _Infinity_ of others. When we see then such a _Multitude_ of Individuals of a Species, _similar_ to each other in a great number of Parts; and when we see in each _Individual_, the corresponding Members so exactly like each other, what possible room is there left for questioning _Design_ in the _Universe_? None but the barest _Possibility_ against an inconceiveably great _Probability_, surpassing every thing which is not _strict Demonstration_. XII. This Argument, as has been already observ'd[15], is quite abstracted from any Sense of _Beauty_ in any particular Form; for the _exact Similarity_ of a hundred or a thousand _Trapezia_, proves _Design_ as well as the _Similarity_ of _Squares_, since both are equally above all the Powers of _undirected Force_ or _Chance_; and what is above the Powers of _Chance_, must give us proportionable Presumption for _Design_. [Footnote 15: See above, Art. viii.] Thus, allowing that a _Leg_, or _Arm_, or _Eye_, might have been the Effect of _Chance_, (which was shewn to be _most absurd_, and next to absolutely _impossible_) that it should not have a corresponding _Leg_, _Arm_, _Eye_, exactly _similar_, must be a Hazard of a Power of _Infinite_ proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the Multitude of Cases increas'd, in which it would not have a corresponding Member _similar_; so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the _twentieth_ or _thirtieth_ Power of _Infinite_ to _Unity_, that the corresponding Part should not be _similar_. What shall we say then of the _similar Forms_ of a whole _Species_? [Sidenote: _Gross Similarity by Chance, impossible._] XIII. If it be objected, "That _natural_ Bodys are not _exactly similar_, but only _grossly so_ to our Senses; as that a _Vein_, an _Artery_, a _Bone_ is not perhaps exactly _similar_ to its Correspondent in the same Animal, tho' it appears so to our Senses, which judge only of the Bulk, and do not discern the small constituent Parts; and that in the several Individuals of a Species the _Dissimilarity_ is always sensible, often in the internal Structure, and always in the external Appearance:" To remove this Objection it will be sufficient to shew, "That the Multitude of Cases wherein _sensible Dissimilitude_ could have happen'd, are still infinitely more than all the Cases in which _sensible Similitude_ might be retained:" so that the same Reasoning holds from _sensible Similarity_, as from the _mathematically exact_: And again, "That the Cases of _gross Dissimilarity_ do in the same manner surpass the Cases of _gross Similarity_ possible, as _infinite_ does _one_." XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance. Suppose a _Trapezium_ of a foot Square in _Area_ should appear grosly _similar_ to another, while no one _Side_ differs, by 1/10 of an Inch; or no _Angle_ in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten Minutes: now this tenth of an Inch is _infinitely_ divisible, as are also the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of _insensible Dissimilarity_ under _apparent Similarity_ are really _Infinite_. But then it is also plain that there are an _Infinity_ of different sensibly dissimilar _Trapezia_, even of the same _Area_, according as we vary a _Side_ by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and so on, and vary the _Angles_ and another _Side_ so as to keep the _Area_ equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of _sensible Dissimilitude_ the several Tenths are _infinitely_ divisible as well as in then first Case; so that the Multitude of _sensible Dissimilaritys_ are to the Multitude of _insensible Dissimilaritys_ under apparent Resemblance, still as the _second_ Power of _Infinite_ to the _first_, or as _Infinite_ to _Unity_. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible _sensible Dissimilaritys_ in such complex Bodys as _Legs_, _Arms_, _Eyes_, _Arterys_, _Veins_, _Skeletons_? XV. As to the _Dissimilaritys_ of Animals of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of _gross Dissimilarity_ are Infinite; and then every Case of gross _Dissimilarity_ contains also all the Cases of _insensible Dissimilarity_. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species _grosly similar_, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a Third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of sensibly different _gross Dissimilaritys_ possible, and then in each of these Cases of _gross Dissimilarity_, there are an Infinity of Cases of _nicer Dissimilarity_, since 1/3 of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but easy Instance; two _Cockle-Shells_ which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of _insensible Differences_, but still there are an Infinity of possible _sensible Differences_; and then in any one of the _sensibly different_ Forms, there may be the same Infinity of _insensible Differences_ beside the _sensible one_: So that still the Hazard for even _gross Similarity_ from _Chance_ is _Infinite_ to _one_, and this always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even _gross Similarity_ is retain'd; since the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in which _sensible Dissimilarity_ may happen; and this Infinity combin'd with the infinite Cases of the former Parts, raises the Hazard by a Power of Infinite. Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the _Cartesian_ or _Epicurean Hypothesis_, even granting their _Postulatum_ of _undirected Force_ impress'd on _Infinite Matter_; and seems almost a Demonstration of _Design_ in the _Universe_. XVI. One Objection more remains to be remov'd, _viz_. "That some imagine, this Argument may hold better _à Priori_ than _à Posteriori_; that is, we have better Reason to believe, when we see a _Cause_ about to act, without Knowledge, that he will not attain any given, or desir'd _End_; than we have on the other hand to believe, when we see the _End_ actually attain'd, that he acted with Knowledge: Thus, say they, when a particular Person is about to draw a Ticket in a _Lottery_, where there is but one _Prize_ to a thousand _Blanks_, it is highly probable that he shall draw a _Blank_; but suppose we have seen him actually draw for himself the _Prize_, we have no ground to conclude that he had _Knowledge_ or _Art_ to accomplish this End." But the Answer is obvious: In such Contrivances we generally have, from the very Circumstances of the Lottery, very strong moral Arguments, which almost demonstrate that _Art_ can have no Place; so that a Probability of a _thousand_ to _one_, may not surmount those Arguments: But let the Probability be increas'd, and it will soon surmount all Arguments to the contrary. For instance, If we saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would question whether he us'd _Art_ or not: much less would we imagine it were _Chance_, if we saw a Man draw for his own Gain successively a hundred, or a thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater Number of Blanks. Now in the Works of _Nature_ the Case is intirely different: we have not the least Argument against _Art_ or _Design_. An _Intelligent Cause_ is surely at least as probable a Notion as _Chance_, _general Force_, _Conatus ad Motum_, or the _Clinamen Principiorum_, to account for any Effect whatsoever: And then all the _Regularity_, _Combinations_, _Similaritys_ of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was _Design_ and _Intelligence_ in the Cause of this Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all _Art_ in drawing is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly improbable. [Sidenote: _Irregularity does not prove want of Design._] XVII. Let it be here observ'd also, "That a _rational Agent_ may be capable of impressing Force without intending to produce any particular Form, and of designedly producing _irregular_ or _dissimilar Forms_, as well as _regular_ and _similar_:" And hence it follows, "That altho' all the _Regularity_, _Combination_ and _Similarity_ in the _Universe_, are Presumptions of _Design_, yet _Irregularity_ is no Presumption of the contrary; unless we suppose that the _Agent_ is determin'd from a Sense of _Beauty_ always to act _regularly_, and delight in _Similarity_; and that he can have no other inconsistent Motive of Action:" Which last is plainly absurd. We do not want in the _Universe_ many Effects which seem to have been left to the general _Laws_ of _Motion_ upon some great _Impulse_, and have many Instances where _Similarity_ has been plainly design'd in some respects, and probably neglected in others; or even _Dissimilarity_ design'd. Thus we see the _general exact Resemblance_ between the two _Eyes_ of most Persons; and yet perhaps no other third _Eye_ in the World is _exactly_ like them. We see a _gross Conformity_ of Shape in all Persons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two _Individuals_ of any Species are undistinguishable; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purposes to the whole Species. [Sidenote: _Wisdom_, _Prudence_.] XVIII. Hitherto the Proof amounts only to _Design_ or _Intention_, barely, in Opposition to _blind Force_ or _Chance_; and we see the Proof of this is independent on _the arbitrary Constitution of our internal Sense of Beauty_. _Beauty_ is often suppos'd an Argument of more than _Design_, to wit, _Wisdom_ and _Prudence_ in the _Cause_. Let us inquire also into this. Wisdom denotes _the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means_; and therefore, before we can from any Effect prove the _Cause_ to be _wise_, we must know what is _best_ to the _Cause_ or _Agent_. Among Men who have Pleasure in contemplating _Uniformity_, the _Beauty_ of Effects is an Argument of Wisdom, because this is good to them; but the same Argument would not hold as to a _Being void_ of this _Sense_ of _Beauty_. And therefore the _Beauty_ apparent to us in _Nature_, will not of itself prove _Wisdom_ in the _Cause_, unless this _Cause_ or Author of _Nature_ be suppos'd Benevolent; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or _Good_ to the Supreme Cause; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his _Wisdom_. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of _Beauty_ produc'd in _Nature_, and expos'd to the View of any _rational Agents_; since upon Supposition of a _Benevolent_ Deity, all the apparent _Beauty_ produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a _Benevolent Design_, to give them the Pleasures of _Beauty_. But what more immediately proves _Wisdom_ is this; When we see any Machine with a great Complication of Parts actually obtaining an _End_, we justly conclude, "That since this could not have been the Effect of _Chance_, it must have been _intended_ for that _End_, which is obtain'd by it;" and then the _Ends_ or _Intentions_ being in part known, the Complication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted to this _End_, is an Evidence "of a _comprehensive large Understanding_ in the _Cause_, according to the Multiplicity of Parts, and the Appositeness of their Structure, even when we do not know the _Intention_ of the _Whole_." [Sidenote: _General Causes_.] XIX. There is another kind of _Beauty_ from which we conclude Wisdom the Cause, as well as Design, _when we see many useful or beautiful Effects flowing from one general Cause_. There is a very good Reason for this Conclusion among Men. _Interest_ must lead _Beings_ of limited Powers, who are uncapable of a great Diversity of Operations, and distracted by them, to choose this _frugal Oeconomy_ of their Forces, and to look upon such Management as an Evidence of _Wisdom_ in other _Beings_ like themselves. Nor is this speculative Reason all which influences them; for even beside this Consideration of _Interest_, they are determin'd by a _Sense of Beauty_, where that Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the Productions of other _Agents_ about whose Oeconomy we are not solicitous. Thus, who does not approve of it as a Perfection in _Clock-work_, that three or four Motions of the _Hour_, _Minute_, and _second Hands_, and _monthly Plate_, should arise from _one Spring_ or _Weight_, rather than from three or four _Springs_ or _Weights_, in a very compound Machine, which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the same Purposes with equal Exactness? Now the Foundation of this _Beauty_ plainly appears to be an _Uniformity_, or _Unity_ of _Cause_ amidst _Diversity_ of Effects. [Sidenote: _General Laws_.] XX. We shall[16] hereafter offer some Reasons, why the Author of _Nature_ may choose to operate in this manner by _General Laws_ and _Universal extensive Causes_, altho' the Reason just now mention'd does not hold with an _Almighty Being_. This is certain, That we have some of the most delightful Instances of _Universal Causes_ in the _Works_ of _Nature_, and that the most studious Men in these Subjects are so delighted with the Observation of them, that they always look upon them as Evidences of _Wisdom_ in the Administration of _Nature_, from a Sense of Beauty. [Footnote 16: See the last _Section_.] XXI. The wonderfully simple _Mechanism_ which performs all Animal Motions, was mention'd[17] already; nor is _that_ of the inanimate Parts of _Nature_, less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one Principle of _Heat_, deriv'd to us from the _Sun_, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is the Cause of _Rains_, _Springs_, _Rivers_, _Winds_, and the universal Cause of _Vegetation_! The _uniform Principle of Gravity_ preserves at once the _Planets_ in their _Orbits_, gives _Cohesion_ to the Parts of each _Globe_, and _Stability_ to _Mountains_, _Hills_, and _artificial Structures_; it raises the _Sea_ in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their Channels; it drains the _Earth_ of its superfluous Moisture, by _Rivers_; it raises the _Vapours_ by its Influence on the _Air_, and brings them down again in _Rains_; it gives an _uniform Pressure_ to our _Atmosphere_, necessary to our Bodys in general, and more especially to _Inspiration_ in _Breathing_; and furnishes us with an _universal Movement_, capable of being apply'd in innumerable Engines. How incomparably more _beautiful_ is this Structure, than if we suppos'd so many _distinct Volitions_ in the Deity, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually flow from the _general Law_! We may rashly imagine that this latter manner of Operation might have been more useful to us; and it would have been no Distraction to _Omnipotence_: But then the great _Beauty_ had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the Contemplation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would rather choose to run the Hazard of its _casual Evils_, than part with that _harmonious Form_, which has been an unexhausted Source of Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages. [Footnote 17: See above, _Sect. ii. Art. 8_.] [Sidenote: _Miracles._] XXII. Hence we see, "That however _Miracles_ may prove the Superintendency of a _voluntary Agent_, and that the _Universe_ is not guided by _Necessity_ or _Fate_, yet that _Mind_ must be _weak_ and _inadvertent_, which needs them to confirm the Belief of a _Wise_ and Good Deity; since the Deviation from _general Laws_, unless upon very extraordinary Occasions, must be a Presumption of _Inconstancy_ and _Weakness_, rather than of _steady Wisdom_ and _Power_, and must weaken the best Arguments we can have for the _Sagacity_ and _Power_ of the _universal_ Mind." SECT. VI. _Of the_ Universality _of the_ Sense of Beauty _among_ Men. [Sidenote: _Internal Sense not an immediate Source of Pain_.] I. We before[18] insinuated, "That all _Beauty_ has a relation to some _perceiving Power_;" and consequently since we know not how great a _Variety_ of Senses there may be among Animals, there is no Form in _Nature_ concerning which we can pronounce, "That it has no _Beauty_;" for it may still please some _perceiving Power_. But our _Inquiry_ is confin'd to Men; and before we examine the _Universality_ of this _Sense of Beauty_, or their Agreement in approving _Uniformity_, it may be proper to consider, "Whether, as the other _Senses_ which give us Pleasure, do also give us Pain, so this _Sense of Beauty_ does make some Objects disagreeable to us, and the Occasion of Pain." [Footnote 18: See above _Sect. i. Art. 17; Sect. iv. Art. 1._] That many Objects give no pleasure to our _Sense_ is obvious; many are certainly void of _Beauty_: But then there is no Form which seems necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no other Evil from it, and compare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects are naturally displeaseing, and distasteful to our _external Senses_, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as _Smells_, _Tastes_, and some separate _Sounds_: but as to our _Sense of Beauty_, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of itself, had we never observ'd any thing better of the Kind. _Deformity_ is only _the Absence of Beauty_, or _Deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species_: Thus _bad Musick_ pleases _Rusticks_ who never heard any better, and the _finest Ear_ is not offended with _tuning_ of Instruments, if it be not too tedious, where no _Harmony_ is expected; and yet much smaller _Dissonancy_ shall offend amidst the Performance, where _Harmony_ is expected. A _rude Heap_ of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas'd with _Irregularity_ in _Architecture_, where _Beauty_ was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we now call _ugly_ or _deform'd_, and had we never seen or expected greater _Beauty_, we should have receiv'd no Disgust from it, altho' the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our _Sense of Beauty_ seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not a positive Pain or Disgust, any farther than what arises from Disappointment. [Sidenote: _Approbation and Dislike from Associations of Ideas._] II. There are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is generally not from any Deformity which of itself is positively displeasing, but either from want of _expected Beauty_, or much more from their carrying some natural Indications of _morally bad Dispositions_, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in _Countenances_, _Airs_, and _Gestures_. That this is not occasion'd by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon long Acquaintance we are sure of finding _Sweetness of Temper_, _Humanity and Chearfulness_, altho' the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas, if any thing were naturally disagreeable, or the Occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, it would always continue so, even altho' the Aversion we might have toward it were counter-balanc'd by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais'd by some Objects, which are only the Effect of _Fear_ for ourselves, or _Compassion_ towards others, when either _Reason_, or some foolish _Association of Ideas_, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form itself: for we find that most of those Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the Occasions of Pleasure; as _ravenous Beasts_, a _tempestuous Sea_, a _craggy Precipice_, a _dark shady Valley_. [Sidenote: _Associations_.] III. We shall see[19] hereafter, "That _Associations of Ideas_ make Objects pleasant and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such Pleasures; and the same way, the _casual Conjunctions of Ideas_ may give a Disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the Form itself." And this is the Occasion of many fantastick Aversions to Figures of some Animals, and to some other Forms: Thus _Swine_, _Serpents_ of all Kinds, and some _Insects_ really beautiful enough, are beheld with Aversion by many People, who have got _some accidental Ideas associated_ to them. And for _Distastes_ of this Kind, no other Account can be given. [Footnote 19: See below _Art_. 11, 12. of this Section.] [Sidenote: _Universality of this Sense_.] IV. But as to the _universal Agreement_ of Mankind in their _Sense of Beauty_ from _Uniformity amidst Variety_, we must consult Experience: and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of understanding simple Arguments, tho' few are capable of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove _this Sense of Beauty universal_, "if all Men are better pleas'd with _Uniformity_ in the simpler Instances than _the contrary_, even when there is no Advantage observ'd attending it; and likewise if all Men, according as their Capacity inlarges, so as to receive and compare more complex Ideas, have a greater Delight in _Uniformity_, and are pleas'd with its more complex Kinds, both _Original_ and _Relative_." Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of _this Sense_ in the simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances of _Harmony_, because, as soon as we find an _Ear_ incapable of relishing complex Compositions, such as our _Tunes_ are, no farther Pains are employ'd about such. But in _Figures_, did ever any Man make choice of a _Trapezium_, or any irregular _Curve_, for the _Ichnography_ or Plan of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of Convenience? or to make the opposite Walls _not parallel_, or _unequal_ in Height? Were ever _Trapeziums_, irregular _Polygons_ or _Curves_ chosen for the Forms of _Doors_ or _Windows_, tho' these Figures might have answer'd the Uses as well, and would have often sav'd a great Part of the Time, Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ'd in suiting the Stones and Timber to the _regular_ Forms? Among all the fantastick Modes of _Dress_, none was ever quite void of _Uniformity_, if it were only in _the Resemblance_ of the two Sides of the same _Robe_, and in _some general Aptitude_ to the human Form. The _Pictish Painting_ had always _relative Beauty_, by Resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects were _originally beautiful_: however justly we might here apply Horace's Censure of impertinent Descriptions in _Poetry_, _Sed non erat his locus_----[20]. But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by _the casual spilling_ of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd with an _Inequality_ of Heights in _Windows_ of the same Range, or _dissimilar Shapes_ of them? with _unequal Legs_ or _Arms_, _Eyes_ or _Cheeks_ in a _Mistress_? It must however be acknowledg'd, "That _Interest_ may often counterbalance our _Sense of Beauty_, in this Affair as well as in others, and superior good Qualitys may make us overlook such Imperfections." [Footnote 20: Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.] [Sidenote: _Real Beauty alone pleases_.] V. Nay farther, it may perhaps appear, "That _Regularity_ and _Uniformity_ are so copiously diffus'd thro' the _Universe_, and we are so readily determin'd to pursue _this_ as the Foundation of _Beauty_ in _Works_ of _Art_, that there is scarcely any thing ever fansy'd as _Beautiful_, where there is not really something of this _Uniformity_ and _Regularity_." We are indeed often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible _Beauty_, where it is but very imperfect; but still it is some Degree of _Beauty_ which pleases, altho' there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and our _Sense_ acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho' we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more. A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the _Architecture_ of his Country to be the most perfect: and a _Conjunction_ of some _hostile Ideas_, may make him have an Aversion to _Roman Buildings_, and study to demolish them, as some of our _Reformers_ did the _Popish Buildings_, not being able to separate the Ideas of the superstitious Worship from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practised: and yet it is still _real Beauty_ which pleases the Goth, founded upon _Uniformity amidst Variety_. For the _Gothick Pillars_ are _uniform_ to each other, not only in their _Sections_, which are _Lozenge-form'd_; but also in their _Heights_ and _Ornaments_: Their _Arches_ are not one _uniform Curve_, but yet they are _Segments_ of _similar Curves_, and generally equal in the same Ranges. The very _Indian Buildings_ have some kind of _Uniformity_, and many of the Eastern Nations, tho' they differ much from us, yet have great _Regularity_ in their Manner, as well as the Romans in their. Our _Indian Screens_, which wonderfully supply our Imaginations with Ideas of Deformity, in which _Nature_ is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the _Beauty_ arising from Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to _Nature_; and yet they cannot divest themselves of all _Beauty_ and _Uniformity_ in the separate Parts: And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give some wild Pleasure from _Variety_, since some _Uniformity_ to the human Shape is still retained. [Sidenote: _History pleases in like manner._] VI. There is one sort of _Beauty_ which might perhaps have been better mention'd before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste or Relish of it is _universal_ in all Nations, and with the Young as well as the Old, and that is the _Beauty_ of _History_. Every one knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of _Gazettes_, which shall perhaps relate all the same Events with the _Historian_: The superior Pleasure then of _History_ must arise, like that of _Poetry_, from the _Manners_; when we see a _Character_ well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an _Interest of State_ laid open, or an _artful View_ nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very different and opposite Actions as the Circumstances may alter. Now this reduces the whole to an _Unity_ of Design at least: And this may be observ'd in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we cannot make them relish them. VII. What has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquirys into the _Universality_ of the _Sense of Beauty_, "That there may be _real Beauty_, where there is not the _greatest_; and that there are an Infinity of different Forms which may all have some _Unity_, and yet differ from each other." So that Men may have different Fancys of _Beauty_, and yet _Uniformity_ be the _universal Foundation_ of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as _Beautiful_. And we shall find that it is so in the _Architecture_, _Gardening_, _Dress_, _Equipage_, and _Furniture_ of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where _Uniformity_ still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasure of the Contemplation of it. [Sidenote: _Diversity of Judgments concerning our Senses_.] VIII. It will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the _internal_ and _external Senses_. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. Locke have rejected _innate Ideas_, than to alledge, "That all our Relish for _Beauty_ and _Order_, is either from Prospect of _Advantage_, _Custom_, or _Education_," for no other Reason but the _Variety_ of _Fancys_ in the World: and from this they conclude, "That our _Fancys_ do not arise from any _natural Power of Perception_, or _Sense_." And yet all allow our _external Senses_ to be _Natural_, and that the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas'd or diminish'd by _Custom_ or _Education_, and counter-balanc'd by _Interest_, yet are really antecedent to _Custom_, _Habit_, _Education_, or Prospect of _Interest_. Now it is certain, "That there is at least as great a Variety of Fancys about their Objects, as the Objects of _Beauty_:" Nay, it is much more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancys or Relishes of the _external Senses_ to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the _Agreeable_ or _Disagreeable_: and yet we all allow, "that these are _natural_ Powers of _Perception_." [Sidenote: _The Reason of it._] IX. The Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this, That we have got distinct Names for the _external Senses_, and none, or very few, for the _Internal_; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, to look upon the former as some way more _fix'd_, and _real_, and _natural_, than the latter. The _Sense_ of _Harmony_ has got its Name, _viz._ a _good Ear_; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a _natural_ Power of _Perception_, or _a Sense_ some way distinct from _Hearing_: now it is certain, "That there is as necessary a Perception of _Beauty_ upon the Presence of _regular Objects_, as of _Harmony_ upon hearing certain _Sounds_." [Sidenote: _An internal Sense does not presuppose innate ideas._] X. But let it be observ'd here once for all, "That an _internal Sense_ no more presupposes an _innate Idea_, or Principle of Knowledge, than the _external_." Both are _natural_ Powers of _Perception_, or _Determinations_ of _the Mind_ to receive necessarily certain Ideas from the Presence of Objects. The _Internal Sense_ is, a _passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety_. Nor does there seem any thing more difficult in this matter, than that the Mind should be always determin'd to receive the Idea of _Sweet_, when Particles of such a Form enter the Pores of the Tongue; or to have the Idea of _Sound_ upon any quick Undulation of the Air. The one seems to have as little Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the _same Power_ could with equal Ease constitute the former the Occasion of Ideas, as the latter. [Sidenote: _Associations Cause of Disagreement._] XI. The _Association_ of Ideas[21] above hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancys in the _Sense of Beauty_, as well as in the _external Senses_, and often makes Men have an Aversion to Objects of _Beauty_, and a Liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions than those of _Beauty_ or _Deformity_. And here it may not be improper to give some Instances of some of these _Associations_. The _Beauty_ of _Trees_, their _cool Shades_, and their _Aptness_ to conceal from Observation, have made _Groves_ and _Woods_ the usual Retreat to those who love _Solitude_, especially to the _Religious_, the _Pensive_, the _Melancholy_, and the _Amorous_. And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the _Heathen Priests_ might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their _Deitys_; and hence we join Ideas of something _Divine_ to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our _Churches_, from the perpetual Use of them only in _religious Exercises_. The faint Light in _Gothick Buildings_ has had the same Association of a very foreign Idea, which our _Poet_ shews in his _Epithet_, [Footnote 21: See above _Art._ 3. of this Section.] ----_A dim religious Light_[22]. In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of _Actions_, or _Places_, or _Dresses_ of Persons, or _Voice_, or _Song_, which have occurr'd at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any Passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur. And this is often the occasion both of great Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Aversion to many Objects, which of themselves might have been perfectly indifferent to us: but these _Approbations_, or _Distastes_, are remote from the Ideas of _Beauty_, being plainly different Ideas. [Footnote 22: Milt. Il Penseroso.] [Sidenote: _Musick, how it pleases differently_.] XII. There is also another Charm in _Musick_ to various Persons, which is distinct from the _Harmony_, and is occasion'd by its raising agreeable Passions. The _human Voice_ is obviously vary'd by all the stronger Passions; now, when our _Ear_ discerns any Resemblance between the _Air_ of a _Tune_, whether sung or play'd upon an Instrument, either in its _Time_, or _Modulation_, or any other Circumstance, to the Sound of the _human Voice_, in any Passion, we shall be touch'd by it in a very sensible manner, and have _Melancholy_, _Joy_, _Gravity_, _Thoughtfulness_, excited in us by a sort of _Sympathy_ or _Contagion_. The same Connexion is observable between the very _Air_ of a _Tune_, and the _Words_ expressing any Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to us together, tho' but one of them affects our _Senses_. Now in such a Diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas, which may be join'd with Forms of _Bodys_, or _Tunes_, when Men are of such different Dispositions, and prone to such a Variety of Passions, it is no Wonder, "that they should often disagree in their Fancys of Objects, even altho' their _Sense of Beauty_ and _Harmony_ were _perfectly uniform_;" because many other Ideas may either please or displease, according to Persons Tempers, and past Circumstances. We know how agreeable a very _wild Country_ may be to any Person who has spent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very _beautiful Places_ may be, if they were the Scenes of his Misery. And this may help us in many Cases to account for the Diversitys of Fancy, without denying the _Uniformity_ of our _internal Sense of Beauty_. XIII. Grandeur and _Novelty_ are two Ideas different from _Beauty_, which often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to the present Subject. See _Spectator_, N^{o} 412. SECT. VII. _Of the Power of_ Custom, Education, _and_ Example, _as to our_ internal Senses. I. Custom, _Education_, and _Example_ are so often alledg'd in this Affair, as the Occasion of our Relish for _beautiful Objects_, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in, a certain _Conduct in Life_ in a _moral_ Species, that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear, "that there is a _natural_ Power of _Perception_, or _Sense of Beauty_ in Objects, antecedent to all _Custom, Education_, or _Example_." [Sidenote: _Custom gives no new Sense_.] II. Custom, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to Actions, it only gives a Disposition to the Mind or Body more easily to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated; but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View, than what we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of _Fear_, and _Dread_ of any powerful _Presence_; and so _Custom_ may connect the Ideas of religious _Horror_ to certain Buildings: but _Custom_ could never have made a _Being_ naturally incapable of _Fear_, receive such Ideas. So, had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were _advantageous_ or _disadvantageous_, _Custom_ could only have made us more ready at perceiving the _Advantage_ or _Disadvantage_ of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose. As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects; When the _Blood_ or _Spirits_, of which _Anatomists_ talk, are rous'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner, by Medicine or Nutriment; or any _Glands_ frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain, that to preserve the Body easy, we shall delight in Objects of Taste, which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to it, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body had been _accustom'd_ to. Farther, _Custom_ will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations, will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but _Custom_ can never give us any Idea of a Sense different from those we had antecedent to it: It will never make the _Blind_ approve Objects as _coloured_, or those who have no _Taste_ approve Meats as _delicious_, however they might approve them as _strengthening_ or _exhilarating_. Were our _Glands_, and the Parts about them, void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the _Blood_, _Custom_ could never make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So, by like Reasoning, had we no _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ from _Uniformity_, _Custom_ could never have made us imagine any _Beauty_ in Objects; if we had had no Ear, Custom could never have given us the Pleasures of _Harmony_. When we have these _natural Senses_ antecedently, _Custom_ may make us capable of extending our Views farther, and of receiving more complex Ideas of _Beauty_ in Bodys, or _Harmony_ in Sounds, by increasing our Attention, and Quickness of Perception. But however _Custom_ may increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of _Beauty_, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how is it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as Milton[23] represents our _Ancestor_ in, upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene. [Footnote 23: See _Paradise Lost_, Book 8.] Custom in like manner may make it easier for any Person to discern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as _advantageous_; but he would never have imagin'd it _beautiful_, had he no _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_. _Custom_ may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of complex _Theorems_, but we all find the Pleasure or _Beauty_ of _Theorems_ as strong at first as ever. _Custom_ makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated _Uniformity_, which escapes the Observation of _Novices_ in any Art; but all this presupposes a _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ in _Uniformity_: for, had there been nothing in Forms, which was constituted the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or Pain, _Beauty_ or _Deformity_, could ever have made them grow pleasing or displeasing. [Sidenote: _Nor Education_.] III. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false; and are often led to believe, that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, which in reality have no such Qualitys. And farther, by _Education_ there are some strong Associations of Ideas without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by Design, which it is very hard for us ever after to break asunder. Thus Aversions are rais'd to Darkness, and to many kinds of Meat, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all these Instances, _Education_ never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not _naturally_ Senses capable of perceiving. We know what Sickness of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe, that very healthful Meats will raise this; we by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally _blind_ prejudic'd against Objects as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they perhaps hear Men dispraise one Colour, and may imagine this Colour to be some quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses, but that is all. And the same way, a Man naturally void of _Taste_ could by no _Education_ receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic'd in favour of Meats as delicious: So, had we no _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_, we could never be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds as _beautiful_ or _harmonious_. _Education_ may make an unattentive Goth imagine that his _Countrymen_ have attain'd the Perfection of _Architecture_; and an Aversion to their Enemys the Romans, may have join'd some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd these Prejudices, had he been void of a _Sense_ of _Beauty_. Did ever _blind Men_ debate whether _Purple_ or _Scarlet_ were the finer _Colour_? or could any _Education_ prejudice them in favour of either as _Colours_? Thus _Education_ and _Custom_ may influence our _internal Senses_, where they are antecedently, by inlarging the Capacity of our Minds to retain and compare the Parts of complex Compositions: And then, if the finest Objects are presented to us, we grow conscious of a Pleasure far superior to what common Performances excite. But all this presupposes our _Sense_ of _Beauty_ to be _natural_. Instruction in _Anatomy_, Observation of _Nature_, and of those _Airs_ of the Countenance, and _Attitudes_ of Body, which accompany any _Sentiment_, _Action_, or _Passion_, may enable us to know where there is a just Imitation: but why should an exact Imitation please upon Observation, if we had not _naturally_ a _Sense_ of _Beauty_ in it, more than the observing the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at random? and should we observe them ever so often, we should never dream of their growing _beautiful_. [Sidenote: _Prejudices how removed_.] IV. There is something worth our Observation as to the manner of rooting out the _Prejudices_ of _Education_, not quite foreign to the present Purpose. When the _Prejudice_ arises from Associations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force ourselves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus, Opinions of _Superstition_ are best remov'd by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their _Virtue_, or by observing that they despise such Opinions. But when the _Prejudice_ arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of _natural Evil_, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the _Evil_ be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials, without receiving any Damage, will remove the _Prejudice_, as in that against _Meats_: But where the _Evil_ is not represented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at some time or other accompany the Use of the Object, there must be frequent Reasoning with ourselves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the _Prejudice_; such is the Case of our Fear of _Spirits_ in the _Dark_, and in _Church-yards_. And when the _Evil_ is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a _future State_, it is then hardest of all to remove the _Prejudice_; and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of _superstitious Prejudices_ against Actions apprehended as offensive to the Deity; and hence it is that they are so hard to be rooted out. [Sidenote: _Example not the Cause of internal Sense_.] V. Example seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we act very much for _Pleasure_, or _private Good_; and are thereby led to imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some _Perfection_ in the Objects which we see others pursue, and _Evil_ in those which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the _Example_ of others may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of _Evil_ in Objects to which we had an Aversion. But all this is done upon an Apprehension of Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which we have; for no _Example_ will induce the _Blind_ or _Deaf_ to pursue Objects as _colour'd_ or _sonorous_; nor could _Example_ any more engage us to pursue Objects as _beautiful_ or _harmonious_, had we no _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ or _Harmony_. Example may make us conclude without Examination, that our Countrymen have obtain'd the Perfection of _Beauty_ in their _Works_, or that there is less _Beauty_ in the Orders of _Architecture_ or _Painting_, us'd in other _Nations_, and so content ourselves with very imperfect Forms. And Fear of Contempt as void of _Taste_ or _Genius_, often makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have _naturally_ a fine _Genius_, or the _internal Senses_ very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad _Taste_ pretend to a livelier Perception of _Beauty_ than in reality they have: But all this presupposes some _natural Power_ of receiving Ideas of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_. Nor can _Example_ effect any thing farther, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by those of a good _Taste_ in such Affairs. SECT. VIII. _Of the_ Importance _of the_ internal Senses _in Life_, _and the_ final Causes _of them_. [Sidenote: _Importance of the_ internal Senses.] I. The busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but a little Reflection will convince us, "That the Gratifications of our _internal Senses_ are as _natural_, _real_, and _satisfying_ Enjoyments as any sensible Pleasure whatsoever; and that they are the chief Ends for which we commonly pursue _Wealth_ and _Power_." For how is _Wealth_ or _Power advantageous_? How do they make us _happy_, or prove _good_ to us? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to our _Senses_, or Facultys of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these _Senses_ or Facultys only the _external ones_? No: Every body sees, that a small portion of _Wealth_ or _Power_ will supply more Pleasures of the _external Senses_ than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloys that Appetite which is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment: and hence the _Poet's_ Advice is perfectly just; ----Tu pulmentaria quære Sudando----[24] In short, the only Use of a great Fortune above a very small one (except in _good Offices_, and _moral Pleasures_) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of _Beauty_, _Order_, and _Harmony_. It is true indeed, that the noblest Pleasures of the _internal Senses_, in the Contemplation of the Works of Nature, are expos'd to every one without Expence; the _Poor_ and the _Low_, may have as free Use of these Objects, in this way, as the _Wealthy_ or _Powerful_. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the _Property_ is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy'd by others beside the _Proprietor_. But then there are other Objects of these _internal Senses_, which require _Wealth_ or _Power_ to procure the Use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in _Architecture_, _Musick_, _Gardening_, _Painting_, _Dress_, _Equipage_, _Furniture_; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without _Property_. And there are some confus'd _Imaginations_, which often lead us to pursue _Property_, even in Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These are the _ultimate Motives_ of our pursuing the greater Degrees of _Wealth_, where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions. [Footnote 24: Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.] That is confirm'd by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these _Senses_. As soon as they think they are got above the _World_, or extricated from the Hurrys of _Avarice_ and _Ambition_; banish'd _Nature_ will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of _Beauty_ and _Order_ in their _Houses_, _Gardens_, _Dress_, _Table_, _Equipage_. They are never easy without some Degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we should see _Regularity_, _Decency_, _Beauty_, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or to their Posterity; and what their Imagination is always presenting to them as the possible Effects of their Labours. Nor without this could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves. There may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted into a thorow _Miser_, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold dull Thought of Possession; but such an Instance in an Age, must not be made the Standard of Mankind against the whole Body. If we examine the Pursuits of the _Luxurious_, who is imagin'd wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as _fine Attendants_, _regular Apartments_, _Services of Plate_, and the like. Besides, a large Share of the Preparation must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, to please _Acquaintance_, _Strangers_, _Parasites_. How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these _internal Sensations_ may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquirys about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, "That they employ us more, and are more efficacious in _Life_, either to our _Pleasure_ or _Uneasiness_, than all our _external Senses_ taken together." [Sidenote: _Final Cause of the internal Senses_.] II. As to the _final Causes_ of this _internal Sense_, we need not inquire, "Whether, to an _Almighty_, and _All-knowing Being_, there be any real Excellence in _regular Forms_, in acting by _general Laws_, in knowing by _Theorems_?" We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions any way; nor need we inquire, "Whether other Animals may not discern _Uniformity_ and _Regularity_ in Objects which escape our Observation, and may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as to perceive _Beauty_ from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects which our Senses are not fit to examine or compare?" We shall confine ourselves to a Subject where we have some certain Foundation to go upon, and only inquire, "if we can find any Reasons worthy of the great Author of _Nature_, for making such a Connection between regular Objects, and the Pleasure which accompanys our Perceptions of them; or, what Reasons might possibly influence him to create the _World_, as it at present is, as far as we can observe, every-where full of _Regularity_ and _Uniformity_." Let it be here observ'd, that as far as we know concerning any of the great Bodys of the _Universe_, we see Forms and Motions really _beautiful_ to our Senses; and if we were plac'd in any _Planet_, the _apparent Courses_ would still be _regular_ and _uniform_, and consequently _beautiful_ to us. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same manner adapted to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours are here, their Senses must be upon the same general Foundation with ours. But to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be contain'd in the following Propositions. 1. The Manner of Knowledge by _universal Theorems_, and of Operation by _universal Causes_, as far as we can attain it, must be most convenient for _Beings_ of limited Understanding and Power; since this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro' the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and consequently their _Reason_, without any _Sense_ of _Beauty_, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent _Advantage_. 2. Those Objects of Contemplation in which there is _Uniformity amidst Variety_, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd, than _irregular Objects_; because the accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from a _Pillar_ or two, with an intermediate _Arch_, and _Cornice_, form a distinct Idea of a whole _regular Building_, if we know of what Species it is, and have its Length and Breadth: From a _Side_ and _solid Angle_, we have the whole _regular Solid_; the measuring one _Side_, gives the whole _Square_; one _Radius_, the whole _Circle_; two _Diameters_, an _Oval_; one _Ordinate_ and _Abscissa_, the _Parabola_; thus also other Figures, if they have any Regularity, are in every Point determin'd from a few _Data_: Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea of any _irregular Form_, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of _rude Rocks_, and _Pebbles_, and _confus'd Heaps_, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great as in the _regular Forms_: for such _irregular Objects_ distract the _Mind_ with _Variety_, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea. 3. From these two Proportions it follows, "That _Beings_ of limited Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own _Interest_, must choose to operate by the _simplest Means_, to invent _general Theorems_, and to study _regular Objects_, if they be as useful as _irregular ones_; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching out each different Truth by a different Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless _Variety_ of dissimilar Ideas in _irregular Objects_." 4. But then, beside this Consideration of _Interest_, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedent to the Constitution of the Author of _Nature_, between _regular Forms_, _Actions, Theorems_, and that sudden sensible _Pleasure_ excited in us upon Observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd in the former Proposition. And possibly, the Deity could have form'd us so as to have receiv'd no immediate Pleasure from such Object, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Presumption of this in the _Beautys_ of various Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them; but then every one seems far more delighted with the peculiar _Beautys_ of its own _Species_, than with those of a different one, which seldom raise any Desire. This makes it probable, that the _Pleasure_ is not the necessary Result of the _Form_ itself, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever, but depends upon a voluntary _Constitution_, adapted to preserve the _Regularity_ of the _Universe_, and is probably not the Effect of _Necessity_, but _Choice_, in the Supreme Agent, who constituted our _Senses_. [Sidenote: _From the divine Goodness._] 5. But from the whole we may conclude, "That supposing the Deity so _kind_ as to connect _sensible Pleasure_ with certain Actions or Contemplations, beside the _rational Advantage_ perceivable in them; there is a great _moral Necessity_, from his _Goodness_, that the _internal Sense_ of Men should be constituted as it is at present, so as to make _Uniformity amidst Variety_ the Occasion of Pleasure." For were it not so, but on the contrary, if _irregular Objects_, _particular Truths_ and _Operations_ pleased us, beside the endless Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since _Reason_ and _Interest_ would lead us to simple _general Causes_, while a _contrary Sense_ of _Beauty_ would make us disapprove them: _Universal Theorems_ would appear to our Understanding the best Means of increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a _contrary Sense_ would set us on the search after _particular Truths_: _Thought_ and _Reflection_ would recommend Objects with _Uniformity amidst Variety_, and yet this _perverse Instinct_ would involve us in Labyrinths of _Confusion_ and _Dissimilitude_. And hence we see "how suitable it is to the _sagacious Bounty_ which we suppose in the Deity, to constitute our _internal Senses_ in the manner in which they are; by which Pleasure is join'd to the Contemplation of _those Objects_ which a finite _Mind_ can best imprint and retain the Ideas of with the least Distraction; to _those Actions_ which are most efficacious, and fruitful in useful Effects; and to those _Theorems_ which most inlarge our _Minds_." [Sidenote: _Reason of general Laws._] III. As to the other Question, "What Reason might influence the Deity, whom no Diversity of Operation could distract or weary, to choose to operate by _simplest Means_, and _general Laws_, and to diffuse _Uniformity_, _Proportion_, and _Similitude_ thro' all the Parts of _Nature_ which we can observe?" Perhaps there may be some real Excellence in this Manner of Operation, and in these Forms, which we know not: but this we may probably say, that since the _divine Goodness_, for the Reasons above-mention'd, has constituted our _Sense_ of _Beauty_ as it is at present, the same _Goodness_ might have determined the _Great_ Architect to adorn this stupendous _Theatre_ in a manner agreeable to the Spectators, and that Part which is expos'd to the Observation of Men, so as to be pleasant to them; especially if we suppose, that he design'd to discover himself to them as _Wise_ and _Good_, as well as _Powerful_: for thus he has given them greater Evidences, thro' the whole _Earth_, of his _Art_, _Wisdom_, _Design_, and _Bounty_, than they can possibly have for the _Reason_, _Counsel_, and _Good-will_ of their Fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse, with full Persuasion of these Qualities in them, about their common Affairs. As to the Operations of the Deity by _general Laws_, there is still a farther Reason from a _Sense_ superior to these already consider'd, even that of Virtue, or the _Beauty of Action_, which is the Foundation of our greatest Happiness. For were there no _general Laws_ fix'd in the Course of _Nature_, there could be no _Prudence_ or _Design_ in Men, no _rational Expectation_ of Effects from Causes, no _Schemes_ of Action projected, or any _regular Execution_. If then, according to the _Frame_ of our _Nature_, our greatest Happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, "the _Universe_ must be govern'd, not by _particular Wills_, but by _general Laws_, upon which we can found our Expectations, and project our Schemes of Action." Nay farther, tho' _general Laws_ did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopp'd their Effects whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually, and justly supersede all human _Prudence_ and _Care_ about Actions; since a superior _Mind_ did thus relieve Men from their Charge. TREATISE II. AN INQUIRY CONCERNING Moral Good _and_ Evil. * * * * * INTRODUCTION. [Sidenote: _Moral Good and Evil._] The Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of _some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended with Desire of the Agent's Happiness_. Moral Evil denotes our Idea of _a contrary Quality, which excites Condemnation or Dislike_. Approbation and Confirmation are probably simple Ideas, which cannot be farther explained. We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover whether we really have such Ideas, and what general _Foundation_ there is in Nature for this Difference of Actions, as _morally Good_ or _Evil_. These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of _Moral Good_ and _Evil_, from _Natural_. All Men who speak of _moral Good_, acknowledge that it procures _Approbation_ and _Good-will_ toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas _natural Good_ does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward these they suppose possess'd of _Honesty_, _Faith_, _Generosity_, _Kindness_; and those who are possess'd of the _natural Goods_, such as _Houses_, _Lands_, _Gardens_, _Vineyards_, _Health_, _Strength_, _Sagacity_? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no _Approbation_ or _Good-will_ at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of _Envy_ and _Hatred_. In the same manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be _morally evil_, raises our Dislike toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as _Treachery_, _Cruelty_, _Ingratitude_; whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to _natural Evils_, such as _Pain_, _Poverty_, _Hunger_, _Sickness_, _Death_. Now the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these different Ideas of Actions?" [Sidenote: _Interest. Advantage._] Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words _Interest_, _Advantage_, _natural Good_, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of _natural Good_ or _Happiness_; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd _immediately good_. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd _Advantageous_: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of _Interest_, or from _Self-Love_. Our _Sense_ of Pleasure is antecedent to _Advantage_ or _Interest_, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our _Interest_ to do so; but Objects or Actions are _advantageous_, and are pursu'd or undertaken from _Interest_, because we receive _Pleasure_ from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is _advantageous_ or _naturally good_ to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure _mediately_, or _immediately_. Such Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be _immediately_ or _mediately advantageous_, or apt to minister Pleasure, we are said to pursue from _Self-Interest_, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus _Meats_, _Drink_, _Harmony_, _fine Prospects_, _Painting_, _Statues_, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be _immediately good_; and our Reason shews _Riches_ and _Power_ to be _mediately so_, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these _natural Goods_ are pursu'd from _Interest_, or _Self-Love_. [Sidenote: _Opinions about our Sense of moral Good and Evil._] Now the greatest Part of our latter _Moralists_ establish it as undeniable, "That all _moral Qualitys_ have necessarily some Relation to the _Law_ of a _Superior_, of sufficient Power to make us _happy_ or _miserable_;" and since all _Laws_ operate only by Sanctions of _Rewards_, or _Punishments_, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of _Self-Interest_, they suppose, "that it is thus that _Laws_ do constitute some Actions _mediately Good_, or _Advantageous_, and others the same way _disadvantageous_." They say indeed, "That a _benevolent Legislator_ constitutes no Actions _advantageous_ to the Agent by Law, but such as in their own Nature tend to the _natural Good_ of the _Whole_, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and that therefore we approve the _Virtue_ of others, because it has some small Tendency to our _Happiness_, either from its own Nature, or from this general Consideration, That Obedience to a _benevolent Legislator_ is in general _advantageous_ to the _Whole_, and to us in particular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the _Vice_ of others, that is, the prohibited Action, as tending to our particular _Detriment_ in some degree." And then they maintain, "That we are determin'd to Obedience to _Laws_, or deterr'd from Disobedience, merely by Motives of _Self-Interest_, to obtain either the _natural Good_ arising from the commanded Action, or the _Rewards_ promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the _natural evil_ Consequences of Disobedience, or at least the _Penaltys_ of the _Law_." Some other Moralists suppose "an _immediate natural Good_ in the Actions call'd _virtuous_; that is, That we are determin'd to perceive some _Beauty_ in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without reflecting upon any _Advantage_ which can any way redound to us from the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure arising from Reflection upon such of our own Actions as we call _virtuous_, even when we expect no other _Advantage_ from them." But they alledge at the same time, "That we are excited to perform these Actions, even as we pursue, or purchase _Pictures_, _Statues_, _Landskips_, from _Self-Interest_, to obtain this Pleasure which arises from Reflection upon the Action, or some other future Advantage." The Design of the following Sections is to inquire into this Matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offered may prove, I. "That some Actions have to Men an _immediate Goodness_; or, that by a _superior Sense_, which I call a _Moral one_, we _approve_ the Actions of others, and perceive them to be their Perfection and Dignity, and are determin'd to love the Agent; a like Perception we have in reflecting on such Actions of our own, without any View of _natural Advantage_ from them." II. It may perhaps also appear, "That the _Affection, Desire_, or _Intention_, which gains _Approbation_ to the Actions flowing from it, is not an Intention to obtain even this _sensible Pleasure_; much less the _future Rewards_ from Sanctions of Laws, or any other _natural Good_, which may be the Consequence of the _virtuous_ Action; but an intirely different Principle of Action from _Self-Love_, or Desire of private Good." SECT. I. _Of the_ Moral Sense _by which we perceive_ Virtue _and_ Vice, _and approve or disapprove them in others_. [Sidenote: _Different Ideas of_ Moral _and _Natural Good.] I. That the Perceptions of _moral Good_ and _Evil_, are perfectly different from those of _natural Good_ or _Advantage_, every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no _Sense_ of _Good_ distinct from the _Advantage_ or _Interest_ arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_; the Sensations and Affections toward a _fruitful Field_, or _commodious Habitation_, would be much the same with what we have toward a _generous Friend_, or any _noble Character_; for both are or may be _advantageous_ to us: And we should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant _Country_, or _Age_, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the _Mountains_ of Peru, while we are unconcern'd in the _Spanish Trade_. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections toward _inanimate Beings_, which we have toward _rational Agents_, which yet every one knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, "Why should we approve or love _inanimate Beings_? They have no Intention of _Good_ to us, or to any other Person; their _Nature_ makes them fit for our Uses, which they neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with _rational Agents_: they study the _Interest_, and desire the _Happiness_ of other Beings with whom they converse." We are all then conscious of the Difference between that _Approbation_ or Perception of _moral Excellence_, which _Benevolence_ excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of _natural Goodness_, which only raises _Desire_ of Possession toward the good Object. Now "what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, or _Sense_ of _Good_ be from Prospect of _Advantage_? Do not _inanimate Objects_ promote our _Advantage_ as well as _benevolent Persons_, who do us Offices of _Kindness_ and _Friendship_? should we not then have the same endearing Approbation of both? or only the same cold Opinion of _Advantage_ in both?" The Reason why it is not so, must be this, "That we have a distinct Perception of _Beauty_ or _Excellence_ in the kind Affections of _rational Agents_; whence we are determin'd to admire and love such _Characters_ and _Persons_." [Sidenote: _In Actions done to ourselves._] Suppose we reap the same _Advantage_ from two Men, one of whom serves us from an _ultimate Desire_ of our Happiness, or Good-will toward us; the other from Views of _Self-Interest_, or by _Constraint_: both are in this Case equally beneficial or _advantageous_ to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of _moral Actions_, than those of _Advantage_: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, _viz._ a _Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will_[25]. [Footnote 25: _See the Preface, Page 6._] [Sidenote: _Of Evil, Moral and Natural._] This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of _Evil_, done to us designedly by a _rational Agent_. Our Senses of _natural Good_ and _Evil_ would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an _Assault_, a _Buffet_, an _Affront_ from a _Neighbour_, a _Cheat_ from a _Partner_, or _Trustee_, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a _Beam_, a _Tile_, or a _Tempest_; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments on both Occasions. _Villainy_, _Treachery_, _Cruelty_, would be as meekly resented as a _Blast_, or _Mildew_, or an overflowing _Stream_. But I fansy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho' there may be equal _natural Evil_ in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest Anger and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of _moral Ideas_ may prevent our _Condemnation_ of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest _natural Evil_. Thus the Opinion of _Justice_ in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of _moral Evil_ in the Execution, or Hatred toward the _Magistrate_, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings. [Sidenote: _In Actions toward others_.] II. In our Sentiments of Actions which affect ourselves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of _natural_ and _moral Good_, which require some Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which affect other Persons only, we may observe the _moral Ideas_ unmix'd with those of _natural Good_ or _Evil_. For let it be here observ'd, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted _Advantageous_, could never raise in us any Desire of _publick Good_, but only of what was good to ourselves in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve an Action merely because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet, as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from _Love_, _Humanity_, _Gratitude_, _Compassion_, a _Study_ of the Good of others, and an ultimate Desire of their Happiness, altho' it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from Ill-will, Desire of the Misery of others without View to any prevalent Good to the Publick, or _Ingratitude_, raises Abhorrence and Aversion. It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin'd to tend to the _natural Good_ of _Mankind_, or of some _Parts_ of it. But whence this _secret Chain_ between _each Person_ and _Mankind_? How is my _Interest_ connected with the most distant _Parts_ of it? And yet I must admire Actions which shew Good-will toward them, and love the Author. Whence this _Love_, _Compassion_, _Indignation_ and _Hatred_ toward even _feign'd Characters_, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear _kind_, _faithful_, _compassionate_, or of the _opposite Dispositions_, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no _moral Sense_, which makes benevolent Actions appear _Beautiful_; if all Approbation be from the _Interest_ of the Approver, _What's_ Hecuba _to us, or we to_ Hecuba?[26] [Sidenote: _Moral ideas not from Interest._] III. Some refin'd Explainers of _Self-Love_ may tell us, "That we approve or condemn _Characters_, according as we apprehend we should have been supported, or injur'd by them, had we liv'd in their Days." But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of _moral Good_ in _Humanity_, _Mercy_, _Faithfulness_, why should not _Self-Love_, and our Sense of _natural Good_ engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful _Tyrant_, or _Traitor_? Why do not we love Sinon or Pyrrhus, in the _Æneid_? for, had we been Greeks, these two would have been very _advantageous Characters_. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or Æneas? Would not the _Parsimony_ of a Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the _Generosity_ of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don't we then approve both alike? It is plain we have some _secret Sense_ which determines our Approbation without regard to _Self-Interest_; otherwise we should always favour the _fortunate_ Side without regard to _Virtue_, and suppose ourselves engaged with that Party. [Footnote 26: _Tragedy of_ Hamlet.] Suppose any great Destruction occasion'd by mere _Accident_, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action might have been as _disadvantageous_ to us as design'd _Cruelty_, or _Malice_; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent _Simplicity_, which exposes a Man of Wealth as a Prey to others, may be as advantageous a Disposition as the most _prudent Generosity_, to those he converses with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former. "Whence then this Difference?" And farther, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even _disadvantageous Actions_, and perceive _moral Good_ in them. A few ingenious _Artisans_, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in _Manufactures_ which support Millions of Poor, increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the _State_, and make us formidable to our _Neighbours_. In a _Nation_ not far distant from us, some resolute _Burgomasters_, full of Love to their _Country_, and Compassion toward their _Fellow-Citizens_, oppress'd in Body and Soul by a _Tyrant_ and _Inquisition_, with _indefatigable Diligence_, _publick Spirit_, and _Courage_, support a tedious perilous War against the _Tyrant_, and form an _industrious Republick_, which rivals us in _Trade_, and almost in _Power_. All the World sees whether the _former_ or the _latter_ have been more _advantageous_ to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether of the _useful Refugee_, or the _publick-spirited Burgomaster_, by whose Love to his own _Country_, we have often suffer'd in our _Interests_? And I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than _Advantage_, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our _Artisans_ is so obscure among us, and yet that of our _Rivals_ is immortal. [Sidenote: _Self-Love not the Ground of Approbation._] IV. Some _Moralists_, who will rather twist _Self-Love_ into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than _Interest_, may tell us, "That whatever profits one Part without Detriment to another, profits the _Whole_, and then some small Share will redound to _each Individual_; that those Actions which tend to the _Good_ of _the Whole_, if universally perform'd, would most effectually secure to _each Individual_ his own Happiness; and that consequently, we may approve such Actions, from the Opinion of their tending ultimately to our own _Advantage_." We need not trouble these _Gentlemen_ to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Instances, that we in this Age reap any _Advantage_ from Orestes's killing the _treacherous_ Ægysthus, or from the Actions of Codrus or Decius. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection and Reasoning, we may find out some Ground to judge certain Actions advantageous to us, which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception. Should any of our Travellers find some old _Grecian Treasure_, the _Miser_ who hid it, certainly perform'd an Action more to the Traveller's _Advantage_, than Codrus or Orestes; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers'd, and lost in various Ages and Nations: Surely then this _Miser_ must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in _Virtue_! For _Self-Interest_ will recommend Men to us only according to the _Good_ they do to _our Selves_, and not give us high Ideas of _publick Good_, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of Cumberland or Pufendorf, to admire _Generosity_, _Faith_, _Humanity_, _Gratitude_? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the _Evil_ in _Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude_? Do not the _former_ excite our _Admiration_, and _Love_, and _Study_ of Imitation, where-ever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection, and the latter, our _Contempt_, and _Abhorrence_? Unhappy would it be for _Mankind_, if a _Sense of Virtue_ was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such _Metaphysicks_. [Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense cannot be brib'd_.] V. This _moral Sense_, either of our _own_ Actions, or of those of _others_, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of _Virtue_ may be counter-balanc'd by _Interest_, our Sentiment or Perception of its _Beauty_ cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of _Advantage_. Let us consider this both as to our _own_ Actions, and those of _others_. [Sidenote: _In judging of our own Actions_.] A Covetous _Man_ shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from _Interest_. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our _Sense_ of _moral Actions_? Should any one advise us to wrong a _Minor_, or _Orphan_, or to do an ungrateful Action, toward a _Benefactor_; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will be very _advantageous_ to us, propose even a _Reward_; our _Sense_ of the Action is not alter'd. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician's Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force ourselves to take it for the Recovery of Health. Had we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their _Advantage_ or _Disadvantage_, could we ever choose an Action as _advantageous_, which we are conscious is still evil? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such _high Bribes_ to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin'd Party, or of _Tortures_ to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is probably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are over-persuaded by _Advantage_, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their _own Sense_ of it, as well as in that of _others_, to whom the base Action was profitable? If any one becomes satisfy'd with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his _private Advantage_, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the _moral Principles_ of his _new Party_; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under some Appearance of _moral Good_, distinct from _Advantage_. [Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense not founded on Religion._] It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in those Actions of our own which we call _good_, there is _this_ constant _Advantage_, superior to all others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from _Self-Love_, _viz_. That we suppose the Deity will _reward_ them." This will be more fully consider'd[27] hereafter: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of _Honour_, _Faith_, _Generosity_, _Justice_, who have scarce any Opinions about the Deity, or any Thoughts of _future Rewards_; and abhor any thing which is _treacherous_, _cruel_, or _unjust_, without any regard to _future Punishments_. [Footnote 27: See _Sect. ii. Art. 7_.] But farther, tho' these _Rewards_ and _Punishments_, may make my own Actions appear _advantageous_ to me, yet they would never make me approve, and love _another_ Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are _advantageous_ indeed to the _Agent_; but his _Advantage_ is not my _Advantage_: and _Self-Love_ could never recommend to me Actions as _advantageous_ to others, or make me like the Authors of them on that account. [Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense of the Actions of others, not to be brib'd._] This is the second thing to be consider'd, "Whether our _Sense_ of the _moral Good_ or _Evil_ in the Actions of others, can be over-balanc'd, or brib'd by Views of _Interest_." Now I may indeed easily be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as _morally evil_, if it were very _advantageous_ to me: _Interest_ in that Case may overbalance my Desire of _Virtue_ in another: But no _Interest to myself_, will make me approve an Action as morally good, which without that _Interest to myself_, would have appear'd morally evil; if upon computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Moment of Good in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before, when it was. In our _Sense_ of _moral Good_ or _Evil_, our own private Advantage or Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear _Good_ or _Evil_. This Sense therefore cannot be over-balanc'd by _Interest_. How ridiculous an Attempt would it be, to engage a Man by Rewards or Threatnings into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his _moral Notions_? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all. [Sidenote: _Not occasion'd by Praise.] VI. A late witty Author[28] says, "That the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire such Actions as those of Regulus, or Decius, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of any State; and therefore by _Panegyricks_, and _Statues_, they encourage such Tempers in others, as the most _tractable_ and _useful_." Here first let us consider, If a _Traitor_, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as _advantageous_ to us, as an _Hero_ who defends us: And yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time praise a _gallant Enemy_, who is very _pernicious_ to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of _Advantage_? [Footnote 28: See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d. Edition.] Again, upon this Scheme what could a _Statue_ or _Panegyrick_ effect?--Men love _Praise_--They will do the Actions which they observe to be _praised_--_Praise_, with Men who have no other Idea of _Good_ but _Self-Interest_, is _the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as useful to them_--Regulus, or Cato, or Decius, had no _Advantage_ by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reap'd the _Advantage_ might praise such Actions.--Regulus or Cato could not possibly praise or love another Hero for a _virtuous Action_; for this would not gain them the _Advantage_ of _Honour_; and their own Actions they must have look'd upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas'd, without any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect upon with Pleasure. Nay, what should excite a Cato or a Decius to desire Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of others that they were useful to the State, without any Perception of Excellence in such Conduct?--Now how unlike is this to what the least Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters? But says[29] he, "These wondrous cunning Governors made Men believe, by their _Statues_ and _Panegyricks_, that there was _publick Spirit_, and that this was in itself _excellent_; and hence Men are led to admire it in others, and to imitate it in themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their own _Advantage_." So easy a matter it seems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in ourselves!----for a Person who is wholly _selfish_, to imagine others to be _publick-spirited_!----for one who has no Ideas of _Good_ but in his own _Advantage_, to be led by the Persuasions of others, into a Conception of _Goodness_ in what is avowedly detrimental to himself, and profitable to others; nay, so intirely, as not to approve the Action thorowly, but so far as he was conscious that it proceeded from a _disinterested Study_ of the _Good_ of others!----Yet this it seems _Statues_ and _Penegyricks_ can accomplish! [Footnote 29: See the same Author in the same Place.] _Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri!_[30] It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts must decide the Matter, "Whether some _moral Actions_ do not at first View appear _amiable_ even to those who are unconcern'd in their Influence? Whether we do not sincerely _approve_ and love a generous kind _Friend_, or _Patriot_, whose Actions procure _Honour_ to him only, without any _Advantage_ to ourselves?" It is true, that the Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the _Whole_, that all Men agreed in performing such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the _Advantage_: But this only proves, that _Reason_ and _calm Reflection_ may recommend to us, from _Self-Interest_, those Actions, which at first View our _moral Sense_ determines us to admire, without considering this _Interest_. Nay, our _Sense_ shall operate even where the _Advantage_ to ourselves does not hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against ourselves: A condemn'd _Traitor_ may approve the Vigilance of a Cicero in discovering Conspiracies, tho' it had been for the Traitor's Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may still approve such Conduct as tending to the _publick Good_, is a Jest from one whose only Idea of _Good_ is _Self-Interest_. Such a Person has no Approbation of _publick Spirit_, nor Desire of _publick Good_, farther than it tends to his own _Advantage_, which it does not at all in the present Case. [Footnote 30: Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.] [Sidenote: _Nor Custom, Education, &c._] VII. If what is said makes it appear, that we have some other _amiable Idea_ of Actions than that of _advantageous_ to ourselves, we may conclude, "That this Perception of _moral Good_ is not deriv'd from _Custom_, _Education_, _Example_, or _Study_." These give us no new Ideas: They might make us see _private Advantage_ in Actions whose Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some Tendency of Actions to our _Detriment_, by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action we should have observ'd no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as _amiable_ or _odious_, without any Consideration of our own _Advantage_. VIII. It remains then, "That as the Author of _Nature_ has determin'd us to receive, by our _external Senses_, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from _uniform Objects_ the Pleasures of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his _Goodness_, as the _Uniformity_ itself proves his _Existence_, whether we had a _Sense_ of _Beauty_ in _Uniformity_ or not; in the same manner he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still _nobler Pleasures_: so that while we are only intending the _Good_ of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest _private Good_." [Sidenote: _This Moral Sense does not infer innate Ideas or Propositions._] We are not to imagine, that this _moral Sense_, more than the other Senses, supposes any _innate Ideas_, _Knowledge_, or _practical Proposition_: We mean by it only _a Determination of our Minds to receive the simple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions observ'd, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound to ourselves from them_; even as we are pleas'd with a _regular Form_, or an _harmonious Composition_, without having any Knowledge of _Mathematicks_, or seeing any _Advantage_ in that Form or Composition, different from the immediate Pleasure. That we may discern more distinctly the Difference between _moral Perceptions_ and others, let us consider, when we taste a pleasant Fruit, we are conscious of Pleasure; when another tastes it, we only conclude or form an Opinion that he enjoys Pleasure; and, abstracting from some previous _Good-Will_ or _Anger_, his enjoying this Pleasure is to us a Matter wholly indifferent, raising no new _Sentiment_ or _Affection_. But when we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper, and thereby engaged in virtuous Actions, we are not always conscious of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing private Pleasures, as will appear hereafter: 'tis only by _reflex Acts_ upon our Temper and Conduct that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue. When also we judge the Temper of another to be virtuous, we do not necessarily imagine him _then_ to enjoy Pleasure, tho' we know _Reflection_ will give it to him: And farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous Temper raises Sentiments of _Approbation_, _Esteem_ or _Admiration_, and the Affection of _Good-will_ toward him. The Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him: _Approbation_ of another's Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho' 'tis attended with some small Pleasure. Virtue is then called _amiable_ or _lovely_, from its raising _Good-will_ or _Love_ in Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent's perceiving the virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it under that View. A virtuous Temper is called _good_ or _beatifick_, not that it is always attended with Pleasure in the Agent; much less that some small Pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the Approver: but from this, that every Spectator is persuaded that the _reflex Acts_ of the virtuous Agent upon his own Temper will give him the highest Pleasures. The admired Quality is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the _Pleasure_ either in the Agent or the Approver; tho' 'tis a sure Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho' attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of _external Forms_ is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject. SECT. II. _Concerning the_ immediate Motive _to_ virtuous Actions. [Sidenote: _Nature_.] The _Motives_ of human Actions, or their _immediate Causes_, would be best understood after considering the _Passions_ and _Affections_; but here we shall only consider the _Springs_ of the Actions which we call _virtuous_, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the _Moral Sense_. [Sidenote: _Affections, the Motives to Actions._] I. Every Action, which we apprehend as either _morally good_ or _evil_, is always suppos'd to flow from some _Affection_ toward sensitive Natures; and whatever we call _Virtue_ or _Vice_, is either some such _Affection_, or some _Action_ consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action or Omission, appear _vitious_, if it argues the Want of such Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted _morally good_. All the Actions counted _religious_ in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so, to flow from some Affections toward the Deity; and whatever we call _social Virtue_, we still suppose to flow from Affections toward our _Fellow-Creatures_: for in this all seem to agree, "That external Motions, when accompany'd with no Affections toward God or _Man_, or evidencing no Want of the _expected_ Affections toward either, can have no _moral Good_ or _Evil_ in them." Ask, for instance, the most _abstemious Hermit_, if _Temperance_ of itself would be _morally good_, supposing it shew'd no Obedience toward the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than _Luxury_; and he will easily grant, that it would be no _moral Good_, tho' still it might be _naturally good_ or _advantageous_ to Health: And mere _Courage_, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs or Self-Interest, would only entitle its Possessor to _Bedlam_. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the Use of it, or as a natural Ability capable of an useful Application. _Prudence_, if it was only employ'd in promoting _private Interest_, is never imagin'd to be a _Virtue_: and _Justice_, or observing a strict Equality, if it has no regard to the _Good_ of _Mankind_, the Preservation of _Rights_, and securing _Peace_, is a Quality properer for its ordinary _Gestamen_, a _Beam_ and _Scales_, than for a _rational Agent_. So that these four Qualitys, commonly call'd _Cardinal Virtues_, obtain that Name, because they are Dispositions universally necessary to promote _publick Good_, and denote _Affections_ toward _rational Agents_; otherwise there would appear no _Virtue_ in them. [Sidenote: _Affections disinterested._] II. Now, if it can be made appear, that none of these Affections which we approve as _virtuous_, are either _Self-love_, or Desire of _private Interest_; since all _Virtue_ is either some such _Affections_, or _Actions_ consequent upon them; it must necessarily follow, "That _Virtue_ springs from some other Affection than _Self-Love_, or Desire of private Advantage. And where Self-Interest excites to the same Action, the Approbation is given only to the disinterested Principle." [Sidenote: _Love of Complacence, and Hatred of Displicence.] The Affections which are of most Importance in _Morals_, are commonly included under the Names Love and Hatred. Now in discoursing of _Love_, we need not be caution'd not to include that _Love_ between the _Sexes_, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Desire of Pleasure, and is never counted a _Virtue_. _Love_ toward rational Agents, is subdivided into _Love_ of _Complacence_ or _Esteem_, and _Love_ of _Benevolence_: And _Hatred_ is subdivided into _Hatred_ of _Displicence_ or _Contempt_, and _Hatred of Malice_. _Complacence_ denotes _Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense_, and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. _Benevolence_ is the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called _Dislike_ and _Malice_. Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, "Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of _Self-Interest_." [Sidenote: _Are intirely disinterested._] _Complacence_, _Esteem_, or _Good-liking_, at first View appears to be _disinterested_, and so _Displicence_ or _Dislike_; and are intirely excited by some _moral Qualitys_, _Good or Evil_, apprehended to be in the Objects; which Qualitys the very _Frame_ of our _Nature_ determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the _moral Sense_[31] above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to _Esteem_ and _Complacence_ toward a Person intirely _unknown_, or if known, apprehended to be _cruel_, _treacherous_, _ungrateful_; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimulation; but _real Esteem_ no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to _Contempt_, which no Motive of _Advantage_ can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as _generous_, _kind_, _faithful_, _humane_, tho' in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid _Esteem_ and _Complacence_. A _Bribe_ may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of _Advantage_ may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us disapprove him, while we retain the same Opinion of his Temper and Intentions. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade ourselves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of _Advantage_; nor execute it without the strongest Reluctance and Remorse, until we have blinded ourselves into a false Opinion about his Temper. [Footnote 31: See _Sect. i_.] [Sidenote: _Benevolence disinterested._] III. As to the _Love_ of _Benevolence_, the very Name excludes _Self-Interest_. We never call that Man _benevolent_, who is in Fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his _own Interest_, without any ultimate Desire of the _Good_ of _others_. If there be any _Benevolence_ at all, it must be _disinterested_; for the most useful Action imaginable loses all Appearance of _Benevolence_, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from _Self-Love_, or _Interest_. Thus, never were any human Actions more _advantageous_, than the Inventions of _Fire_, and _Iron_; but if these were casual, or if the _Inventor_ only intended his own _Interest_ in them, there is nothing which can be call'd _benevolent_ in them. Where-ever then _Benevolence_ is suppos'd, there it is imagin'd _disinterested_, and design'd for the _Good_ of others. To raise Benevolence, no more is required than calmly to consider any _sensitive Nature_ not pernicious to others. _Gratitude_ arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourselves, or those we love; _Complacence_ is a Perception of the moral Sense. Gratitude includes some _Complacence_, and Complacence still raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no Opposition of Interests. [Sidenote: Self-Love _join'd with_ Benevolence.] But it must be here observ'd, That as all Men have _Self-Love_, as well as _Benevolence_, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong _Benevolence_, as would have produc'd an Action without any Views of _Self-Interest_; that such a Man has also in View _private Advantage_, along with _publick Good_, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the _Benevolence_ of the Action. When he would not have produc'd so much _publick Good_, had it not been for Prospect of _Self-Interest_, then the Effect of _Self-Love_ is to be deducted, and his _Benevolence_ is proportion'd to the Remainder of _Good_, which pure _Benevolence_ would have produc'd. When a Man's _Benevolence_ is hurtful to himself, then _Self-Love_ is opposite to _Benevolence_, and the _Benevolence_ is proportion'd to the Sum of the _Good_ produc'd, added to the Resistance of _Self-Love_ surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the _Benevolence_ of Actions is to be computed. [Sidenote: _Benevolence is disinterested._] IV. There are two ways in which some may deduce _Benevolence_ from _Self-Love_, the one supposing that "we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourselves, whenever we have an Opinion that it will be for our Interest to _have this Affection_, either as it may be immediately pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Sense, or as it may tend to procure some external Reward from God or Man." The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our _Choice_ or _Volition_; but "supposes our Minds determined by the Frame of their Nature to desire whatever is apprehended as the _Means_ of any private Happiness; and that the _Observation of the Happiness of other Persons_, in many Cases is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to the Observer, as their _Misery_ is the Occasion of his Uneasiness: and in consequence of this Connexion, as soon as we have observed it, we begin to desire the Happiness of others as the _Means_ of obtaining this Happiness to ourselves, which we expect from the Contemplation of others in a happy State. They alledge it to be impossible to desire either the Happiness of another, or any Event whatsoever, without conceiving it as the _Means_ of some Happiness or Pleasure to _ourselves_; but own at the same time, that Desire is not raised in us directly by any _Volition_, but arises necessarily upon our apprehending any Object or Event to be conducive to our Happiness." [Sidenote: _The first contrary Opinion confuted._] That the former Scheme is not just, may appear from this general Consideration, that "neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or Desire can be directly raised by _Volition_." If they could, then we could be bribed into any Affection whatsoever toward any Object, even the most improper: we might raise _Jealousy_, _Fear_, _Anger_, _Love_, toward any sort of Persons indifferently by an Hire, even as we engage Men to external Actions, or to the Dissimulation of Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us _from having any Affection_, may indeed turn our Attention to those _Qualitys_ in the Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary _Causes_ or _Occasions_ of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus _indirectly_ the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no _Volition_ of ours, nor _Desire_, will ever raise any Affection in us. But more particularly, _that Desire_ of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospect of any _Pleasure accompanying_ the Affection itself: for 'tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with _Pleasure_; nay, 'tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy then pleasant. 'Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections _justify themselves_; while they continue, (as _Malebranch_ expresses it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like Occasion. So the _Sorrowful_, the _Angry_, the _Jealous_, the _Compassionate_, approve their several Passions on the apprehended Occasion; but we should not therefore conclude, that _Sorrow_, _Anger_, _Jealousy_ or _Pity_ are pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as innocent. _Uneasiness_ generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this _Sensation_ tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire. But the Desire does not terminate upon the _Removal of the Pain accompanying the Desire_, but upon some other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, unless when it is very violent. Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may accompany the Affection; much less is it raised by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleasure. The same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will raise in ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View to obtain future Pleasures of _Self-Approbation_ by our Moral Sense. Could we raise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged to any Affection by the _Prospect of an Interest_ equivalent to this of _Self-Approbation_, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that _that_ Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally _selfish_? But what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a _Desire_ of the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining these _pleasant Reflections_ on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in _natural Affection_ toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the _Absence_ of which is indeed the greatest _Vice_, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these Desires or Affections are not produced by _Choice_, with a View to obtain this private Good. In like manner, if no _Volition_ of ours can directly raise Affections from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any _Volition_ raise them from Prospects of _eternal Rewards_, or to avoid _eternal Punishments_. The former Motives differ from these only as smaller from greater, shorter from more, durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us _angry_ at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and _jealous_ of the most faithful and affectionate, or _sorrowful_ for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a _future State_, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration[32]. [Footnote 32: _These several_ Motives of Interest, _which, some alledge, do excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner_. _Prospect of_ external Advantage _of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the_ Volition of external Actions _immediately, and not to raise Desire of the Happiness of others_. _Now being_ willing to do external Actions _which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness of others, without any_ Desire _of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous: Otherwise it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money._ _The Prospect of_ Rewards from the Deity, _of future Pleasures from the_ Self-Approbation _of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure attending an Affection itself, are only Motives to us to_ desire _or_ wish to have the Affection of Benevolence _in our Hearts; and consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these Motives would make us will or choose to raise_ benevolent Affections: _But these Prospects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire the_ Happiness of others; _for, from Self-Love we only desire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good_. _Now the_ having those Affections _is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not the actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self Approbation, and Divine Rewards, are not obtained or lost according as others are happy or miserable, but according to the_ Goodness of our Affections. _If therefore Affections are not directly raised by Volition or Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot directly raise them_.] 'Tis indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the _virtuous Benevolence_ jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no _Opposition of apparent Interest_, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by a greater _Interest_. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a _disinterested Desire_ partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an _evil Deity_ in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good Deity only from the same Motives, without any _Love_ or _Gratitude_ towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no _Approbation_. We plainly see that a Change of _external Circumstances_ of Interest under an evil Deity, without any Change in the _Disposition_ of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and Inhumanity. Gratitude toward the Deity is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho' there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the _Sanction of the Law_ is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more _Benevolence_, nor no other _Affection_, than those in one forced by the _Law_ to be _Curator_ to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the _Success_ of his Attempts, or the _Happiness_ of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct. [Sidenote: _The Second Opinion confuted._] V. The other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any _Volition_ upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some _pleasant Sensations_ which we expect to feel upon seeing others happy; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery. This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among _Friends_, _Parents_ and _Children_, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from _Self-Love_ as any other Desire. To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the _Means_ of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man _approves_ the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of procuring _Wealth_ or _sensual Pleasure_ to ourselves? If a Person had _wagered_ concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not; would this Wagerer's Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the Wager, be _approved as virtuous_? If not, wherein does this Desire differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other Sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this Case may be made either greater or less than that in the other. Reflecting on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this _Connection_: nor do we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any such Pleasure when we do generous Offices. We all often _feel_ Delight upon seeing others happy, but during our Pursuit of their Happiness we have no _Intention_ of obtaining this Delight. We often feel the Pain of Compassion; but were our sole ultimate Intention or Desire the _freeing ourselves_ from this Pain, would the Deity offer to us either wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person in Distress, to take away this Connection, so that we should be easy during the Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on the other would relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to choose the former way as the latter; since either of them would free us from _our Pain_, which upon this Scheme is the _sole End_ proposed by the compassionate Person.----Don't we find in ourselves that our Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this our sole Intention, we would run away, shut our Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless _calm Reflection_ upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or some _selfish Affection_, as _Fear of Danger_, overpower it. To make this yet clearer, suppose that theDeity should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly _annihilated_, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life? Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing only as the _Means of private Good_, as violently when we know that we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possession of this Good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of _Annuities_? How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, 'tis hard to account: perhaps 'tis owing to the Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of _simple Ideas_.----_Desire_, say they, _is Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence of any Good_.----Whereas Desire is as distinct from _Uneasiness_, as _Volition_ is from Sensation. Don't they themselves often speak of our _desiring to remove Uneasiness_? _Desire_ then is different from _Uneasiness_, however a Sense of Uneasiness accompanies it, as _Extension_ does the Idea of _Colour_, which yet is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the _Means_ of removing the Uneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of _removing our own Uneasiness_ is an _ultimate Desire_: and why may we not have other _ultimate Desires_? "But can any Being be _concerned_ about the Absence of an Event which gives it no _Uneasiness_?" Perhaps superior Natures desire without _uneasy Sensation_. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the _Means_ of removing this Uneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this _Uneasiness_, we should never have brought the Uneasiness upon ourselves by _desiring_ it. So likewise we may _feel Delight_ upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the _Means_ of obtaining this Delight; even as we often receive Delight from Events which we had an Aversion to. VI. If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our _moral Sense_, our _Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others_? To what Purpose serves the _wise Order of Nature_, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are _eternal Rewards_ appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have _benevolent Affections_, and consequently turn our _Attention_ to those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent _contrary Motives_, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the Deity, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtues were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible _additional Motives_ to them; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good _Affection_, to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of _Self-Interest_, or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external _Acts of Beneficence_, and to restrain them from Vice[33]. [Footnote 33: _Let it be also remembered, that every Consideration suggested in the Gospel, as an_ additional Motive _to beneficent Actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper_ Motive _to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing from it alone. We have the_ Promises of this Life _as well as of the next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are also brought to confute this Scheme of disinterested Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, such as_ 1 Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32. _which imports no more than this, "That if there were no Resurrection, and consequently_ Christ _had not risen, and therefore his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest Folly in the Apostle to have exposed himself to Persecution:" Not that the Prospect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle bear Persecution was, Hope of Reward_. _Another Text insisted on is_, Heb. XI. ver. 6. _But this only means, either "that no Man can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who does not believe his Existence and Goodness," which is self-evident: Or it is to be understood of "embracing the true Religion, and adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may allow no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward." Now this does not prove either that our fate, or our_ strongest Incitement _to virtuous Actions is a Prospect of Interest, nor even that any Action is approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward_. Heb. XII. ver. 2. _is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have it well translated, it only asserts, "That the Hope of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring Sufferings," not that this was the_ principal Spring _of his beneficent Actions, or that they were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood metonymically, for its Object_, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. _Not to mention another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom insist that [Greek: atti] is seldom used for the_ final Cause; _but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with the_ Socinians: _And then this Verse may be thus translated_. _"Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Power to have enjoyed, as he had from the Beginning, he submitted to the Cross." Nor is there any thing to confute this Translation; save that same_ Antithesis _between our suffering from Faith in a Reward, and his suffering in like manner, is not kept up so well; as if it were a necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such_ Antitheses. _For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our Saviour's Sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to_ Philip. II. ver. 6, 7. Whoever _would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian Exhortations, will find disinterested Love more inculcated, and_ Motives of Gratitude _more frequently suggested, than any others_.] From the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a _disinterested ultimate Desire_ of the Happiness of others; and that our _Moral Sense_ determines us only to approve Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire. [Sidenote: _Human Nature incapable of sedate Malice._] VII. As to Malice, _Human Nature_ seems scarce capable of _malicious disinterested Hatred_, or a sedate ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our _Interest_: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose _those_ whose Interests are opposite to _ours_, it is only the Effect of _Self-Love_, and not of _disinterested Malice_. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as _absolutely evil_; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of _disinterested Malice_: but as soon as we reflect upon _human Nature_, and form just Conceptions, this _unnatural_ Passion is allay'd, and only _Self-Love_ remains, which may make us, from _Self-Interest_, oppose our Adversarys. Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our _Pirates_; and yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate Island, and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more: Now let us calmly reflect, that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel, may be happy and joyful, or may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of _Love_, _Humanity_, _Kindness_, and become _Friends_, _Citizens_, _Husbands_, _Parents_, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask ourselves, when _Self-Love_, or Regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good _moral Quality_; whether we would wish them the Fate of Cadmus's _Army_, by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather, that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become _kind_, _compassionate_, and _friendly_; contrive _Laws_, _Constitutions_, _Governments_, _Propertys_; and form an honest happy Society with _Marriages_, and _Relations dear, and all the Charities Of Father, Son, and Brother_----[34]? I fansy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence of them from _Self-Interest_, or _publick Love_, and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any _sedate Malice_ against any Person, or ultimate Desire of his Misery. Our calm Ill-will is only from Opposition of _Interest_; or if we can entertain _sedate Malice_, it must be toward a Character apprehended _necessarily_ and _unalterably Evil_ in a _moral Sense_; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: yet perhaps no _such Being_ occurs to us among the Works of a _good_ Deity. [Footnote 34: Milt. Par. Lost. B. iv. ver. 756.] [Sidenote: _Other Affections disinterested_.] VIII. Having offer'd what may perhaps prove, That neither our _Esteem_ or _Benevolence_ is founded on _Self-Love_, or Views of _Interest_; let us see "if some _other Affections_, in which _Virtue_ may be plac'd, do arise from _Self-Love_;" such as _Fear_, or _Reverence_, arising from an Apprehension of _Goodness_, _Power_, and _Justice_. For no body apprehends any _Virtue_ in _base Dread_ and _Servitude_ toward a _powerful evil Being_: This is indeed the _meanest Selfishness_. Now the same Arguments which prove _Esteem_ to be _disinterested_, will prove this _honourable Reverence_ to be so too; for it plainly arises from an Apprehension of _amiable Qualitys_ in the Person, and _Love_ toward him, which raises an _Abhorrence_ of offending him. Could we reverence a _Being_ because it was our _Interest_ to do so, a third Person might bribe us into Reverence toward a _Being_ neither _good_, nor _powerful_, which every one sees to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other Passions, which have been reputed virtuous. [Sidenote: _Objections._] IX. There is one Objection against _disinterested Good-Will_, which occurs from considering, "That nothing so effectually excites our _Love_ toward rational Agents, as their _Beneficence_, and especially toward ourselves; whence we are led to imagine, that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from _Self-Interest_." But let us here examine ourselves more narrowly. Do we only wish well to the _Beneficent_, because it is our _Interest_ to do so? Or do we choose to love them, because our _Love_ is the means of procuring their _Bounty_? If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible. Nay, farther, is not our _Good will_ the Consequent of _Bounty_, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of _Beneficence_; but _real Love_ always presupposes it, and will necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from Consideration of past Benefits. Or can any one say he only loves the _Beneficent_, as he does a _Field_ or _Garden_, because of its _Advantage_? His _Love_ then must cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical _Prosopopoeia_ animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. _Beneficence_ then must increase our Good-will, as it raises _Complacence_, which is still attended with stronger Degrees of Benevolence: and hence we love even those who are _beneficent_ to others. In the Benefits which we receive ourselves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the Circumstances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the _Donor_; and from the good Opinion we have of ourselves, we are apt to look upon the Kindness as better employ'd, than when it is bestow'd on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that _Bounty_ from a _Donor_ apprehended as _morally evil_, or extorted by _Force_, or conferr'd with some View of _Self-Interest_, will not procure _real Good-will_; nay, it may raise _Indignation_, if we suspect Dissimulation of Love, or a Design to allure us into any thing dishonourable: whereas wisely employ'd _Bounty_ is always approv'd, and gains Love to the Author from all who hear of it. [Sidenote: _Virtue disinterested_.] If then no _Good-will_ toward Persons arises from _Self-Love_, or Views of _Interest_, and all _Virtue_ flows from _Good-will_, or some other Affection equally _disinterested_; it remains, "That there must be some other Affection than _Self-Love_, or _Interest_, which excites us to the Actions we call _Virtuous_." Had we no other _ultimate Desire_ but that of _private Advantage_, we must imagine that every _rational Being_ acts only for its own _Advantage_; and however we may call a _beneficent Being_ a _good Being_, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon _this Scheme_ we should not be apt to think there is any _beneficent Being_ in _Nature_, or a _Being_ who acts for the _Good_ of others. Particularly, If there is no _Sense_ of Excellence in _publick Love_, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, "That the Deity will make the _Virtuous_ happy?" Can we prove that it is for the _Advantage_ of the Deity to do so? This I fansy will be look'd upon as very absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the Deity. And if there be such Dispositions in the Deity, where is the Impossibility of some small Degree of this _publick Love_ in his Creatures? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from _Self-Love_? In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than _Self-Love_, I see no Foundation to expect _Beneficence_, or _Rewards_ from _God_ or _Man_, farther than it is the _Interest_ of the _Benefactor_; and all Expectation of Benefits from a _Being_ whose Interests are independent on us, must be _perfectly ridiculous_. What should engage the Deity to reward _Virtue_? _Virtue_ is commonly suppos'd, upon _this Scheme_, to be only _a consulting our own Happiness in the most artful way, consistently with the Good of the Whole_; and in _Vice_ the _same thing_ is foolishly pursu'd, in a manner which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to the _Good_ of the _Whole_. But how is the Deity concern'd in this _Whole_, if every Agent always acts from _Self-Love_? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of infinite Power and Art, to believe the Deity is _good_ in the _Christian Sense_, that is, _studious of the Good of his Creatures_? Perhaps the _Misery_ of his Creatures may give him as much Pleasure, as their _Happiness_: And who can find fault, or blame such a _Being_ to study their _Misery_? for what else should we expect? A _Manichean evil God_, is a Notion which Men would as readily run into, as that of a _good one_, if there is no Excellence in _disinterested Love_, and no Being acts but for its own _Advantage_; unless we prov'd, that the Happiness of _Creatures_ was _advantageous_ to the Deity. [Sidenote: _The true Spring of Virtue_.] X. Having remov'd these _false Springs_ of _virtuous Actions_, let us next establish the _true one_, viz. _some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others_; or _some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others_; even as the _moral Sense_, [35]above explain'd, determines us to _approve_ the Actions which flow from _this Love_ in ourselves or others. This _disinterested Affection_, may appear strange to Men impress'd with Notions of _Self-Love_, as the _sole_ Spring of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its _universal Extent_. [Footnote 35: See _Sect. i._] [Sidenote: _Natural Affection_.] An honest _Farmer_ will tell you, that he studies the _Preservation_ and _Happiness_ of his Children, and loves them without any Design of Good to himself. But say some of our _Philosophers_, "The Happiness of their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery gives them Pain; and therefore to obtain the _former_, and avoid the _latter_, they study, from _Self-Love_, the Good of their Children." Suppose several Merchants join'd in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them is employ'd abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain for their Share in the Loss: Is this then the _same_ Kind of Affection with _that_ of Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the _Parent_ and _Child_? Do the Child's _Sensations_ give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent _hungry_, _thirsty_, _sick_, when his Children are so? No, but _his_ naturally implanted Desire of their Good, and Aversion to their Misery, makes him be affected with Joy or Sorrow from their Pleasures or Pains. This Desire then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: it then must be _disinterested_. "No, says another _Sophist_, Children are _Parts_ of ourselves, and in loving them we but love _ourselves_ in them." A very good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they _Parts_ of ourselves? Not as a _Leg_ or an _Arm_: We are not conscious of their Sensations. "But _their_ Bodys were form'd from Parts of _ours_." So is a _Fly_, or a _Maggot_, which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! there must be something else then which makes Children _Parts_ of ourselves; and what is this but _that Affection_, which Nature determines us to have toward them? _This Love_ makes them _Parts_ of ourselves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and where-ever we find a Determination among several rational Agents to _mutual Love_, let _each Individual_ be look'd upon as a _Part_ of a great _Whole_, or _System_, and concern himself in the _publick Good_ of it. But a later Author observes, [36]"That _natural Affection_ in Parents is _weak_, till the Children begin to give Evidences of _Knowledge_ and _Affections_." Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges was true; as I fansy it is in some measure, tho' we may find in some Parents an Affection toward Idiots. The observing of _Understanding_ and _Affections_ in Children, which make them appear _moral Agents_, can increase Love toward them without Prospect of _Interest_; for I hope, this Increase of Love is not from Prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling, and never intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a _Moral Capacity_ can be the occasion of increasing Love without _Self-Interest_, even from the _Frame_ of our _Nature_; pray, may not _this_ be a Foundation of _weaker_ degrees of Love, where there is no preceding Tie of Parentage, and extend it to _all Mankind_? [Footnote 36: See the Fable of the Bees, _Pag. 68. 3d Ed._] [Sidenote: _Publick Affections, natural_.] XI. And that this is so in Fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into _Friendships_, _Familys_, _Partnerships_, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal, if he would not more desire their _Prosperity_, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than their _Misery_ and _Ruin_? and you shall find a _Bond_ of _Benevolence_ farther extended than a _Family_ and _Children_, altho' the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his _native Country_, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv'd no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, would he not rather desire the _Prosperity_ of his Country? Or could he, now that his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as readily wish that it was laid waste by _Tyranny_, or a _foreign_ Power? I fansy his Answer would shew us _a Benevolence_ extended beyond _Neighbourhoods_ or _Acquaintances_. Let a Man of a _compos'd_ Temper, out of the Hurry of his _private_ Affairs, only read of the _Constitution_ of a _foreign_ Country, even in the _most distant_ Parts of the Earth, and observe _Art_, _Design_, and a _Study_ of _publick Good_ in the _Laws_ of this Association; and he shall find his Mind _mov'd_ in their Favour; he shall be _contriving_ Rectifications and Amendments in their Constitution, and _regret_ any unlucky Part of it, which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall _bewail_ any Disaster which befalls them, and _accompany_ all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this proves _Benevolence_ to be in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no _interfering_ Interest, which from _Self-Love_ may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of _rational Agents_, capable of moral Affections, in the _most distant_ Planets, our _good Wishes_ would still attend them, and we should desire their Happiness. And that all these Affections, whether more or less extensive, are properly _disinterested_, not even founded on any Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed, _Art. IV._ of this Section. [Sidenote: _National Love_.] XII. Here we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call _national Love_, or Love of one's _native Country_. Whatever Place we have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the _various Affections_ of _human Nature_; we have known many _lovely Characters_; we remember the _Associations_, _Friendships_, _Familys_, _natural Affections_, and other _human Sentiments_: our _moral Sense_ determines us to approve these _lovely Dispositions_, where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our _Benevolence_ concerns us in the Interests of those Persons possess'd of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in _another_ Country, we begin to acquire a _national Love_ toward it also; nor has our _own_ Country any other Preference in our Idea, unless it be by an _Association_ of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the _Buildings_, _Fields_, and _Woods_ where we receiv'd them. This may let us see how _Tyranny_, _Faction_, a _Neglect_ of Justice, a _Corruption_ of Manners, and _any thing_ which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this _national Love_, and the _dear Idea_ of a Country. [Sidenote: _The Reason why natural Affections do not always appear_.] We ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that _apparent Want_ of natural Affection, among _collateral Relations_, is, that these _natural Inclinations_, in many Cases, are overpower'd by _Self-Love_, where there happens any _Opposition_ of Interests; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, tho' with different Degrees of Strength, according to the _nearer_ or _more remote_ Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the _natural Affection_ of _Benevolence_ is join'd with and strengthen'd by _Esteem_, _Gratitude_, _Compassion_, or _other kind Affections_; or on the contrary, weaken'd by _Displicence_, _Anger_, or _Envy_. SECT. III. _The_ Sense _of_ Virtue, _and the_ various Opinions _about it, reducible to_ one general Foundation. _The Manner of computing the_ Morality _of_ Actions. [Sidenote: _All Virtue benevolent_.] I. If we examine all the Actions which are counted _amiable_ any-where, and inquire into the Grounds upon which they are _approv'd_, we shall find that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as Benevolent, or flowing from _Good-will to others_, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the _Approver_ be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not; so that all those _kind Affections_ which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from _such_ Affections, appear _morally good_, if, while they are _benevolent_ towards some Persons, they be not _pernicious_ to others. Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no _Benevolence_ imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for, _benevolent_ Purposes. Nay, as was before observ'd[37], the Actions which in Fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of _moral Beauty_, if we know they proceeded from no kind Intentions towards others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting _publick Good_, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow'd from as _strong Benevolence_. [Sidenote: _Religion_.] II. Hence _those_ Affections, which would lead us to do Good to our Benefactor, shall appear _amiable_, and the _contrary_ Affections _odious_, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any Advantage or Hurt to him. Thus a _sincere Love_ and _Gratitude_ toward our Benefactor, a _chearful Readiness_ to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a _hearty Inclination_ to comply with his Intentions, and _Contentment_ with the State he has plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of _Benevolence_ we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly _amiable_. And under these is included all the _rational Devotion_, or _Religion_ toward a Deity apprehended as _good_, which we can possibly perform. [Footnote 37: See _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 3. _Par._ 1. _Art._ 9. _Par._ 2. We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the _Frame_ of our _Nature_, which is wonderfully adapted to promote _Benevolence_, _viz._ That as a Benefit conferr'd necessarily raises _Gratitude_ in the Person who receives it, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are _wonderfully delightful_ to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather choose to be belov'd than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the _most abject Person oblig'd_ is capable, and inclin'd to make no small Addition to our Happiness by his _Love_ and _Gratitude_, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus, ----_A grateful Mind By owing owes not, but still pays, at once Indebted and discharg'd_----[38] As to _external Performances_ of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations and Ages; and _Education_ may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the Deity: but then, where-ever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from _Love_ toward the Deity, or some other Affection necessarily join'd with _Love_, as _Reverence_, _Repentance_, or _Sorrow_ to have offended. So that the general Principle of _Love_ is the Foundation of all the _apparent moral Excellence_, even in the most fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv'd. For as to Rites design'd only to appease a _furious Being_, no Mortal, I fansy, apprehends there is any _Virtue_, or _Excellence_ in them; but that they are chosen only as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various speculative Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity, it necessarily follows, "That, accordingly, _Practices_, and _Approbation_, must be _various_; tho' all the _moral Goodness_ of Actions is still presum'd to flow from _Love_." [Footnote 38: Par. Lost. _B._ iv. _l. 55_.] [Sidenote: _Social Virtues_.] III. Again, that we may see how _Benevolence_ is the Foundation of all apprehended _Excellence_ in _social Virtues_, let us only observe, That amidst the Diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is still allow'd to be the way of deciding the Controversy about any disputed Practice, _viz._ to inquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will most effectually promote the _publick Good_. The _Morality_ is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the _universal natural Good_ of _Mankind_, is agreed upon. That which produces more _Good_ than _Evil_ in the _Whole_, is acknowledg'd _good_; and what does not, is counted _evil_. In this Case, we no other way regard the Good of the _Actor_, or that of those who are thus inquiring, than as they make a Part of the great _System_. In our late Debates about _Passive Obedience_, and the Right of _Resistance_ in Defence of _Privileges_, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, "Whether _universal Submission_ would probably be attended with greater _natural Evils_, than _temporary Insurrections_, when Privileges are invaded? and not, Whether what tended in the Whole to the _publick natural Good_, was also _morally good_?" And if a _divine Command_ was alledg'd in Favour of the Doctrine of _Passive Obedience_, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the Balance of _natural Good_ to its own Side, and determine our Election from _Interest_; and yet _our Sense_ of the _moral Good_ in _Passive Obedience_, would still be founded upon some Species of _Benevolence_, such as _Gratitude_ toward the Deity, and _Submission_ to his Will to whom we are so much oblig'd. But I fansy those, who believe the Deity to be _good_, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the _universal Good_, than the contrary, either by preventing the external Evils of _Civil War_, or by enuring Men to _Patience_, or some _other Quality_ which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting Happiness. And were it not so, _Passive Obedience_ might be recommended as an _inglorious Method_ of escaping a greater Mischief, but could never have any thing _morally amiable_ in it. But let us quit the Disputes of the _Learned_, on whom, it may be alledg'd, _Custom_ and _Education_ have a powerful Influence; and consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are _approv'd_ or _condemn'd_, _vindicated_ or _excus'd_. We are universally asham'd to say an Action is _just_, because it tends to my _Advantage_, or to the _Advantage_ of the _Actor_: And we as seldom condemn a _beneficent kind Action_, because it is not _advantageous_ to us, or to the _Actor_. _Blame_ and _Censure_ are founded on a Tendency to _publick Evil_, or a Principle of _private Malice_ in the _Agent_, or _Neglect_ at least of the _Good_ of others; on _Inhumanity_ of Temper, or at least such _strong Selfishness_ as makes the _Agent_ careless of the Sufferings of others: and thus we _blame_ and _censure_ when the Action no way affects ourselves. All the moving and persuasive Vindications of Actions, which may, from some _partial_ evil Tendency, appear _evil_, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some _greater Good_, which counter-balanc'd the _Evil_: "_Severity_ toward a few, is _Compassion_ toward Multitudes.--_Transitory Punishments_ are necessary for avoiding more _durable Evils_.-- Did not _some_ suffer on such Occasions, there would be _no living_ for honest Men",--and such like. And even when an Action cannot be intirely justify'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge, "That it was only the Effect of _Inadvertence_ without _Malice_, or of _partial good Nature_, _Friendship_, _Compassion_, _natural Affection_, or _Love_ of a _Party_?" All these Considerations shew, what is the _universal Foundation_ of _our Sense_ of _moral Good_, or _Evil_, viz. _Benevolence_ toward others on the one hand, and _Malice_, or even _Indolence_, and _Unconcernedness_ about the _apparent publick Evil_ on the other. And let it be here observ'd, that we are so far from imagining all Men to act only from _Self-Love_, that we universally expect in others a Regard for the _Publick_; and do not look upon the Want of this, as barely the Absence of _moral Good_, or _Virtue_, but even as _positively evil_ and _hateful_. [Sidenote: _Moral Evil not always Malice_.] IV. Contrarys may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the _general Foundation_ of _our Sense_ of _moral Evil_ more particularly. _Disinterested Malice_, or ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, is the highest Pitch of what we count _vicious_; and every Action appears =evil=, which is imagin'd to flow from any Degree of _this Affection_. Perhaps a _violent Passion_ may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our _rash angry Sentiments_ of our Enemys, may represent them as having such _odious Dispositions_; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer'd above[39], that there is no such Degree of Wickedness in _human Nature_, as, in _cold Blood_, to desire the _Misery_ of others, when it is conceiv'd no way useful to _our Interests_. [Footnote 39: See _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 4.] The frequent, and seemingly unprovoked Cruelties of the Nero's and Domitian's, are often alleged in Opposition to all this; but perhaps unjustly. Such Tyrants are conscious that they are hated by all those whom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them: A Tyrant looks upon such Men as designing, artful, or ambitious, under a false Shew of Virtue. He imagines the surest Means of his own Safety is to appear terrible, and to deprive his Enemys of all Hopes of escaping by his Compassion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is matter of Envy, and is a Reproach upon the Tyrant: It weakens his Power, and makes them dangerous to him. _Power_ becomes the Object of Delight to the Tyrant; and in Ostentation of it, he may break through all Regards to Justice and Humanity. Habits of Cruelty can be acquired in such a Course. Any of these apparent Interests seem better to account for the Crueltys of Tyrants, than the supposing in them a Principle of _calm Malice_ without _Interest_, of which the _rest_ of _Mankind_ seem intirely incapable. [Sidenote: _Temper of a_ Tyrant.] The Temper of a _Tyrant_ seems a continu'd State of _Anger_, _Hatred_, and _Fear_. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those Passions which to the _Tyrant_ are _habitual_. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were _absolutely evil_, and _delighted_ in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him: we forget that perhaps he acted from _Self-Love_, and not _Malice_, or, it may be, some _generous_ or _kind Intention_ toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a _Tyrant_ constantly forms concerning _Mankind_; and having very much weaken'd all _kind Affections_ in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were Men really such as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others: if they are rashly form'd upon some sudden slight Views, it is no Wonder if we find Dispositions following upon them, very little suited to the _real State of human Nature_. [Sidenote: _Ordinary Springs of Vice_.] The ordinary Spring of _Vice_ then among Men, must be a _mistaken Self-Love_, made so violent, as to overcome _Benevolence_; or such strong _Appetites_, or Passions either selfish, or toward some narrow Systems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good; or _Affections_ arising from _false_, and _rashly form'd Opinions_ of _Mankind_; which we run into thro' the Weakness of our _Benevolence_. When Men, who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have _contrary Interests_, they are apt to have their _good Opinions_ of each other _abated_, by imagining a _design'd Opposition_ from _Malice_; without this, they can scarcely hate one another. Thus two _Candidates_ for the same Office wish each other _dead_, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition may be without _Hatred_; and if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were bestow'd on one of them, the other shall rejoice at it. [Sidenote: Self-Love indifferent.] V. Actions which flow solely from _Self-Love_, and yet evidence no want of _Benevolence_, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem of a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor vitious, and neither raise the _Love_ or _Hatred_ of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from _Self-Love_, consistently with the _Good_ of the _Whole_; but every Mortal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own _Good_, is absolutely necessary for the _Good_ of the _Whole_; and the Want of such _Self-Love_ would be _universally pernicious_. Hence, he who pursues his own _private Good_, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the _Good_ of the _Whole_; and much more he who promotes his _own Good_, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving God, or doing good to _Mankind_; acts not only _innocently_, but also _honourably_, and _virtuously_: for in both these Cases, _Benevolence_ concurs with _Self-Love_ to excite him to the Action. And thus _a Neglect_ of our _own Good_ may be _morally evil_, and argue a Want of _Benevolence_ toward the _Whole_. But when _Self-Love_ breaks over the Bounds above-mentioned, and leads us into Actions detrimental to _others_, and to the _Whole_; or makes us insensible of the _generous kind Affections_; then it appears _vitious_, and is _disapprov'd_. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our _Benevolence_ becomes so faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions of _Men_, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were _wholly evil_, or _malicious_, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into _malevolent Affections_, or at least weaken our _good ones_, and make us _really vitious_. [Sidenote: _Benevolence of different Kinds_.] VI. Benevolence is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop _Cumberland_ always uses it. But to understand this more distinctly, 'tis highly necessary to observe, that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of the Soul. Sometimes it denotes a _calm, extensive Affection_, or Good-will toward all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain smaller Systems or Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a Country, Friendship, Parental-Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The several kind particular Passions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Distinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully considered[40]. [Footnote 40: See _Treatise_ III. _Sect_. ii. _Art_. 3. and _Treatise_ IV. _Sect_. vi. _Art_. 4.] Now tho' all these different Dispositions come under the general Character of Benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above all amiable and excellent: 'Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable the Person appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Passions, or counteracts them. The second Sort of _Benevolence_ is more amiable than the third, when it is sufficiently strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho' of a lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these more noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho' it does not justify such Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet it is a strong extenuating Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all sensible of this, when any Person from Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done something hurtful to larger Societies. [Sidenote: Self-Love _not excluded by Benevolence_.] VII. Here we must also observe, that every _moral Agent_ justly considers himself as a _Part_ of this _rational System_, which may be useful to the _Whole_; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his own universal _Benevolence_. Nay farther, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the _System_ requires every one to be _innocently solicitous_ about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings _greater Evil_ to the _Agent_, than _Good_ to others, however it may evidence the Strength of some particular kind Attachment, or of a _virtuous Disposition_ in the _Agent_, yet it must be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to _publick Good_; so that a Man who reason'd justly, and consider'd the Whole, would not be led into it, by the calm extensive _Benevolence_, how strong soever it were; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the _Agent_ from a _kind Action_, did evidence a strong virtuous Disposition. Nay farther, if any _Good_ was propos'd to the Pursuit of an _Agent_, and he had a _Competitor_ in every respect _only equal_ to himself; the _highest_ universal _Benevolence_ possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance, to move him to yield to his _Competitor_. A Man surely of the _strongest Benevolence_, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a Competitor of _equal Merit_ with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of _Benevolence_; so no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only _equal Abilitys_. Where-ever a Regard to _myself_ tends as much to the Good of the _Whole_, as Regard to _another_; or where the _Evil_ to myself is equal to the _Good_ obtain'd for another; tho' by acting, in such Cases, for the Good of _another_, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to _myself_, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive _Benevolence_; since the _Moment_ of Good to the _Whole_ is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it be here observ'd, that this does not supersede the Necessity of _Liberality_, or _gratuitous Gifts_, altho' in such Actions the Giver loses what the other receives; since the _Moment_ of Good to any Person, in any given Case, is in a compound Proportion of the _Quantity_ of the Good itself, and the _Indigence_ of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater _Addition_ to the Happiness of the _Receiver_, than the _Diminution_ it occasions in the Happiness of the _Giver_: And that the most useful and important Gifts are those from the _Wealthy_ to the _Indigent_. Yet Gifts from _Equals_ are not useless, since they often increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of _mutual Love_: but Gifts from the _Poor_ to the _Wealthy_ are really foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of _Gratitude_, which are also fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the _Wealthy_, if they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor _Giver_. In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the _Agent_, than Good to the _Publick_; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the _Agent_, tho' 'tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the _Agent_ be so great, as to make him incapable, at another time, of promoting a _publick Good_ of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action; the Action may really be evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable _publick Good_ for a smaller one; tho' at present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition. [Sidenote: Benevolence, _how affected by the Qualitys of its Object_.] VII. The _moral Beauty_, or _Deformity_ of Actions, is not alter'd by the _moral Qualitys_ of the Objects any farther than the Qualitys of the Objects increase or diminish the _Benevolence_ of the Action, or the _publick Good_ intended by it. Thus _Benevolence_ toward the _worst_ Characters, or the Study of their _Good_, may be as _amiable_ as any whatsoever; yea, often more so than _that_ toward the _Good_, since it argues such a strong Degree of _Benevolence_ as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the _moral Evil_ in the Object. Hence the _Love_ of _unjust Enemys_, is counted among the _highest Virtues_. Yet, when our _Benevolence_ to the _Evil_ encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys the _Beauty_ of the Action, or even makes it _evil_, as it betrays _a Neglect_ of the _Good of others_ more valuable; Beneficence toward _whom_, would have tended more to the _publick Good_, than _that_ toward our _Favourites_: But _Benevolence_ toward _evil_ Characters, which neither encourages nor enables them to do Mischief, nor diverts our _Benevolence_ from Persons more useful, has as much _moral Beauty_ as any whatsoever. [Sidenote: _Qualitys of regulating our_ Election.] VIII. In comparing the _moral Qualitys_ of Actions, in order to regulate our _Election_ among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest _moral Excellency_, we are led by _our moral Sense_ of _Virtue_ to judge thus; that in _equal Degrees_ of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the _Virtue_ is in proportion to the _Number_ of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the _Dignity_, or _moral Importance_ of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal _Numbers_, the _Virtue_ is as the _Quantity_ of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the _Virtue_ is in a _compound Ratio_ of the _Quantity_ of Good, and _Number_ of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the _moral Evil_, or _Vice_, is as the Degree of Misery, and _Number_ of Sufferrers; so that _That Action_ is _best_, which procures the _greatest Happiness_ for the _greatest Numbers_; and _that worst_, which, in _like manner_, occasions _Misery_. [Sidenote: _Consequences, how they affect the Morality of Actions._] Again, when the _Consequences_ of Actions are of a _mix'd_ Nature, partly _advantageous_, and partly _pernicious_; _that Action_ is _good_, whose _good_ Effects preponderate the _evil_ by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and _that evil_, which is otherwise. Here also the _moral Importance_ of Characters, or _Dignity_ of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the _Degrees_ of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an _inconsiderable Good_ to many, but an _immense Evil_ to few, may be _evil_; and an _immense Good_ to few, may preponderate _small Evil_ to many. But the _Consequences_ which affect the _Morality_ of Actions, are not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but also all those _Events_ which otherwise would not have happen'd. For many Actions which have no immediate or natural _evil Effects_, nay, which actually produce _good Effects_, may be _evil_; if a man foresees, that the evil Consequences, which will probably flow from the _Folly_ of others, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overbalance all the _Good_ produc'd by those Actions, or all the _Evils_ which would flow from the Omission of them: And in such Cases the _Probability_ is to be computed on both sides. Thus, if an Action of mine will probably, thro' the Mistake or Corruption of others, be made a _Precedent_ in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho' good in itself, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some _mistaken Notion_ of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine _evil_, whenever the Evils which will probably be occasion'd by the _Action_, are greater than the Evils occasion'd by the _Omission_. And this is the Reason, that many _Laws_ prohibit Actions in general, even when some particular _Instances_ of those Actions would be very useful; because an universal _Allowance_ of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an universal _Prohibition_; nor could there be any more _special Boundarys_ fix'd between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if in some very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less _evil Consequence_, than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it. IX. 'Tis here to be observed, that tho' every _kind Affection_ abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our _calm Affections_, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our _particular Passions_; _calm Self-Love_ quite distinct from _Hunger_, _Thirst_, _Ambition_, _Lust_, or _Anger_; so _calm Good-will_ toward others is different from _Pity_, _passionate Love_, _the parental Affection_, or the Passion of _particular Friends_. Now every kind Passion, which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is _an universal calm Good-will_ toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some Defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue[41]. [Footnote 41: _See Essay on Passions,_ Sect. 2_, Art. 3. _And Illustrations, Sect._ 6. _Art._ 4.] [Sidenote: _Partial Benevolence, how virtuous_.] X. From these Observations, we may see what Actions our _moral Sense_ would most recommend to our Election, as the most _perfectly virtuous_: _viz._ such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the _greatest_ and _most extensive Happiness_ of all the _rational Agents_, to whom our Influence can reach. All _Beneficence_, even toward a _Part_, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the _Good_ of the _Whole_: But this is a smaller Degree of _Virtue_, unless our Beneficence be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the _Whole_. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of _Beauty_, even when the _Good_ of the _Whole_ requires a stricter Attachment to a _Part_, as in _natural Affection_, or _virtuous Friendships_; except when _some Parts_ are so eminently useful to the _Whole_, that even _universal Benevolence_ does determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus _universal Benevolence_ would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of _great_ and _generous Characters_ in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the Interests of any _generous Society_, whose whole Constitution was contriv'd to promote _universal Good_. Thus a good Fancy in _Architecture_ would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a completely regular Building, to choose such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro' the _Whole_, and not move him to make a vain unfinish'd Attempt in _one Part___, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to _the Whole_. And he would condemn a great Profusion of Ornament on _one Part_, above the Proportion of _the Whole_, unless _that Part_ be some eminent Place of the _Edifice_, such as the _chief Front_, or _publick Entrance_; the adorning of which would beautify the _Whole_ more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any _other Part_. This Constitution of our _Sense_, whereby the _moral Beauty_ of Actions, or Dispositions, increases according to the _Number_ of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence also Actions which flow from the _nearer Attachments_ of _Nature_, such as _that_ between the _Sexes_, and the _Love_ of _our Offspring_, do not appear _so virtuous_ as Actions of _equal Moment_ of _Good_ towards Persons less attach'd to us; has been chosen by the Author of Nature for this good Reason, "That the more limited _Instincts_ tend to produce a smaller Moment of Good, because confined to small Numbers. Whereas the more _extensive calm Instinct_ of Good-will, attended with Power, would have no Bounds in its good Effects, and would never lead into any Evil, as the particular Passions may: and hence it is made more lovely to our _Sense_, that we might be induced to cultivate and strengthen it; and make it check even _kind Passions_, when they are opposite to a greater Good." [Sidenote: _Moral Dispositions and Abilitys_.] X. From this primary Idea of _moral Good_ in Actions, may arise a Notion of moral _Good_ in those Dispositions, whether _natural_ or _acquir'd_, which enable us to do good to others; or which are presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpose; or are natural Indications of a good Temper, and usually accompany it. And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our Approbation of the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for _publick Mischief_, they make us hate him the more: Such are a _penetrating Judgment_, a _tenacious Memory_, a _quick Invention_; _Patience of Labour_, _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Watching_; a _Contempt_ of _Wealth_, _Rumour_, _Death_. These may be rather call'd _natural Abilitys_, than _moral Qualitys_: And we seem to have a natural Relish for them distinct from moral Approbation. But if we plainly see them _maliciously_ employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable. [Sidenote: _How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Sense of them_.] XI. To find a _universal Rule_ to compute the _Morality_ of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by ourselves, or by others, we must observe the following _Propositions_ or _Axioms_. 1. The moral _Importance_ of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his _Benevolence_ and _Abilitys_. For 'tis plain that his good Offices depend upon these two jointly. In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent obtains for himself, is in a like compound Proportion of his _selfish Principles_, and his _Abilitys_. We speak here only of the external Goods of this World, which one pursues from some selfish Principles. For as to internal Goods of the Mind, these are most effectually obtain'd by the Exercise of other Affections than those called _Selfish_, even those which carry the Agent beyond himself toward the Good of others. 2. In comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilitys are equal, the _Moments_ of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodness of the Temper, or the _Benevolence_; and when the _Tempers_ are equal, the Quantitys of Good are as the _Abilitys_. 3. The Virtue then or Goodness of Temper is directly as the _Moment of Good_, when other Circumstances are equal, and _inversly_ as the Abilitys. That is to say, where the Abilitys are greatest, there is less Virtue evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced. 4. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some _good_ to ourselves, and _evil_ to the Publick; and others _evil_ to ourselves, and _good_ to the Publick; or either _useful_ both to ourselves and others, or _pernicious_ to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always _Benevolence alone_; or of Evil, _Malice alone_ (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found); but in most Actions we must look upon _Self-Love_ as another Force, sometimes conspiring with _Benevolence_, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of _private Interest_, as well as _publick Good_; and sometimes opposing _Benevolence_, when the good Action is any way _difficult_ or _painful_ in the Performance, or _detrimental_ in its Consequences to the _Agent_. These _selfish Motives_ shall be[42] hereafter more fully explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word _Interest_: which when it concurs with _Benevolence_, in any Action capable of Increase or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of _Good_, than _Benevolence_ alone in the same _Abilitys_; and therefore when the _Moment_ of _Good_, in an Action partly intended for the _Good_ of the _Agent_, is but equal to the _Moment_ of _Good_ in the Action of _another Agent_, influenc'd only by _Benevolence_, the former is less _virtuous_; and in this Case the _Interest_ must be deducted to find the true Effect of the _Benevolence_ or _Virtue_. In the same manner, when _Interest_ is opposite to _Benevolence_, and yet is surmounted by it; this _Interest_ must be added to the _Moment_, to increase the _Virtue_ of the Action, or the Strength of the _Benevolence_. By _Interest_, in this last Case, is understood all the _Advantage_ which the _Agent_ might have obtain'd by omitting the Action, which is a _negative Motive_ to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes _positive_. [Footnote 42: Vide _Sect._ v.] [Sidenote: _Intention and Foresight affect Actions_.] But here we must observe, that no _Advantage_, not _intended_, altho' casually, or naturally, redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its _Morality_ to make it less _amiable_: nor does any _Difficulty_ or _Evil_ unforeseen, or not resolved upon, make a kind Action more _virtuous_; since in such Cases _Self-Love_ neither assists nor opposes _Benevolence_. Nay, _Self-Interest_ then only diminishes the _Benevolence_, when without this View of _Interest_ the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much _Good_ would not have been produc'd by the _Agent_; and it extenuates the _Vice_ of an _evil_ Action, only when without this _Interest_ the Action would not have been done by the _Agent_, or so much _Evil_ have been produc'd by him. The sixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each other's Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have _Benevolence_ sufficient to surmount any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much _Virtue_ in the _Agent_, tho' he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must be the Case with the Deity, to whom nothing is difficult. [Sidenote: _Perfect Virtue_.] Since then, in judging of the Goodness of Temper in any Agent, the Abilitys must come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none can act beyond their natural Abilitys; that must be the Perfection of Virtue, where the _Moment_ of Good produced equals the Ability, or when the _Being_ acts to the utmost of his Power for the _publick Good_; and hence the Perfection of _Virtue_, in this Case, is as _Unity_. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the _Stoicks_, "That a Creature suppos'd innocent, by pursuing _Virtue_ with his utmost Power, may in _Virtue_ equal the _Gods_." For in their Case, if the _Ability_ be _infinite_, unless the _Good_ to be produced in the whole, be so too, the _Virtue_ is not _absolutely perfect_; and the _Quotient_ can never surmount _Unity_. [Sidenote: _Moral Evil how computed_.] XII. In the same Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any Temper, _directly_ as the Moment of Evil effected, and _inversly_ as the Abilitys. The Springs of vicious Actions however are seldom any real ultimate Intention of Mischief, and never ultimate deliberate Malice; but only sudden Anger, Self-Love, some selfish Passion or Appetite, some kind Attachments to Parties, or particular kind Passions. The Motives of Interest may sometimes strongly cooperate with a depraved Temper, or may oppose it, in the same Manner that they cooperate with or oppose a good Temper. When they cooperate, they diminish the Moral Evil; when they oppose, they may argue the Depravity of Temper to be greater, which is able to surmount such Motives of Interest. [Sidenote: _Intention, Foresight_.] But we must observe, that not only _Innocence_ is expected from all Mortals, but they are presum'd, from their _Nature_, in some measure inclin'd to _publick Good_[43]; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to make an _Agent_ be reputed _evil_: Nor is a direct Intention of _publick Evil_ necessary to make an Action _evil_; it is enough that it flows from _Self-Love_, with a plain Neglect of the _Good_ of others, or an Insensibility of their Misery, which we either _actually_ foresee, or have a probable _Presumption_ of. [Footnote 43: See _Treatise_ IV. § 6.] It is true indeed, that _that publick Evil_ which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my _present Action_ criminal or odious; even altho' I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either _Malice_, or _want of Benevolence_. But then it is also certain, that my _prior Negligence_, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the Want of _that_ Degree of good Affections which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the _Guilt_ properly lies in this _Neglect_, rather than in an _Action_ which really flows from a _good Intention_. _Human Laws_ however, which cannot examine the _Intentions_, or secret Knowledge of the _Agent_, must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain. In like manner, no good Effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action _morally good_; however _Human Laws_ or _Governors_, who cannot search into Mens _Intentions_, or know their secret _Designs_, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good, altho' the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by _selfish Views_; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them. The Difference in _Degree of Guilt_ between _Crimes of Ignorance_, when the Ignorance is _vincible_, and _faulty_, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and _Crimes of Malice_, or direct evil Intention; consists in this, that the former, by a _prior Neglect_, argues a want of the due Degree of _Benevolence_, or _right Affection_; the latter evidences direct _evil Affections_, which are vastly more odious. [Sidenote: _Morality distinct from Interest_.] XIII. From the former Reasonings we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, "That we have a _Sense_ of _Goodness_ and _moral Beauty_ in Actions, distinct from _Advantage_;" for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the _Advantage_ which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward ourselves, we should make no Account of the _Abilitys_ of the _Agent_, but would barely esteem them according to their _Moment_. The _Abilitys_ come in only to shew the Degree of _Benevolence_, which supposes _Benevolence_ necessarily _amiable_. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a _barren rocky Farm_, or an _inconvenient House_, by being told that the _poor Farm_ gave as great Increase as it could; or that the _House_ accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose _Moment_ is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the _Beauty_ to alledge, "That it was all the _poor Agent_ could do for the _Publick_, or his _Friend_." [Sidenote: _Morality of Characters_.] XIV. The _moral Beauty_ of _Characters_ arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the _publick Good_, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their _fix'd Disposition_, and not according to any _particular Sallys_ of _unkind Passions_; altho' these abate the _Beauty_ of _good Characters_, as the Motions of the _kind Affections_ diminish the _Deformity_ of the _bad ones_. What then properly constitutes a _virtuous Character_, is not some few accidental Motions of _Compassion_, _natural Affection_, or _Gratitude_; but such a _fix'd Humanity_, or _Desire_ of the _publick Good_ of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of _Beneficence_; and makes us careful of informing ourselves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving their Interests. Every Motion indeed of the _kind Affections_ appears in some degree _amiable_; but we denominate the _Character_ from the _prevailing Principle_. [Sidenote: _Instinct may be the Spring of Virtue_.] XV. Some will not allow that Virtue can spring from Passions, Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. 'Tis true, kind particular Passions are but a lower kind of Goodness, even when they are not opposite to the general Good. Those _calmer Determinations_ of the Will, whether of greater or less Extent, or sedate strong Affections, or Desires of the Good of others, are more amiable. These may be as much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That "Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;" as if Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition could ever move to Action where there is no _End_ proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End[44]. For this see _Treatise_ IV. _Sect_. i. and ii. [Footnote 44: _These Gentlemen should either remember the common Doctrine of the Schools, or else confute it better; that the_ [Greek: psoairesis] _which is necessary in virtuous Actions is_ [Greek: orexis bouleulichê]: _And that Virtue needs not only the_ [Greek: logon alêthê] _but the_ [Greek: orexinosthên]. _These very Authors who deny any_ Affections _or Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs of sublime Virtue, yet, inconsistently with themselves, must allow in Men of sublime Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a settled_ Disposition of Will, _or a constant_ Determination, _or_ Desire _to act in Conformity to Reason, or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of Conduct. Now an ill-natur'd Adversary would call this an_ Instinct, _an Essential or Natural_ Disposition of Will, _an_ Affectionate Determination _toward a very sublime Object presented by the Understanding._ _See_ Aristotle's Magn. Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35. _and_ Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. _and in many other Places._] The ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one _his own Happiness_; and yet this he seeks by Instinct. Now may not another _Instinct_ toward the _Publick_, or the _Good_ of others, be as proper a Principle of _Virtue_, as the _Instinct_ toward _private Happiness_? This is certain, that whereas we behold the _selfish_ Actions of others, with _Indifference_ at best, we see something _amiable_ in every Action which flows from _kind Affections_ or _Passions_ toward others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any way to attain their End, consistently with the general Good. If it be said, "That Actions from _Instinct_ are not the Effect of _Prudence_ and _Choice_," this Objection holds full as strongly against the Actions which flow from _Self-Love_; since the Use of our Reason is as requisite to find the proper Means of promoting _publick Good_, as _private Good_. And as it must be an _Instinct_, or _a Determination previous to Reason_, which makes us pursue _private Good_, as well as _publick Good_ as our _End_; there is the same Occasion for _Prudence_ and _Choice_, in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I see no Harm in supposing, "That Men are _naturally_ dispos'd to _Virtue_, and not left _merely indifferent_, until some Prospect of Interest allures them to it." Surely, the Supposition of a _benevolent universal Instinct_ would recommend _human Nature_, and its Author, more to the _Love_ of a _good Man_, and leave Room enough for the Exercise of our _Reason_, in contriving and settling _Rights_, _Laws_, _Constitutions_; in _inventing_ Arts, and _practising_ them so as to gratify, in the most effectual manner, that _generous Inclination_. And if we must bring in _Self-Love_ to make _Virtue rational_, a little Reflection will discover, as shall appear hereafter, that this _Benevolence_ is our _greatest Happiness_; and thence we may resolve to cultivate, as much as possible, this _sweet Disposition_, and to despise every _opposite Interest_. Not that we can be _truly virtuous_, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which arises from _Beneficence_, without the _Love_ of _others_: Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of _disinterested Love_ to _others_, as the _Spring_ of our Actions. But _Self-Interest_ may be our _Motive_ in studying to raise these kind Affections, and to continue in this _agreeable State_; tho' it cannot be the _sole_ or _principal Motive_ of any Action, which to our _moral Sense_ appears _virtuous_[45]. [Footnote 45: _Tis thus we must understand many Places of_ Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, _and others of the Antients, when they speak of "a natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue." 'Tis acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution, and our several Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the natural Principles of Virtue, or the_ [Greek: phusichai arelai], _implanted in us: They appear to us the noblest Parts of our Nature; such are our_ Desires of Knowledge, _our_ Relish for Beauty, _especially of the_ Moral _Kind, our_ Sociable Affections. _These upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned general Instinct. We must not thence conclude, that all our Affections spring from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good_. Disinterested Affections _are presupposed as natural Parts of our Constitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of Choice for some private Good, nor ultimately pursuing it_. (_See_ Cicer. de Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) _This would be manifestly contrary to the most express Words of these great Men on Friendship, Patriotism, and other Subjects._ _See_ Aristotle _in the_ Magn. Moral. & Nicom. _on Friendship_; _and_ Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.] [Sidenote: _Heroism in all Stations_.] From the preceding _Reasonings_ we shall only draw this one Inference, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest Rank of Mankind, _viz._ "That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the _most heroick Virtue_." For how small soever the _Moment_ of _publick Good_ be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his _Abilitys_ are proportionably small, the _Virtue_ may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the _Prince_, the _Statesman_, the _General_, are capable of _true Heroism_, tho' these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus'd thro' various Nations and Ages: but when we find in an _honest Trader_, the _kind Friend_, the _faithful prudent Adviser_, the _charitable_ and _hospitable Neighbour_, the _tender Husband_, and _affectionate Parent_, the _sedate_ yet _chearful Companion_, the _generous Assistant_ of _Merit_, the _cautious Allayer_ of _Contention_ and _Debate_, the _Promoter_ of _Love_ and _good Understanding_ among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were _all_ the _good Offices_ which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge _this Character_ really as _amiable_, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, "That they are the _only Heroes_ in _Virtue_." SECT. IV. _All Mankind agree in_ this general Foundation _of their Approbation of_ moral Actions. _The Grounds of the_ different Opinions _about_ Morals. [Sidenote: _This Moral Sense universal_.] I. To shew how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the _universal Foundation_ of this _moral Sense, viz._ Benevolence, we have observ'd already[46], that when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we universally alledge its _Usefulness_ to the _Publick_, and not to the _Actor_ himself. If we are vindicating a censur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we generally make this one Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd nobody, or did more _Good_ than _Harm_." On the other hand, when we blame any Piece of Conduct, we shew it to be _prejudicial_ to others, besides the _Actor_; or to evidence at least a _Neglect_ of their Interest, when it was in our Power to serve them; or when _Gratitude_, _natural Affection_, or some other _disinterested Tye_ should have rais'd in us a Study of their Interest. If we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any Reflection upon its Tendency to _publick Evil_, it is generally occasion'd by our _Benevolence_, which makes us concern'd for the Evils befalling others[47]. We all know how great an Extenuation of Crimes it is, to allege, "That the poor Man does harm to nobody but himself;" and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet we shall find, that the greatest part of the Actions which are _immediately prejudicial_ to ourselves, and are often look'd upon as _innocent_ toward others, do really tend to the _publick Detriment_, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do. This is the Case of _Intemperance_ and _extravagant Luxury_. [Footnote 46: See above, _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 3. _Par._ 3.] [Footnote 47: _Beside that moral Approbation or Commendation, we have also an immediate natural Relish for certain Powers and Abilitys, and the regular Exercise of them; and a Dislike and Contempt of a Person who wants them, or has not cultivated them; when we don't think of any Subserviency to a publick Good. But this is rather perceiving a_ vigorous _or a_ mean _Character, than a_ virtuous _or_ vitious _one_.] [Sidenote: _Benevolence the sole ground of Approbation_.] II. And farther, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was ever approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill-grounded, of some _really good moral Quality_. If we observe the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is always some _really amiable_ and _benevolent Appearance_ which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging that Actions tend to the publick Good, which do not; or be so inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix'd on some _partial good Effects_, we may quite overlook many _evil Consequences_ which counterbalance the _Good_. Our _Reason_ may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the Tendency of Actions; but it is still some _apparent Species_ of _Benevolence_ which commands our Approbation. And _this Sense_, like our other Senses, tho' counteracted by stronger Motives of _external Advantage_, ceases not to operate, but makes us _uneasy_ and _dissatisfy'd_ with ourselves; even as the _Sense_ of _Tasting_ makes us loath and dislike the nauseous Potion, which we may force ourselves, from Interest, to swallow. [Sidenote: _False Approbations_.] It is therefore to no purpose to allege here, "That many Actions are really done, and approv'd, which tend to the _universal Detriment_." For the same way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time approv'd, which tend to the _Hurt_ of the _Actor_. But as we do not, from the _latter_, infer the _Actor_ to be void of _Self-Love_, or a _Sense_ of _Interest_; no more should we infer from the _former_, that such Men are void of a _Sense_ of _Morals_, or a Desire of _publick Good_. The Matter is plainly this: Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to _publick_, or _private Good_: Nay, sometimes _violent Passions_, while they last, will make them approve very bad Actions by their _Moral Sense_, and conceive very _pernicious ones_ to the _Agent_, to be _advantageous_: But this proves only, "That sometimes there may be some more _violent Motive_ to Action, than a _Sense_ of _moral Good_; or that Men by Passion may become blind even to their own _Interest_." But to prove that Men are void of a _moral Sense_, we should find some Instances of _cruel_, _malicious Actions_, done without any _Motive_ of _Interest_, _real_ or _apparent_; and approv'd without any Opinion of _Tendency to publick Good_, or _flowing from Good-will_: We must find a Country where _Murder_ in cold Blood, _Tortures_, and _every thing malicious_, without any _Advantage_, is, if not _approv'd_, at least look'd upon with _Indifference_, and raises _no Aversion_ toward the Actors in the unconcern'd Spectators: We must find Men with whom the _Treacherous_, _Ungrateful_, _Cruel_, are in the same account with the _Generous_, _Friendly_, _Faithful_, and _Humane_; and who approve the _latter_, no more than the _former_, in all Cases where they are not affected by the Influence of these Dispositions, or when the _natural Good_ or _Evil_ befals other Persons. And it may be question'd, whether the _Universe_, tho' large enough, and stor'd with no inconsiderable Variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance, not only of a _Nation_, but even of a _Club_, or a _single Person_, who will think all Actions _indifferent_, but those which regard his _own Concerns_. [Sidenote: _Diversity of Manners accounted for_.] III. From what has been said, we may easily account for the _vast Diversity_ of _moral Principles_, in _various Nations_ and _Ages_; and the Grounds of _this Diversity_ are principally these: [Sidenote: _From various Notions of_ Happiness.] 1st. Different Opinions of _Happiness_, or _natural Good_, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a _courageous Disposition_, where _Liberty_ is counted a _great Good_, and _War_ an _inconsiderable Evil_, all Insurrections in Defence of Privileges will have the Appearance of _moral Good_ to our _Sense_, because of their appearing _benevolent_; and yet the _same Sense_ of _moral Good_ in _Benevolence_, shall in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more _abject_ and _timorous_, where _Civil War_ appears the _greatest natural Evil_, and _Liberty_ no _great Purchase_, make the same Actions appear _odious_. So in Sparta, where thro' Contempt of Wealth the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the Thing chiefly desir'd, as _naturally good to the State_, was to abound in a _hardy shifting Youth_; _Theft_, if dexterously perform'd, was so little odious, that it receiv'd the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity. But in these, and all other Instances of the like Nature, the Approbation is founded on _Benevolence_, because of some real, or apparent Tendency to the _publick Good_. For we are not to imagine, that this _Sense_ should give us, without Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencys to _Good_ or _Evil_: it only determines us to approve _Benevolence_, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate _the contrary_. So our _Sense_ of _Beauty_ does not, without Reflection, Instruction or Observation, give us Ideas of the _regular Solids_, _Temples_, _Cirques_, and _Theatres_; but determines us to approve and delight in _Uniformity amidst Variety_, where-ever we observe it. Let us read the _Preambles_ of any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any disputed Practice by the _Moralists_, and we shall find, no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of the _natural good_ or _evil Consequences_ of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv'd, is still some Tendency to the _greater natural Good_ of others, apprehended by those who approve it. [Sidenote: _Travellers Accounts of barbarous Customs_.] The same Reason may remove also the Objections against the _Universality of this Sense_, from some Storys of Travellers, concerning _strange Crueltys_ practis'd toward the _Aged_, or _Children_, in certain Countrys. If such Actions be done in such angry Passions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower _Benevolence_ in its _strongest Ties_: and if they really be universally allow'd, look'd upon as innocent, and vindicated; it is certainly under some Appearance of _Benevolence_; such as to secure them from Insults of Enemys, to avoid the Infirmity's of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A Love of Pleasure and Ease, may in the immediate Agents be stronger in some Instances, than _Gratitude_ toward Parents, or _natural Affection_ to Children. But that such Nations are continu'd, notwithstanding all the Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of _natural Affection_: For I fansy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain Number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of _publick Good_ was the Ground of Laws equally barbarous, enabled by Lycurgus and Solon, of killing the Deform'd, or Weak, to prevent a burdensome Croud of useless Citizens. A late ingenious Author[48] has justly observ'd the Absurdity of the _monstrous Taste_, which has possess'd both the _Readers_ and _Writers_ of _Travels_. They are sparing enough in Accounts of the _natural Affections_, _the Familys_, _Associations_, _Friendships_, _Clans_, of the _Indians_; and as transiently do they mention their Abhorrence of _Treachery_ among themselves; their _Proneness_, to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several _States_; their Contempt of Death in Defence of their Country, or upon Points of _Honour_. "These are but _common Storys_.--No need to travel to the _Indies_ for what we see in _Europe_ every Day." The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting _Horror_, and making Men _stare_. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk of the _Indians_ in Support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the _Prodigious_: But a _Human Sacrifice_, a Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of _Indians_, in Nations no Strangers to the _Massacre_ at _Paris_, the _Irish Rebellion_, or the Journals of the _Inquisition_. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the _Indian Sacrifices_, flowing from a like Perversion of _Humanity_ by _Superstition_, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous _Credulity_ of some Gentlemen of great Pretensions in other Matters to Caution of Assent, for these _marvellous Memoirs_ of Monks, Friars, Sea-Captains, Pirates; and for the _Historys_, _Annals_, _Chronologys_, receiv'd by oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks. [Footnote 48: Ld. Shaftsbury, Vol. i, p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.] [Sidenote: _Use of Reason in Morals_.] Men have _Reason_ given them, to judge of the Tendencys of their Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of _publick Good_; but it is still some Appearance of _Good_ which they pursue. And it is strange, that _Reason_ is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places; and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very _Opinions_, shall seem an Argument against any _moral Sense_, altho' the bad Conduct is not owing to any Irregularity in the _moral Sense_, but to a wrong _Judgment_ or _Opinion_. If putting the _Aged_ to _Death_, with all its Consequences, really tends to the _publick Good_, and the _lesser Misery_ of the _Aged_, it is, no doubt, _justifiable_; nay, perhaps the _Aged_ choose it, in Hopes of a _future State_. If a _deform'd_ or _weak Race_ could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is _just_ to put them to Death. This all allow to be _just_, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for _killing_ of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from _Self-Love_; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any-where. If _Wood_ or _Stone_, or _Metal_ be Deities, have _Government_, and _Power_, and have been the _Authors_ of _Benefits_ to us; it is _morally amiable_ to praise and worship them. Or if the true Deity be pleas'd with Worship before _Statues_, or any _other Symbol_ of some more _immediate Presence_ or _Influence_; _Image-Worship_ is _virtuous_. If _he_ delights in _Sacrifices_, _Penances_; _Ceremonys_, _Cringings_; they are _all laudable_. Our _Sense_ of _Virtue_ generally leads us exactly enough according to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no _Reason_, than that they have no _moral Sense_ of _Beauty_ in Actions. [Sidenote: _Narrow Systems pervert the moral Sense_.] IV. The next _Ground_ of _Diversity_ in Sentiments, is the _Diversity_ of _Systems_, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their _Benevolence_. We intimated above[49], that it is _regular_ and _beautiful_, to have _stronger Benevolence_ toward the _morally good_ Parts of Mankind, who are _useful_ to the _Whole_, than toward the _useless_ or _pernicious_. Now, if Men receive a _low_ or _base Opinion_ of any _Body_, or _Sect_ of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless _Burdens_ of the Earth; _Benevolence_ itself will lead them to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason why, among Nations who have high Notions of _Virtue_, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for _just_; why Romans and Greeks could approve of making those they call'd _Barbarians_, _Slaves_. [Footnote 49: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 10. _Par._ 1.] [Sidenote: _Sects pernicious to Virtue_.] A late ingenious Author[50] justly observes, "That the various _Sects_, _Partys_, _Factions_, _Cabals_ of Mankind in larger Societys, are all influenc'd by a _publick Spirit_: That some generous Notions of _publick Good_, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, and excite Men of the same _Faction_ or _Cabal_ to the most disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions, and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc'd by a sociable _publick Spirit_ in a limited System." But certain it is, that Men are little oblig'd to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent _Commerce_, or _Manufactures_, Cabals for Defence of _Liberty_, against a _Tyrant_; or even lower Clubs for _Pleasantry_, or _Improvement_ by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when Mens Heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable Notion of _Sanctity_ and _Religion_, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to God, or our own _Species_; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each other as _odious_, _contemptible_, _profane_, because of their different Tenets or Opinions; even when these Tenets, whether true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the publick Good; when the keenest Passions are rais'd about such Trifles, and Men begin to hate each other for what, of itself, has no Evil in it; and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite Sects; (which is what all Partys commonly call _Zeal_) 'tis then no Wonder, if our _moral Sense_ be much impair'd, and our _natural Notions_ of _Good_ and _Evil_ almost lost, when our _Admiration_, and _Love_ or _Contempt_, and _Hatred_, are thus perverted from their natural Objects. [Footnote 50: Ld. Shaftesbury's Essay on Wit and Humour, _Part_ iii. _Sect._ ii. _Vol._ 1. p. 110.] If any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the _Party-Tenets_ of most of our Sects; or, if they have heard of them, have either never espous'd any Sect, or all equally; they bid fairest for a truly _natural_ and _good_ Disposition, because their _Tempers_ have never been soured about vain Trifles; nor have they contracted any _Sullenness_ or _Rancour_ against any Part of their own _Kind_. If any _Opinions_ deserve to be contended for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the Deity, and of our _Fellow-Creatures_: If any Opinions deserve Opposition, they are such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the _Goodness_ of Providence, or represent our Fellow-Creatures as _base_ and _selfish_, by instilling into us some ill-natur'd, cunning, shrewd Insinuations, "That our most generous Actions proceed wholly from _selfish Views_." This wise _Philosophy_ of some _Moderns_, after Epicurus, must be fruitful of nothing but _Discontent_, _Suspicion_, and _Jealousy_; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory _Injurys_, to which we might be expos'd by a good-natur'd _Credulity_. But Thanks be to the kind Author of our Nature, that in spite of such Opinions, our _Nature_ itself leads us into _Friendship_, _Trust_, and _mutual Confidence_. Were we freely conversant with _Robbers_, who shew a _moral Sense_ in the _equal_ or _proportionable Division_ of their Prey, and in _Faith_ to each other, we should find they have their own sublime _moral Ideas_ of their Party, as _generous_, _courageous_, _trusty_, nay _honest_ too; and that those we call _honest_ and _industrious_, are imagin'd by them to be _mean-spirited_, _selfish_, _churlish_, or _luxurious_; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow'd, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our _profess'd Debauchees_, our _most dissolute Rakes_, we shall find their Vices cloath'd, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of _Liberty_, _Generosity_, _just Resentment_ against the Contrivers of artful Rules to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures. Perhaps never any Men pursu'd Vice long with Peace of Mind, without some such deluding Imagination of _moral Good_[51], while they may be still inadvertent to the _barbarous_ and _inhuman Consequences_ of their Actions. The Idea of an _ill-natur'd Villain_ is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we shall find, that the _basest Actions_ are dress'd in some _tolerable Mask_. What others call _Avarice_, appears to the _Agent_ a _prudent Care_ of a _Family_, or _Friends_; _Fraud_, _artful Conduct_; _Malice_ and _Revenge_, a _just Sense_ of _Honour_, and a _Vindication_ of our Right in Possessions, or Fame; _Fire_ and _Sword_, and _Desolation_, among Enemys, a _just thorow Defence_ of _our Country_; _Persecution_, a _Zeal_ for the _Truth_, and for the _eternal Happiness_ of Men, which _Hereticks_ oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a _Sense_ of _Virtue_ upon _false Opinions_, and _mistaken Benevolence_; upon _wrong_ or _partial Views_ of _publick Good_, and the Means to promote it; or upon very _narrow Systems_ form'd by like _foolish Opinions_. It is not a _Delight_ in the Misery of others, or _Malice_, which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our Historys; but generally an _injudicious_, _unreasonable Enthusiasm_ for some kind of _limited Virtue_. [Footnote 51: See below, _Sect._ vi. _Art._ 2. _Par._ 1.] _Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui, Ultra, quam satis est,_ virtutem _si petat ipsam_.[52] [Sidenote: _False Opinions of the divine Laws_.] V. The last Ground of _Diversity_ which occurs, are the _false Opinions_ of the _Will_ or _Laws_ of the Deity. To obey these we are determin'd from _Gratitude_, and a _Sense_ of _Right_ imagin'd in the Deity, to dispose at Pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have produc'd _Follys_, _Superstitions_, _Murders_, _Devastations_ of Kingdoms, from a Sense of _Virtue_ and _Duty_, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we may observe, "That all those _Follys_, or _Barbaritys_, rather confirm than destroy the Opinion of a _moral Sense_;" since the Deity is believ'd to have a _Right_ to dispose of his Creatures; and _Gratitude_ to him, if he be conceiv'd _good_, must move us to Obedience to his Will: if he be not conceiv'd _good_, _Self-Love_ may overcome our _moral Sense_ of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury. [Footnote 52: Hor. _Ep._ 6. _Lib._ 1. _Ver._ 15.] As for the Vices which commonly proceed from _Love_ of _Pleasure_, or any _violent Passion_, since generally the _Agent_ is soon sensible of their _Evil_, and that sometimes amidst the Heat of the Action, they only prove, "That this _moral Sense_ and _Benevolence_ may be overcome by the more importunate Solicitations of _other Desires_." [Sidenote: _Objection from Incest_.] VI. Before we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the strongest Objections against what has been said so often, _viz._ "That this _Sense_ is _natural_, and independent on _Custom_ and _Education_." The Objection is this, "That we shall find _some Actions_ always attended with the strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations, in which there appears nothing contrary to _Benevolence_; and that the _same Actions_ shall in another Nation be counted _innocent_, or _honourable_. Thus Incest, among _Christians_, is abhorr'd at first Appearance as much as _Murder_; even by those who do not know or reflect upon any necessary Tendency of it to the Detriment of Mankind. Now we generally allow, that what is from _Nature_ in one Nation, would be so in all. This Abhorrence therefore cannot be from _Nature_, since in Greece, the marrying Half-sisters was counted _honourable_; and among the _Persian_ Magi, the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may not all our _Approbation_ or _Dislike_ of Actions arise the same way from _Custom_ and _Education_?" The Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said. Had we no _moral Sense natural_ to us, we should only look upon _Incest_ as hurtful to ourselves, and shun it, and never disapprove other _incestuous Persons_, more than we do a _broken Merchant_; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a _Sense_ of _moral Good_. And farther, it is true, that many who abhor _Incest_ do not know, or reflect upon the natural Tendency of some sorts of _Incest_ to the _publick Detriment_: but where-ever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the Deity, and that it exposes the Person concern'd to his just Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg'd to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the Deity, to whom it is under such Obligations. This then is plainly _a moral evil Quality_ apprehended in _Incest_, and reducible to the general Foundation of _Malice_, or rather Want of _Benevolence_. Nay farther, where this Opinion, "That _Incest_ is offensive to the Deity," prevails, _Incest_ must have another direct Contrariety to _Benevolence_; since we must apprehend the _Incestuous_, as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of _Nature_, to the lowest State of _Misery_ and _Baseness_, _Infamy_ and _Punishment_. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of the Deity's abhorring or prohibiting _Incest_; if no obvious _natural Evils_ attend it, it may be look'd upon as _innocent_. And farther, as Men who have the _Sense_ of _Tasting_, may, by _Company_ and _Education_, have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as _unsavoury_; so may Men who have a _moral Sense_, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith, of the _moral Evil_ of Actions, altho' they do not themselves discern in them any Tendency to _natural Evil_; imagining that others do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated, which raise an Abhorrence without Reason. But without a _moral Sense_ we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View than as _naturally disadvantageous_ to ourselves. [Sidenote: _Moral Sense not from Education_.] VII. The _Universality_ of this _moral Sense_, and that it is antecedent to _Instruction_, may appear from observing the Sentiments of _Children_, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain'd as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where _Kindness_ and _Humanity_ are found; and detest the _Cruel_, the _Covetous_, the _Selfish_, or the _Treacherous_. How strongly do we see their Passions of _Joy_, _Sorrow_, _Love_, and _Indignation_, mov'd by these _moral Representations_, even tho' there have been no Pains taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of _Laws_, of a _future State_, or of the more intricate Tendency of the _universal Good_ to that of each _Individual_! SECT. V. _A farther Confirmation, that we have_ practical Dispositions _to_ Virtue _implanted in our_ Nature; _with a farther Explication of our Benevolent_ Instincts _of various Kinds, with the_ additional Motives _of_ Interest, _viz._ Honour, Shame _and_ Pity. [Sidenote: _Degrees of Benevolence_.] I. We have already endeavoured to prove, "That there is a _universal Determination_ to _Benevolence_ in _Mankind_, even toward the most distant Parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine, that all benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alike strong. There are nearer and stronger Kinds of _Benevolence_, when the Objects stand in some nearer Relations to ourselves, which have obtain'd distinct Names; such as _natural Affection_, _Gratitude_, _Esteem_. [Sidenote: _Natural Affection_.] One Species of _natural Affection_, viz. that in _Parents_ towards their _Children_, has been consider'd already[53]; we shall only observe farther, That there is the same kind of _Affection_ among _collateral Relations_, tho' in a weaker Degree; which is universally observable, where no Opposition of _Interest_ produces contrary Actions, or counterbalances the Power of this _natural Affection_. [Footnote 53: See above, _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 9. _Par._ 2, 3.] [Sidenote: _Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance_.] We may also observe, that as to the _Affection_ of _Parents_, it cannot be entirely founded on _Merit_ and _Acquaintance_; not only because it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion _Esteem_; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce _Hatred_, even toward _Children_ apprehended to be _vitious_. And this _Affection_ is farther confirm'd to be from Nature, because it is always observ'd to _descend_, and not _ascend_ from _Children_ to _Parents_ mutually. Nature, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly determin'd _Parents_ to the Care of their _Children_, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it to _Reflection_, and a _Sense_ of _Gratitude_, to produce Returns of _Love in Children_, toward such _tender kind Benefactors_, who very seldom stand in such absolute Need of Support from their Posterity, as their Children did from them. Now, did _Acquaintance_ or _Merit_ produce _natural Affection_, we surely should find it strongest in _Children_, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin'd to _Mankind_, but extends to other _Animals_, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ'd to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any Service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their _Dams_. But as it is otherwise with _rational Agents_, so _their Affections_ are of longer Continuance, even during their whole Lives. [Sidenote: _Gratitude_.] II. But nothing will give us a juster Idea of the _wise Order_ in which _human Nature_ is form'd for _universal Love_, and _mutual good Offices_, than considering _that strong Attraction_ of _Benevolence_, which we call _Gratitude_. Every one knows that _Beneficence_ toward ourselves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises _Gratitude_, or a _stronger Love_ toward the _Benefactor_, than _equal Beneficence_ toward a _third Person_[54]. Now because of the great Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habitations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to great Multitudes; that our _Benevolence_ might not be quite distracted with Maultiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our Regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes, whose Interests we could not understand, nor be capable of promoting, having no Intercourse of Offices with them; Nature has so well ordered it, that as our Attention is more raised by those good Offices which are done to ourselves or our Friends, so they cause a stronger Sense of Approbation in us, and produce a stronger Benevolence toward the Authors of them. This we call _Gratitude_. And thus a Foundation is laid for _joyful Associations_ in all kinds of _Business_, and _virtuous Friendships_. [Footnote 54: See above, _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 6. _Par._ 3.] By _this Constitution_ also the _Benefactor_ is more encourag'd in his _Beneficence_, and better secur'd of an _Increase_ of Happiness by _grateful Returns_[55], than if his _Virtue_ were only to be honour'd by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern'd, who could not know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would all be equally determin'd to love innumerable Multitudes, whose equal Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love. [Footnote 55: See above, _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 2. _Par._ 2.] The _universal Benevolence_ toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of _Gravitation_, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the _Universe_; but _increases_ as the Distance is diminish'd, and is _strongest_ when Bodys come to touch each other. Now this _Increase_, upon nearer Approach, is as necessary as that there should be any _Attraction_ at all. For a _general Attraction_, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such Multitudes of equal Forces, put an End to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it altogether. Beside this general Attraction, the Learned in these Subjects shew us a great many other Attractions among several Sorts of Bodys, answering to some particular Sorts of Passions, from some special Causes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of each Body cohere, may represent the Self-Love of each Individual. These different Sorts of Love to Persons according to their _nearer Approaches_ to _ourselves_ by their _Benefits_, is observable in the high Degree of _Love_, which _Heroes_ and _Lawgivers_ universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of _Friendship_, _Acquaintance_, _Neighbourhood_, _Partnership_; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of Human Society. [Sidenote: _Love of Honour_.] III. From considering that _natural Gratitude_, and _Love_ toward our _Benefactors_, which was already shewn to be _disinterested_[56]; we are easily led to consider _another Determination_ of our _Minds_, equally _natural_ with the _former_, which is to desire and delight in the _good Opinion_ and _Love of others_, even when we expect no other _Advantage_ from them, except what flows from _this Constitution_, whereby Honour is made an _immediate Good_. This Desire of _Honour_ I would call Ambition, had not _Custom_ join'd some evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote such a _violent Desire_ of _Honour_, and of _Power_ also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by Nature subjected to a _grievous Sensation_ of _Misery_, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other _Evil_ from them. This we call Shame; which in the same manner is constituted an _immediate Evil_, as we said _Honour_ was an _immediate Good_. [Footnote 56: See above, _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 6.] Now, were there no _moral Sense_, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as _advantageous_ or _hurtful_, I see no Reason why we should be _delighted_ with _Honour_, or subjected to the _Uneasiness_ of _Shame_; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, should ever be _uneasy_ at its being known to _all the World_. The _World_ may have an Opinion of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this Opinion of the _World_? Why, perhaps, he shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only Reason of _Shame_, and it has no _immediate Evil_ or _Pain_ in it, distinct from Fear of Loss, then, where-ever we expose ourselves to Loss, we should be _asham'd_, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it is quite otherwise. A Merchant, for Instance, lest it should impair his Credit, conceals a _Ship-wreck_, or a very bad _Market_, which he has sent his Goods to. But is this the same with the Passion of Shame? Has he that _Anguish_, that _Dejection_ of _Mind_, and _Self-condemnation_, which one shall have whose _Treachery_ is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd _morally good_, tho' they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense; that is, the Opinion of their _Wealth_, or _Fitness_ for Business? Was any Man ever _asham'd_ of impoverishing himself to serve his _Country_, or his _Friend_? [Sidenote: _The Foundation of Morals not the Opinions of our Country_.] IV. The _Opinions_ of our Country are by some made the first Standard of _Virtue_. They alledge, "That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between _moral Good_ and _Evil_: And then, say they, Ambition, or the _Love_ of Honour, is our _chief Motive_." But what is _Honour_? It is not the being universally known, no matter how. A _covetous Man_ is not _honour'd_ by being universally known as _covetous_; nor a _weak_, _selfish_, or _luxurious Man_, when he is known to be so: Much less can a _treacherous_, _cruel_ or _ungrateful Man_, be said to be _honour'd_ for his being known as such. A _Posture-master_, a _Fire-eater_, or _Practiser_ of _Leger-de-main_, is not _honour'd_ for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of _Admiration_ and _Surprize_ to Multitudes. _Honour_ then is _the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum'd to be apply'd that way_; for _Abilitys_ constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now it is certain, that _Ambition_, or Love of _Honour_, is really _selfish_; but then this Determination to love _Honour_, presupposes a _Sense_ of _moral Virtue_, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it. And let it be observ'd, that if we knew an _Agent_ had no other Motive of Action than _Ambition_, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any _Love_ to others, or _Desire_ to their Happiness. When _Honour_ is thus constituted by Nature _pleasant_ to us, it may be an _additional Motive_ to _Virtue_, as, we said above[57], the Pleasure arising from _Reflection on our Benevolence_ was: but the Person whom we imagine _perfectly virtuous_, acts immediately from the _Love_ of others; however these refin'd Interests may be _joint Motives_ to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every _kind Inclination_, and to despise every _contrary Interest_, as giving a smaller Happiness than _Reflection_ on his own Virtue, and _Consciousness_ of the Esteem of others. Shame is in the same manner constituted an _immediate Evil_, and influences us the same way to abstain from _moral Evil_: not that any Action or Omission would appear _virtuous_, where the _sole Motive_ was Fear of _Shame_. [Footnote 57: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 15. _Par._ 2.] [Sidenote: _Opinions flow from the Moral Sense_.] V. But to inquire farther, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of _moral Good or Evil_: If any Opinion be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ'd to be _advantageous_ to the _Agent_, we may be led to believe so too, and then _Self-Love_ may make us undertake it; or may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed _pernicious_ to the _Agent_. If an Action pass for _advantageous_ to the _Publick_, we may believe so too; and what next? If we have no _disinterested Benevolence_, what shall move us to undertake it? "Why, we love _Honour_; and to obtain this Pleasure, we will undertake the Action from _Self-Interest_." Now, is _Honour_ only the Opinion of our Country, that an Action is _advantageous_ to the _Publick_? No: we see no Honour paid to the _useful Treachery_ of an Enemy, whom we have brib'd to our Side, to _casual undesign'd Services_, or to the most useful Effects of _Compulsion_ on _Cowards_; and yet we see Honour paid to _unsuccessful Attempts_ to serve the Publick from sincere Love to it. _Honour_ then presupposes a _Sense_ of something _amiable_ besides _Advantage_, _viz._ a _Sense_ of _Excellence_ in a _publick Spirit_; and therefore the _first Sense_ of _moral Good_ must be antecedent to _Honour_; for _Honour_ is founded upon it[58]. The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the _publick Good_; but that our Company _honours_ such Actions, and loves the _Agent_, must flow from a _Sense_ of _some Excellence_ in this Love of the _Publick_, and serving its Interests. [Footnote 58: _This should be considered by those who talk much of_ Praise, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory, _as Things much desired; while yet they allow no_ moral Sense.] "We therefore, say they again, pretend to _love_ the _Publick_, altho' we only desire the Pleasure of _Honour_; and we will applaud all who seem to act in that manner, either that we may reap _Advantage_ from their Actions, or that others may believe we _really love_ the _Publick_." But shall any Man ever be heartily _approved_ and _admired_, when we know that _Self-Love_ is the only Spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or, shall we ever really admire Men who appear to _love_ the _Publick_, without a _moral Sense_? No: we could form no Idea of such a Temper; and as for these Pretenders to _publick Love_, we should hate them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had a _moral Sense_, provided we had none ourselves: They never could make us admire _Virtue_, or _virtuous Characters_ in others; but could only give us Opinions of _Advantage_ or _Disadvantage_ in Actions, according as they tended to procure to us the Pleasures of _Honour_, or the Pain of Shame. But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a _moral Sense_ of _Goodness_ in Actions; and that they are capable of _disinterested Love_; all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude, that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are _morally evil_, when perhaps they are not so; and then _our Sense_ may determine us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the same way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as _good_; and then our Desire of _Honour_ may cooperate with _Benevolence_, to move us to such Actions. But, had we no _Sense_ of _moral Qualitys_ in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as _advantageous_ or _hurtful_, we never could have _honour'd_ or _lov'd Agents_ for _publick Love_, or had any Regard to their Actions, farther than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of _publick Good_, but we had never desir'd it, farther than it tended to our own _private Interest_, without a Principle of _Benevolence_; nor admir'd and lov'd those who are studious of it, without a _moral Sense_. So far is _Virtue_ from being (in the Language of a late Author[59]) _the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride_; that _Pride_, in the bad Meaning of that Word, is _the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense_, _and Flattery_ only _an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-Love in the Flatterer_. [Footnote 59: Author of the Fable of the Bees, _Pag._ 37. 3_d Ed._] [Sidenote: _Moral Sense, not from Love of Honour_.] VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of _Honour_: Suppose a State or Prince, observing the Money which is drawn out of _England_ by _Italian Musicians_, should decree _Honours_, _Statues_, _Titles_, for _great Musicians_: This would certainly excite all who had Hopes of Success, to the Study of _Musick_; and all Men would look upon the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a _good Ear_, or make them delight in _Harmony_? Or could it ever make us really love a _Musician_, who study'd nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a _Patriot_, or a _generous Friend_? I doubt, not. And yet _Friendship_, without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear _exceedingly amiable_. Let us take another Instance: Suppose _Statues_ and _triumphal Arches_ were decreed, as well as a _large Sum_ of _Money_, to the Discoverer of the _Longitude_, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks: This would raise an universal Desire of such Knowledge from _Self-Love_; but would Men therefore love a _Mathematician_, as they do a _virtuous Man_? Would a _Mathematician_ love every Person who had attain'd Perfection in that Knowledge, where-ever he observ'd it, altho' he knew that it was not accompany'd with any _Love_ to _Mankind_, or _Study_ of their _Good_, but with _Ill-nature_, _Pride_, _Covetousness_? In short, let us honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please; if we do not discern a _benevolent Intention_ in the Application, or presume upon it, we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who is possess'd of them; but they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of _Esteem_ and _Love_, which our _Nature_ determines us to appropriate to _Benevolence_ or _Virtue_. Love of _Honour_, and Aversion to _Shame_, may often move us to do Actions, for which others profess to honour us, even tho' we see no Good in them ourselves: And _Compliance_ with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the _Agent_, from Spectators who see no _moral Good_ in the Action itself. But without some _Sense_ of _Good_ in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy'd with themselves, when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the Case with us, as to _Virtue_; and therefore we must have, by Nature, a _moral Sense_ of it antecedent to _Honour_. [Footnote 60: See the Fable of the Bees, _Page_ 38. 3_d Ed._] This will shew us with what Judgment a late Author[60] compares the Original of our Ideas of _Virtue_, and Approbation of it, to _the manner of regulating the Behaviour of_ aukward _Children by Commendation_. It shall appear hereafter[61], that our Approbation of some _Gestures_, and what we call _Decency_ in Motion, depends upon some _moral Ideas_ in People of advanc'd Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only _good Nature_, an _Inclination_ to please, and _Love_ of _Praise_, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir'd; and not any Perception of _Excellence_ in this Behaviour. Hence they are not solicitous about Gestures when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to Company; nor do they ever love or approve others for any Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the Connexion between _Gestures_ and _moral Qualitys_; or reflect on the _good Nature_, which is evidenc'd by such a Compliance with the Desire of the Company. [Footnote 61: See _Sect._ vi. _Art._ 4.] [Sidenote: _False Honour_.] VII. The considering _Honour_ in the manner above explain'd may shew us the Reason, why Men are often _asham'd_ for things which are not _vitious_, and _honour'd_ for what is not _virtuous_. For, if any Action only appears _vitious_ to any Persons or Company, altho' it be not so, they will have a bad Idea of the _Agent_; and then he may be asham'd, or suffer Uneasiness, in being thought _morally evil_. The same way, those who look upon an Action as _morally good_, will honour the _Agent_; and he may be pleas'd with the _Honour_, altho' he does not himself perceive any _moral Good_ in what has procur'd it. [Sidenote: _Moral Incapacity, matter of Shame_.] Again, we shall be _asham'd_ of every Evidence of _moral Incapacity_, or Want of _Ability_; and with good Ground, when this Want is occasion'd by our own Negligence. Nay farther, if any Circumstance be look'd upon as _indecent_ in any Country, _offensive_ to others, or _deform'd_; we shall, out of our Desire of the good Opinions of others, be _asham'd_ to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on _Nature_, but is merely the Effect of _Custom_. Thus being observ'd in those Functions of Nature which are counted _indecent_ and _offensive_, will make us _uneasy_, altho' we are sensible that they really do not argue any _Vice_ or _Weakness_. But on the contrary, since _moral Abilitys_ of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a good Application, and of having been acquired by Virtue, procure the Esteem of others, we shall value ourselves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham'd of any Discovery of our Want of such _Abilitys_. This is the Reason that _Wealth_ and _Power_, the great _Engines_ of _Virtue_, when presum'd to be intended for _benevolent_ Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure _Honour_ from others, and are apt to beget _Pride_ in the _Possessor_; which, as it is a general Passion, which may be either _good_ or _evil_, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be _the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it_. The same are the Effects of _Knowledge_, _Sagacity_, _Strength_; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them. But, whenever it appears that Men have only their _private Advantage_ in View, in the Application of these _Abilitys_, or _natural Advantages_, the _Honour_ ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more, when there is any Suspicion of an _ill-natur'd_ Application. Thus some _Misers_ are asham'd of their _Wealth_, and study to conceal it; as the _Malicious_ or _Selfish_ do their _Power_: Nay, this is very often done, where there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their _Abilitys_, increases the _moral Good_ of any little kind Action, which they can find in their Hearts to perform. [Sidenote: _Selfishness shameful_.] In short, we always see Actions which flow from _publick Love_, accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only _malicious_, but even _selfish ones_, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of _private Pleasure_ is the ordinary Occasion of _Vice_; and when Men have got any lively Notions of _Virtue_, they generally begin to be asham'd of every thing which betrays _Selfishness_, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal'd from those who do not partake with us. Such are _venereal Pleasures_ between _Persons marry'd_, and even _eating_ and _drinking_ alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks: whereas a _hospitable Table_ is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other kind generous Offices between _marry'd Persons_, where there is no Suspicion of _Self-Love_ in the _Agent_; but he is imagin'd as acting from Love to his _Associate_. This, I fansy, first introduc'd Ideas of _Modesty_ in polite Nations, and _Custom_ has strengthen'd them wonderfully; so that we are now asham'd of many things, upon some confus'd implicit Opinions of _moral Evil_, tho' we know not upon what account. [Sidenote: _Honour and Shame often from some Associations of Ideas_.] Here too we may see the Reason, why we are not asham'd of any of the Methods of _Grandeur_, or _High-Living_. There is such a Mixture of _moral Ideas_, of _Benevolence_, of _Abilitys_ kindly employ'd; so many Dependants _supported_, so many Friends _entertain'd_, _assisted_, _protected_; such a _Capacity_ imagin'd for _great_ and _amiable Actions_, that we are never asham'd, but rather boast of such _things_. We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather desire that our _State_ and _Magnificence_ should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of _moral Ideas_, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of _State_, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could any Man be pleas'd with a Company of _Statues_ surrounding his Table, so artfully contriv'd as to consume his various Courses, and inspir'd by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling Returns in Praise of their Fare? Or with so many _Machines_ to perform the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee? The _Shame_ we suffer from the Meanness of _Dress_, _Table_, _Equipage_, is intirely owing to the same Reason. This Meanness is often imagin'd to argue _Avarice_, _Meanness_ of _Spirit_, Want of _Capacity_, or _Conduct_ in Life, of _Industry_, or _moral Abilitys_ of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion'd by a _good_ Action. How many would be asham'd to be surpriz'd at a Dinner of _cold Meat_, who will boast of their having fed upon _Dogs_ and _Horses_ at the Siege of _Derry_? And they will all tell you, that they were not, nor are asham'd of it. This ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between _external Grandeur_, _Regularity_ in _Dress_, _Equipage_, _Retinue_, _Badges_ of _Honour_, and some _moral Abilitys_ greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more Consequence in the World than some _recluse Philosophers_ apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count _miraculous_, _viz._ That _civil Governors_ of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible _Awe_ and _Authority_, quell the Spirits of _Vulgar_, and keep them in Subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those Associations which might be rais'd among the _Disaffected_, or _Factious_ of any _State_; who are daring enough among their _Equals_, and shew a Sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize. Hence also we may discover the Reason, why the gratifying our _superior Senses_ of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_, or the Enjoyment of the Pleasure of _Knowledge_, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho' our Enjoyment were known to all the _World_. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a Nature, as to afford the same Delights to Multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that, altho' we pursue these Enjoyments from _Self-Love_, yet, since our Enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin'd any way _inhumanly selfish_, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same _Regularity_ or _Harmony_ which delights me, may at the same time delight Multitudes; the same _Theorem_ shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd Thousands. Men therefore are not asham'd of such Pursuits, since they never, of themselves, seduce us into any thing _malicious_, _envious_, or _ill-natur'd_; nor does any one apprehend another _too selfish_, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure[62]. This View of _Honour_ and _Shame_ may also let us see the Reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais'd, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really _selfish_; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by Hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we choose Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do not share with us. [Footnote 62: See another Reason of this, perhaps more probably true, in the _Essay on the Passions_, p. 6.] [Sidenote: _Compassion a Motive to Virtue_.] VIII. Let us next consider another Determination of our _Mind_, which strongly proves _Benevolence_ to be _natural_ to us, and that is Compassion; by which we are dispos'd to study the _Interest_ of others, without any Views of _private Advantage_. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv'd in, unless the Person be imagin'd _evil_ in a _moral Sense_: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov'd, even in that Case. _Advantage_ may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome _Pity_; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of _Hatred_ or _Anger_ may represent a Person as _absolutely evil_, and so extinguish _Pity_; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another _disinterested_ View may even in cold Blood overcome _Pity_; such as _Love_ to _our Country_, or _Zeal_ for _Religion_. _Persecution_ is generally occasion'd by _Love_ of _Virtue_, and a _Desire_ of the _eternal Happiness_ of _Mankind_, altho' our _Folly_ makes us choose absurd Means to promote it; and is often accompany'd with _Pity_ enough to make the _Persecutor_ uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chooses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the _Heretick_ as _absolutely_ and _intirely evil_. We may here observe, how wonderfully the Constitution of _human Nature_ is adapted to move _Compassion_. Our _Misery_ or _Distress_ immediately appears in our _Countenance_, if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who, from Observation, universally understand the Meaning of those _dismal Airs_. We _mechanichally_ send forth _Shrieks_ and _Groans_ upon any surprizing Apprehension of _Evil_; so that no Regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them. This is the Voice of Nature, understood by all Nations, by which all who are present are rous'd to our Assistance, and sometimes our _injurious_ Enemy is made to relent. We observ'd above[63], that we are not immediately excited by _Compassion_ to desire the _Removal_ of our own Pain: we think it just to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we are excited directly to desire the _Relief_ of the Miserable; without any Imagination, that this Relief is a _private Good_ to ourselves: And if we see this impossible, we may by _Reflection_ discern it to be vain for us to indulge our _Compassion_ any farther; and then _Self-Love_ prompts us to retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and to endeavour to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such _Reflection_, People are hurry'd by a _natural kind Instinct_, to see Objects of _Compassion_, and expose themselves to this Pain, when they can give no Reason for it; as in the Instance of _publick Executions_. [Footnote 63: See _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 8. _Par._ 2.] This same Principle leads Men to _Tragedies_; only we are to observe, that another strong Reason of this is the _moral Beauty_ of the _Characters_ and _Actions_, which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept Strangers to the _moral Qualitys_ of the Sufferers, or their _Characters_ and _Actions_. As in such a Case, there would be no _Beauty_ to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose ourselves to Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious. It was the same Cause which crouded the _Roman Theatres_ to see _Gladiators_. There the People had frequent Instances of great _Courage_, and _Contempt_ of Death, two great _moral Abilitys_, if not _Virtues_. Hence Cicero looks upon them as great Instructions in _Fortitude_. The _Antagonist Gladiator_ bore all the Blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the _courageous_ and artful one, really obtain'd a Reputation of _Virtue_, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of _Self-defence_. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their _natural Instinct_ to _Compassion_, was the true Occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for. What Sentiments can we imagine a _Candidate_ would have rais'd of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of _Misery_; had he drain'd _Hospitals_ and _Infirmarys_ of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many _Slaves_, and without any Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however _Compassion_ might cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his _Antagonist_ chose a Diversion apparently more _virtuous_, or with a _Mixture_ of Scenes of _Virtue_. [Sidenote: _Compassion natural_.] How independent this Disposition to _Compassion_ is on _Custom_, _Education_ or _Instruction_, will appear from the Prevalence of it in _Women_ and _Children_, who are less influenc'd by these. That _Children_ delight in some Actions which are _cruel_ and _tormenting_ to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from _Malice_, or want of _Compassion_, but from their _Ignorance_ of those Signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a _Curiosity_ to see the various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their _Compassion_ often becomes too strong for their _Reason_; as it generally does in beholding _Executions_, where as soon as they observe the Evidences of Distress, or Pain in the _Malefactor_, they are apt to condemn this necessary Method of Self-defence in the _State_. SECT. VI. _Concerning the_ Importance _of this_ moral Sense _to the present Happiness of_ Mankind, _and its_ Influence _on human Affairs_. [Sidenote: _Importance of the Moral Sense_.] I. It may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Manners so justly complain'd of every-where, this _moral Sense_ has a greater Influence on _Mankind_ than is generally imagin'd, altho' it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of _publick Good_, and often overcome by _Self-Love_. But we shall offer some farther Considerations to prove, "That it gives us more _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, than all our _other Facultys_." And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, "That where-ever any _morally good Quality_ gives Pleasure from _Reflection_, or from _Honour_, the contrary _evil one_ will give proportionable Pain, from _Remorse_ and _Shame_." Now we shall consider the _moral Pleasures_, not only _separately_, but as they are the _most delightful Ingredient_ in the ordinary Pleasures of _Life_. All Men seem persuaded of some _Excellency_ in the Possession of _good moral Qualitys_, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of _moral Evil_, as worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for, however they may be influenc'd by _moral Sentiments_, yet it is certain, that _self-interested Passions_ frequently overcome them, and _partial Views_ of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really _morally evil_, apprehending it to be _good_. But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments _human Nature_ is _calm_ and _undisturb'd_, and shews its _true Face_. Now should we imagine a _rational Creature_ in a sufficiently happy State, whose Mind was, without _Interruption_, wholly occupy'd with pleasant Sensations of _Smell_, _Taste_, _Touch_, _&c._ if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State _low_, _mean_, and _sordid_, if there were no _Society_, no _Love_ or _Friendship_, no _good Offices_? What then must that State be, wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the _external Senses_, with such long Intervals as _human Nature_ at present must have? Do these short Fits of Pleasure make the _Luxurious_ happy? How _insipid_ and _joyless_ are the Reflections on past Pleasure! And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the _nauseous Satietys_, and _Languors_ in the Intervals! This _Frame_ of our _Nature_, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the _external Senses_, points out to us, "That there must be some other more _durable Pleasure_, without such _tedious Interruptions_, and _nauseous Reflections_." Let us even join with the Pleasures of the _external Senses_, the Perceptions of _Beauty_, _Order_, _Harmony_. These are, no doubt, more _noble Pleasures_, and seem to inlarge the _Mind_; and yet how _cold_ and _joyless_ are they, if there be no _moral Pleasures_ of _Friendship_, _Love_ and _Beneficence_! Now, if the bare Absence of _moral Good_ makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of _contrary_ Dispositions is always imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a _wrathful_, _malicious_, _revengeful_, or _envious Being_, tho' we were at the same time to enjoy all the Pleasures of the _external_ and _internal Senses_? The internal Pleasures of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_ contribute greatly indeed toward soothing the Mind into a Forgetfulness of _Wrath_, _Malice_ or _Revenge_; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while _these Affections_ possess the Mind, there is nothing but _Torment_ and _Misery_. [Sidenote: _Castle-builders prove it_.] What _Castle-builder_, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he should be happy, ever made _acknowledg'd Treachery_, _Cruelty_, or _Ingratitude_, the Steps by which he mounted to his wish'd-for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct ourselves in such Resveries, according to the Dictates of _Honour_, _Faith_, _Generosity_, _Courage_; and the lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by some innocent Accident. _O si urnam Argenti_ Fors _qua mihi monstret!_[64]---- But _Labour_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, _Poverty_, _Pain_, _Danger_, have nothing so detestable in them, that our _Self-Love_ cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them. On the contrary, the Virtues which these give us Occasions of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero, in _Romance_ or _Epic_, brought to his highest Pitch of Happiness, without going thro' them _all_. Where there is no _Virtue_, there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the _Romance_ or _Epos_ must end. Nay, the _Difficulty_[65], or _natural Evil_, does so much increase the _Virtue_ of the _good_ Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we continue the Work, it must be by presenting a new Scene of _Benevolence_, in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of _external Prosperity_ or _natural Good_, without any thing _moral_ or _virtuous_, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where _Virtue_ ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness. [Footnote 64: Hor. _Lib._ 2. _Sat._ 6. _ver._ 10.] [Footnote 65: _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 11. _Axiom_ 6.] [Sidenote: _Virtue own'd superior to all Pleasure_.] Let us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Possession of _Virtue_ to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon _Vice_ as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of Regulus, as related by Cicero, and some others, without concerning himself in the Fortunes of that _gallant_ Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how better a Fate? Should he have comply'd with the Terms of the Carthaginians, and preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho' to the Detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated his plighted Faith, and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, _that_ Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes,--"Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals."--What else do we wish then, but that the Carthaginians had relented of their Cruelty, or that Providence, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him out of their Hands? Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge _Virtue_ with Peace and Safety, preferable to _Virtue_ with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the _Virtuous_, the _Publick-spirited_, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all Affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we choose to have our Favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains, and natural Evils. We should never have imagin'd him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the Expence of his _Virtue_. We secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore we never imagine he acted foolishly in securing his _Virtue_, his _Honour_, at the Expence of his _Ease_, his _Pleasure_, his _Life_. Nor can we think these _latter_ Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the former are intirely lost. [Sidenote: _Necessary in other Pleasures_.] II. Let us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness of others in common Life. Wealth and External Pleasures bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in _Wealth_, some suppos'd _beneficent Intention_ of doing good Offices to Persons dear to _us_, at least to our _Familys_ or _Kinsmen_? And in our imagin'd Happiness from _external Pleasure_, are not some Ideas always included of some _moral_ Enjoyments of _Society_, some _Communication_ of Pleasure, something of _Love_, of _Friendship_, of _Esteem_, of _Gratitude_? Who ever pretended to a _Taste_ of these Pleasures without _Society_? Or if any seem violent in Pursuit of them, how _base_ and _contemptible_ do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no Expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure? Now, were there no _moral Sense_, no Happiness in _Benevolence_, and did we act from no other Principle than _Self-Love_; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Senses, which we could not enjoy alone, with less Trouble and Expence than in _Society_. But a _Mixture_ of the _moral Pleasures_ is what gives the _alluring Relish_; 'tis some Appearance of _Friendship_, of _Love_, of _communicating Pleasure_ to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the _Luxurious_ from being _nauseous_ and _insipid_. And this partial Imagination of some _good moral Qualitys_, some _Benevolence_, in Actions which have many _cruel, inhuman_, and _destructive_ Consequences toward others, is what has kept _Vice_ more in Countenance than any other Consideration[66]. But to convince us farther wherein the Happiness of _Wealth_, and _external Pleasure_ lies; let us but suppose _Malice_, _Wrath_, _Revenge_; or only _Solitude_, Absence of _Friendship_, of _Love_, of _Society_, of _Esteem_, join'd with the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet _Love_, _Friendship_, _Society_, _Humanity_, tho' accompany'd with _Poverty_ and _Toil_, nay even with smaller degrees of _Pain_, such as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a sort of Emulation: which plainly shews, "That _Virtue_ is the chief _Happiness_ in the Judgment of _all Mankind_." [Footnote 66: See above, _Sect._ iv. _Art._ 4. _Par._ 4, 5.] [Sidenote: _The Charm in_ Beauty.] III. There is a farther Consideration which must not be pass'd over, concerning the External Beauty of Persons, which all allow to have a great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended _Morality_, some natural or imagin'd Indication of _concomitant Virtue_, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of _Beauty_. Let us consider the Characters of _Beauty_, which are commonly admir'd in Countenances, and we shall find them to be _Sweetness_, _Mildness_, _Majesty_, _Dignity_, _Vivacity_, _Humility_, _Tenderness_, _Good-nature_; that is, that certain _Airs_, _Proportions_, _je ne scai quoy's_, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or of Abilitys or Dispositions toward them. As we observ'd above[67] of _Misery_ or _Distress_ appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all _habitual Dispositions_ of _Mind_ form the Countenance in such a manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our _violent_ Passions are obvious at first View in the Countenance; so that sometimes no Art can conceal them: and smaller Degrees of them give some less obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now, when the _natural Air_ of a Face approaches to that which any Passion would form it unto, we make a Conjecture from this concerning the _leading Disposition_ of the Person's _Mind_. [Footnote 67: See _Sect._ v. _Art._ 8. _Par._ 2.] As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward _large Lips_, _little Noses_, _narrow Eyes_; unless we knew from themselves under what Idea such Features are admir'd, whether as _naturally beautiful_ in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum'd Indications of some _moral Qualitys_; we may more probably conclude that it is the _latter_; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation or Aversion towards Faces among ourselves. And as to those Features which we count _naturally disagreeable_ as to Form, we know the Aversion on this Account is so weak, that _moral Qualitys_ shall procure a Liking even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the _Irregularity_, or Want of that _Regularity_ which is common in others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote _Dullness_; as _hollow Eyes_, _large Lips_; a _Colour_ of Hair, _Wantonness_: and may we not conclude the like _Association of Ideas_, upon some probable Foundation in Nature, and sometimes without any, to be the Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us? In the same manner, when there is nothing _grosly_ disproportion'd in any Face, what is it we dispraise? Is it _Pride_, _Haughtiness_, _Sourness_, _Ill-nature_, _Discontent_, _Folly_, _Levity_, _Wantonness_; which some Countenances discover in the Manner above hinted at? And _these Airs_, when brought by Custom upon the most _regular Set_ of Features, have often made them very disagreeable; as the _contrary Airs_ have given the strongest Charms to Countenances, which were far from Perfection in _external Beauty_. Had Homer, in his Character of Helen, rais'd our Idea of her _external Beauty_ to the greatest Height, yet it would have been ridiculous to have engag'd his Countrymen in a War for such a Helen as Virgil has drawn her. He therefore still retains something morally amiable amidst all her Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader, ----[Greek: Helenês oxmêmata te sonachas te][68], as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge. [Footnote 68: See _Homer, Iliad_ 2. _ver._ 356, 590.] [Sidenote: _The Cause of different Fancys of Beauty_.] This Consideration may shew us one Reason, among many others, for Mens _different Fancys_, or _Relishes_ of _Beauty_. The _Mind_ of Man, however generally dispos'd to esteem _Benevolence_ and _Virtue_, yet by more particular Attention to some Kinds of it than others, may gain a stronger Admiration of some _moral Dispositions_ than others. _Military_ Men may admire _Courage_ more than other Virtues; Persons of _smaller Courage_, may admire _Sweetness_ of _Temper_; Men of _Thought_ and _Reflection_, who have more extensive Views, will admire the _like Qualitys_ in others; Men of _keen Passions_ expect equal Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm'd by _Compliance_: The _Proud_ may like those of _higher Spirit_, as more suitable to their Dignity; tho' _Pride_, join'd with _Reflection_ and _good Sense_, will recommend to them _Humility_ in the Person belov'd. Now as the _various_ Tempers of Men make _various_ Tempers of others agreeable to them, so they must differ in their _Relishes_ of _Beauty_, according as it denotes the several Qualitys most agreeable to themselves. This may also shew us, how, in _virtuous Love_, there may be the greatest Beauty, without the least Charm to engage a Rival. _Love_ itself gives a Beauty to the _Lover_, in the Eyes of the Person _belov'd_, which no other Mortal is much affected with. And this perhaps is the _strongest Charm_ possible, and that which will have the greatest Power, where there is not some very great Counterbalance from _worldly Interest_, _Vice_, or _gross Deformity_. [Sidenote: _Air, Motion, Gestures_.] IV. This same Consideration may be extended to the whole Air and Motion of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes _Chearfulness_, _Ease_, a _Condescension_, and _Readiness_ to oblige, a _Love_ of _Company_, with a _Freedom_ and _Boldness_ which always accompanys an _honest_, _undesigning Heart_. On the contrary, what is shocking in _Air_ or _Motion_, is _Roughness_, _Ill-nature_, a _Disregard_ to others, or a _foolish Shame-facedness_, which evidences a Person to be unexperienc'd in Society, or Offices of Humanity. With relation to these _Airs_, _Motions_, _Gestures_, we may observe, that considering the different _Ceremonys_ and _Modes_ of shewing Respect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude, that there is no _natural_ Connection between any of these _Gestures_ or _Motions_, and the _Affections_ of _Mind_ which they are by _Custom_ made to express. But when _Custom_ has made any of them pass for Expressions of _such Affections_, by a constant _Association_ of Ideas, some shall become _agreeable_ and _lovely_, and others _extremely offensive_, altho' they were both, in their own Nature, _perfectly indifferent_. [Sidenote: _The Spring of Love between the Sexes_.] V. Here we may remark the Manner in which Nature leads _Mankind_ to the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible Delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any great Prospect of Happiness; as we see _Hunger_ and _Thirst_ determine us to preserve our Bodys, tho' few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness. The _Sexes_ might have been engag'd to Concurrence, as we imagine the _Brutes_ are, by _Desire_ only, or by a _Love_ of _sensual Pleasure_. But how dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in Marriage! Who would have had Resolution enough to bear all the Cares of a _Family_, and Education of _Children_? Or who, from the general Motive of _Benevolence_ alone, would have chosen to subject himself to _natural Affection_ toward an _Offspring_, when he could so easily foresee what Troubles it might occasion? This Inclination therefore of the _Sexes_, is founded on something stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Solicitations of _Uneasiness_, or the bare _Desire_ of _sensible Pleasure_. Beauty gives a favourable Presumption of _good Moral Dispositions_, and _Acquaintance_ confirms this into a real _Love_ of _Esteem_, or begets it, where there is little _Beauty_. This raises an Expectation of the greatest _moral Pleasures_ along with the _sensible_, and a thousand tender Sentiments of _Humanity_ and _Generosity_; and makes us impatient for a _Society_ which we imagine big with unspeakable _moral Pleasures_: where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service, being an Evidence of _this strong Love_ and _Esteem_, is mutually receiv'd with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and of the most substantial Obligation; and where _Prudence_ and _Good-nature_ influence both Sides, this _Society_ may answer all their Expectations. Nay, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the _fair Sex_, and we shall find, that _Love_ of _sensible Pleasure_ is not the chief Motive of _Debauchery_, or _false Gallantry_. Were it so, the _meanest Prostitutes_ would please as much as any. But we know sufficiently, that Men are fond of _Good-nature_, _Faith_, _Pleasantry_ of _Temper_, _Wit_, and many other _moral Qualitys_, even in a _Mistress_. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, _viz._ "That _Chastity_ itself has a powerful Charm in the Eyes of the _Dissolute_, even when they are attempting to destroy it." This powerful Determination even to a _limited Benevolence_, and other _moral Sentiments_, is observ'd to give a strong Bias to our Minds towards a _universal Goodness_, _Tenderness_, _Humanity_, _Generosity_, and _Contempt_ of _private Good_ in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our _external Deportment_, and in our Relish of _Beauty_, _Order_, and _Harmony_. As soon as a Heart, before _hard_ and _obdurate_, is soften'd in this Flame, we shall observe, arising along with it, a Love of _Poetry_, _Music_, the _Beauty_ of _Nature_ in rural Scenes, a _Contempt_ of other selfish Pleasures of the _external Senses_, a _neat Dress_, a _humane Deportment_, a _Delight_ in, and _Emulation_ of, every thing which is _gallant_, _generous_, and _friendly_. [Sidenote: _Society_, _Friendships_, _from our Moral Sense_.] In the same manner we are determin'd to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our _Necessitys_, or Prospects of _Interest_; but by an incredible Variety of little, agreeable, engaging Evidences of _Love_, _Good-nature_, and other _morally, amiable Qualitys_ in those we converse with. Among the rest, none of the least considerable is an Inclination to _Chearfulness_, a _Delight_ to raise _Mirth_ in others, which procures a secret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an _agreeable_, _innocent_, _good-natur'd_, and _easy State_ of Mind, as we are conscious of, while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd by _moderate Laughter_. [Sidenote: _The Power of Oratory founded on it_.] VI. Upon this _moral_ Sense is founded all the Power of the Orator. The various Figures of Speech are the several Manners, which a lively Genious, warm'd with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only a little diversify'd by _Custom_: and they only move the _Hearers_, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the _Speaker_; which are communicated to the _Hearers_, as we[69] observ'd above of one Passion, _viz._ _Pity_. [Footnote 69: See _Sect._ v. _Art._ 8. _Par._ 2.] Now the Passions which the _Orator_ attempts to raise, are all founded on _moral Qualitys_. All the bold _Metaphors_, or _Descriptions_, all the artificial Manners of _Expostulation_, _Arguing_, and _Addressing_ the _Audience_, all the _Appeals_ to _Mankind_, are but more lively Methods of giving the _Audience_ a stronger Impression of the _moral Qualitys_ of the Person _accus'd_ or _defended_; of the Action _advis'd_, or _dissuaded_: And all the _Antitheses_, or _Witticisms_; all the _Cadences_ of sonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have separately, are of no Consequence to persuade, if we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of _Morality_. They may perhaps raise a little Admiration of the _Speaker_, among those who already favour his Party, but they oftener raise Contempt in his _Adversarys_. But when you display the _Beneficence_ of any Action, the _good Effect_ it shall have on the _Public_ in promoting the Welfare of the _Innocent_, and relieving the _unjustly Distressed_; if you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking it. When any Person is to be _recommended_, display his _Humanity_, _Generosity_, _Study_ of the _publick Good_, and _Capacity_ to promote it, his _Contempt_ of Dangers, and private Pleasures; and you are sure to procure him _Love_ and _Esteem_. If at the same time you shew his _Distress_, or the _Injurys_ he has suffer'd, you raise _Pity_, and every _tender_ Affection. On the contrary, represent the _Barbarity_, or _Cruelty_ of any Action, the _Misery_ it shall procure to the _Kind_, the _Faithful_, the _Generous_, or only to the _Innocent_; and you raise an Abhorrence of it in the Breasts of the _Audience_, tho' they were not the Persons who would have suffer'd by it. The same way, would you make a Person _infamous_, and _despis'd_ and _hated_, represent him as _cruel_, _inhuman_, or _treacherous_ toward the most distant rational Agents; or shew him only to be _selfish_, and given to _solitary Luxury_, without regard to any _Friend_, or the _Interest_ of others; and you have gain'd your Point, as soon as you prove what you alledge. Nay, how does it stop our Admiration of any _celebrated_ Action, to suggest, "That the _Author_ of it was no Fool; he knew it would turn to his own _Advantage_!" Now, are the _Learned_ and _Polite_ the only Persons who are mov'd by such Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the _Moralists_ and _Politicians_, or the _Art_ of _Rhetoric_, to be capable of being persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of promoting _Self-Interest_? Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the _rude undisciplin'd Multitude_ most affected? Where had _Oratory_ so much Power as in _popular States_, and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? _Reflection_ and _Study_ may raise in Men a Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent, when they have some Knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, and find them employ'd upon themselves: but _rude Nature_ is still open to every _moral_ Impression, and carry'd furiously along without Caution, or Suspense. It was not the _Groves_ of the _Academy_, or the _polish'd Stones_ of the _Portico_, or the _manag'd Horses_ of Greece, which listen'd to the Harp of an Amphion, or an Orpheus; but the _Trees_, and _Rocks_, and _Tygers_ of the _Forest_: which may shew us, "That there is some _Sense_ of _Morality_ antecedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Arguments proving the _private Interest_ of the Person who is persuaded, to be connected with the _publick Good_." [Sidenote: _Poetry pleases from this Moral Sense_.] VII. We shall find this _Sense_ to be the Foundation also of the chief Pleasures of Poetry. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the _Numbers_, _Measures_, _Metaphors_, _Similitudes_[70]. But as the Contemplation of _moral Objects_, either of _Vice_ or _Virtue_, affects us more strongly, and moves our Passions in a quite different and a more powerful manner, than _natural Beauty_, or (what we commonly call) _Deformity_; so the most moving Beautys bear a Relation to our _moral Sense_, and affect us more vehemently, than the Representations of _natural Objects_ in the liveliest Descriptions. _Dramatic_ and _Epic_ Poetry are intirely address'd to this _Sense_, and raise our Passions by the Fortunes of _Characters_, distinctly represented as _morally good_ or _evil_; as might be seen more fully, were we to consider the Passions separately. [Footnote 70: See _Treatise_ I. _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 13. _Sect._ iv. _Art._ 3.] Where we are studying to raise any _Desire_, or _Admiration_ of an Object _really beautiful_, we are not content with a _bare Narration_, but endeavour, if we can, to present the _Object_ itself, or the most _lively Image_ of it. And hence the _Epic Poem_, or _Tragedy_, gives a far greater Pleasure than the Writings of _Philosophers_, tho' both aim at recommending _Virtue_. The representing the Actions themselves, if the Representation be _judicious, natural_, and _lively_, will make us admire the _Good_, and detest the _Vitious_, the _Inhuman_, the _Treacherous_ and _Cruel_, by means of our _moral Sense_, without any Reflections of the Poet to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that Horace has justly made Knowledge in _Morals_ so necessary to a _good Poet_: _Scribendi recte_ Sapere _est & principium & fons_[71]. [Footnote 71: Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 309.] And again: _Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid Amicis, Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus, & Hospes, Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium, quæ Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto Reddere Personæ scit convenientia cuique_[72]. [Sidenote: _Imagery in Poetry founded on the Moral Sense_.] Upon this same _Sense_ is founded the Power of that _great Beauty_ in Poetry, the Prosopopoeia, by which _every Affection_ is made a _Person_; every _natural Event_, _Cause_, _Object_, is animated by _moral Epithets_. For we join the Contemplation of _moral Circumstances_ and _Qualitys_, along with _natural Objects_, to increase their _Beauty_ or _Deformity_; and we affect the _Hearer_ in a more lively manner with the Affections describ'd, by representing them as _Persons_. Thus a shady Wood must have its _solemn venerable Genius_, and proper _rural Gods_; every clear Fountain, its _sacred chaste Nymph_; and River, its _bountiful God_, with his _Urn_, and perhaps a _Cornucopiæ_ diffusing _Plenty_ and _Fruitfulness_ along its Banks. The _Day-light_ is _holy_, _beneign_, and _powerful_ to banish the pernicious Spirits of the _Night_. The Morning is a _kind officious Goddess_, _tripping_ over the dewy Mountains, and _ushering_ in Light to _Gods_ and _Men_. War is an _impetuous_, _cruel_, _undistinguishing Monster_, whom no _Virtue_, no Circumstance of _Compassion_, can move from his bloody Purposes. The Steel is _unrelenting_; the Arrow and Spear are _impatient_ to destroy, and carry _Death_ on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are also _frightful Personages_, counterfeiting with their rude Throats the Thunder of Jove. The _moral Imagery_ of _Death_ is every-where known, _viz._ his _Insensibility_ to _Pity_, his _Inflexibility_, and _universal impartial Empire_. Fortune is inimitably drawn by Horace[73], with all her _Retinue_ and _Votarys_, and with her _rigid severe_ Minister, _Necessity_. The Qualitys of _Mind_ too become _Persons_. _Love_ becomes a Venus, or a Cupid; _Courage_, or _Conduct_, a Mars, or a Pallas, _protecting_ and _assisting_ the Hero; before them march _Terror_ and _Dread_, _Flight_ and _Pursuit_, _Shouts_ and _Amazement_. Nay, the _most sacred Poets_ are often led into this _Imagery_, and represent _Justice_ and _Judgment_, as _supporting_ the Almighty's Throne, and _Mercy_ and _Truth going_ before his Face: They shew us _Peace_ as _springing_ up from the Earth, and _Mercy looking_ down from Heaven. [Footnote 72: Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 312, &c.] [Footnote 73: See _Lib._ i. _Od._ 35.] Every one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of _moral Ideas_, than in the fullest Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the fourth Book of Homer, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the _Gods_, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beautiful Description which ever was imagin'd of _shooting_ an Arrow, meets with its _moral Epithet_, ----[Greek: melainaôn hezm odynaôn][74], ----_The Source of blackest Woes_; he will find himself more mov'd by this Circumstance, than by all the Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine. [Footnote 74: See _Homer, Iliad_ iv. _ver._ 117.] [Sidenote: _History_.] VIII. History derives its chief Excellence from the representing the _Manners_ and _Characters_; the Contemplation of which in _Nature_ being very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure, when well related. [Sidenote: _Painting_.] IX. It is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of _Face-painting_ is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with those Pieces which represent _moral Actions_, _Passions_, and _Characters_. SECT. VII. _A Deduction of some_ Complex moral Ideas; _viz. of_ Obligation, _and_ Right, Perfect, Imperfect, _and_ External, Alienable, _and_ Unalienable, _from this_ moral Sense. I. To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the _true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence_. It remains to be explain'd, how we acquire more particular Ideas of _Virtue_ and _Vice_, abstracting from any _Law_, _Human_, or _Divine_. [Sidenote: _Obligation_.] If any one ask, Can we have any Sense of Obligation, abstracting from the _Laws_ of a _Superior_? We must answer according to the various Senses of the Word _Obligation_. If by _Obligation_ we understand a _Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas'd with ourselves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it_: in this Meaning of the word _Obligation_, there is _naturally_ an _Obligation_ upon all Men to _Benevolence_; and they are still under its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this _moral Sense_ leads them to _Evil_; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd; for it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same Purpose, this _internal Sense_, and _Instinct_ of _Benevolence_, will either influence our Actions, or make us very uneasy and dissatisfy'd; and we shall be conscious, that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any _Law_ whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And farther, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole _beneficent_, and what not, as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action; and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd _good_: or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur'd will not fail to upbraid us. So that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a _serious Inquiry_ into the Tendency of his Actions, and a _perpetual Study_ of _universal Good_, according to the justest Notions of it. But if, by _Obligation_, we understand _a Motive from Self-Interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions_; we may have a Sense of such an _Obligation_, by reflecting on this _Determination_ of our _Nature_ to approve _Virtue_, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done _virtuous Actions_, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of _Virtue_ to any other Enjoyment[75]. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of _Obligation_, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of _benevolent_ and _social Actions_, to be the most probable Means of promoting the _natural Good_ of every _Individual_; as Cumberland and Pufendorf have prov'd: And all this without Relation to a _Law_. [Footnote 75: See above, _Sect._ vi. _Art._ 1, 2.] But farther, if our _moral Sense_ be suppos'd exceedingly weakened, and the _selfish Passions_ grown strong, either thro' some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our _Understanding_ be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our _Passions_ into precipitate and rash Judgments, that _malicious Actions_ shall promote our Advantage more than _Beneficence_; in such a Case, if it be inquir'd what is necessary to engage Men to _beneficent Actions_, or induce a steady Sense of an _Obligation_ to act for the _public Good_; then, no doubt, "A _Law_ with Sanctions, given by a _superior Being_, of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, must be necessary to counterbalance those apparent Motives of _Interest_, to calm our _Passions_, and give room for the Recovery of our _moral Sense_, or at least for a just View of our _Interest_." [Sidenote: _How far Virtue can be taught_.] II. Now the principal Business of the _moral Philosopher_ is to shew, from solid Reasons, "That _universal Benevolence_ tends to the Happiness of the _Benevolent_, either from the Pleasures of _Reflection_, _Honour_, _natural Tendency_ to engage the good Offices of Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for our Happiness in this World; or from the Sanctions of _divine Laws_ discover'd to us by the Constitution of the _Universe_;" that so no apparent Views of _Interest_ may counteract this _natural Inclination_: but not to attempt proving, "That Prospects of our _own Advantage_ of any kind can raise in us the _virtuous Benevolence_ toward others." Let the Obstacles from _Self-Love_ be only remov'd, and Nature itself will incline us to _Benevolence_. Let the Misery of _excessive Selfishness_, and all its Passions, be but once explain'd, that so _Self-Love_ may cease to counteract our _natural Propensity_ to _Benevolence_; and when this _noble_ Disposition gets loose from these Bonds of _Ignorance_, and false Views of _Interest_, it shall be assisted even by _Self-Love_, and grow strong enough to make a _noble virtuous Character_. Then he is to inquire, by _Reflection_ upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the _universal Good_, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit Exceptions; that so our _good Inclinations_ may be directed by _Reason_, and a _just Knowledge_ of the _Interests_ of _Mankind_. But _Virtue_ itself, or _good Dispositions_ of _Mind_, are not directly taught, or produc'd by _Instruction_; they must be originally implanted in our Nature by its _great_ Author, and afterwards strengthen'd and confirm'd by our own Cultivation. [Sidenote: _Objection_.] III. We are often told, "That there is no Need of supposing such a _Sense_ of _Morality_ given to Men, since _Reflection_ and _Instruction_ would recommend the same Actions from Arguments of _Self-Interest_, and engage us, from the acknowledg'd Principle of _Self-Love_, to the Practice of them, without this _unintelligible Determination_ to _Benevolence_, or the _occult Quality_ of a _moral Sense_." [Sidenote: _Moral Sense, not from Reflection_.] It is perhaps true, that _Reflection_, and _Reason_ might lead us to approve the same Actions as _advantageous_. But would not the _same_ Reflection and Reason likewise generally recommend the same _Meats_ to us, which our _Taste_ represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude, that we have no _Sense_ of _Tasting_, or that such a _Sense_ is _useless_? No: The Use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty _Reason_ we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of Doubt and Hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the _external Senses_, or to influence our Actions for the _Good_ of the _Whole_, without this _moral Sense_. Nor could we be so strongly determin'd at all times to what is most conducive to either of these Ends, without these _expeditious Monitors_, and _importunate Solicitors_; nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in Pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of _Self-Interest_, as by those delightful Sensations. This _natural Determination_ to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is, no doubt, an _occult Quality_. But is it any way more mysterious, that the Idea of an Action should raise _Esteem_ or _Contempt_, than that the Motion or tearing of Flesh should give _Pleasure_ or _Pain_; or the Act of Volition should move _Flesh_ and _Bones_? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the _Indian's_ Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one Step farther, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with _this Determination_ to love and approve, or condemn and despise _Actions_ and _Agents_, without any Views of _Interest_, as they appear _benevolent_, or the contrary. When they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such _Sense_, antecedent to all Prospect of _Interest_, "That these Actions for the most part are really _advantageous_, one way or other, to the _Actor_, the _Approver_, or _Mankind_ in general, by whose Happiness our own State may be some way made better;" may we not ask, supposing the Deity intended to impress such a _Sense_ of something _amiable_ in Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) What sort of Actions would a _good_ God determine to _approve_? Must we deny the Possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no _Advantage_ to _Mankind_, or to love _Agents_ for their being _eminent Triflers_? If then the Actions which a _wise_ and _good_ God must determine us to approve, if he give us any such _Sense_ at all, must be Actions _useful_ to the _Publick_, this _Advantage_ can never be a Reason against the _Sense_ itself. After the same manner, we should deny all _Revelation_, which taught us _good Sense_, _Humanity_, _Justice_, and a _rational Worship_, because _Reason_ and _Interest_ confirm and recommend such _Principles_ and _Services_; and should greedily embrace every _Contradiction_, _Foppery_, and _Pageantry_, as a _truly divine Institution_, without any thing _humane_, or _useful_ to _Mankind_. [Sidenote: _Moral Sense judges of Laws_.] IV. The Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of _Good_ and _Evil_ from the _private Advantage_ of the _Actor_, or from Relation to a _Law_, and its _Sanctions_, either known from _Reason_ or _Revelation_, are perpetually recurring to this _moral Sense_ which they deny; not only in calling the _Laws_ of the Deity _just_ and _good_, and alledging _Justice_ and _Right_ in the Deity to govern us; but by using a Set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their only Meaning. _Obligation_, with them, is only such a _Constitution, either of Nature, or some governing Power, as makes it advantageous for the Agent to act in a certain manner_. Let this Definition be substituted, where-ever we meet with the Words, _ought_, _should_, _must_, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the Deity _must_ act rationally, _must_ not, or _ought_ not to punish the Innocent, _must_ make the State of the _Virtuous_ better than that of the _Wicked_, _must_ observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, _must_, _ought_, _should_, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable. V. But that our first Ideas of _moral Good_ depend not on _Laws_, may plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the _Justice_ of _Laws themselves_; and that not only of _human Laws_, but of the _divine_. What else can be the Meaning of that universal Opinion, "That the _Laws_ of God are _just_, and _holy_, and _good_?" _Human Laws_ may be call'd _good_, because of their Conformity to the _Divine_. But to call the _Laws_ of the _supreme_ Deity _good_, or _holy_, or _just_, if all _Goodness_, _Holiness_, and _Justice_ be constituted by _Laws_, or the _Will_ of a _Superior_ any way reveal'd, must be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, "That God _wills_ what he _wills_." It must then first be suppos'd, that there is something in Actions which is apprehended _absolutely good_; and this is _Benevolence_, or Desire of the _publick natural Happiness_ of _rational Agents_; and that our _moral Sense_ perceives this _Excellence_: and then we call the _Laws_ of the Deity _good_, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the _publick Good_ in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the Deity is call'd _good_, in a _moral Sense_, when we apprehend that his _whole Providence_ tends to the universal Happiness of his _Creatures_; whence we conclude his _Benevolence_, and _Desire_ in their Happiness. Some tell us, "That the _Goodness_ of the _divine Laws_ consists in their Conformity to some _essential Rectitude_ of his _Nature_." But they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the Meaning of this Metaphor, _essential Rectitude_; and till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a _perfectly wise_, _uniform_, _impartial Benevolence_. [Sidenote: _Difference between Constraint and Obligation_.] Hence we may see the Difference between _Constraint_ and _Obligation_. There is indeed no Difference between _Constraint_, and the second Sense of the Word _Obligation_, viz. _a Constitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Interest_, if we only mean _external Interest_, distinct from the delightful Consciousness which arises from the _moral Sense_. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by _Constraint_, we do not understand an _external Force_ moving our Limbs without our Consent; for in that Case we are not _Agents_ at all; but that _Constraint_ which arises from the threatening and presenting some _Evil_, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there seems an universally acknowledg'd Difference between even this sort of _Constraint_ and _Obligation_. We never say, we are _oblig'd_ to do an Action which we count base, but we may be _constrain'd_ to it: we never say, that the _divine Laws_, by their Sanctions, _constrain_ us, but _oblige_ us; nor do we call Obedience to the Deity _Constraint_, unless by a Metaphor, tho' many own they are influenc'd by Fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an _almighty evil Being_ should require, under grievous Penaltys, _Treachery_, _Cruelty_, _Ingratitude_, we would call this _Constraint_. The Difference is plainly this: When any Sanctions cooperate with our _moral Sense_, in exciting us to Actions which we count _morally good_, we say we are _oblig'd_; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Punishments oppose our _moral Sense_, then we say we are _brib'd_ or _constrain'd_. In the former Case we call the _Lawgiver good_, as designing the _publick Happiness_; in the latter we call him _evil_, or _unjust_, for the suppos'd _contrary_ Intention. But were all our Ideas of _moral Good_ or _Evil_ deriv'd solely from Opinions of _private Advantage_ or _Loss_ in Actions, I see no possible Difference which could be made in the Meaning of these Words. [Sidenote: _Rights_.] VI. From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights. Whenever it appears to us, that _a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the Whole tend to the general Good_, we say, that one in such Circumstances has _a Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing_. And according as this Tendency to the _publick Good_ is _greater_ or _less_, the _Right_ is _greater_ or _less_. [Sidenote: _Perfect Rights._] The _Rights_ call'd _perfect_, are of _such Necessity to the publick Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable_; and it actually makes those miserable, whose _Rights_ are thus _violated_. On the contrary, to fulfil these _Rights_ in every Instance, tends to the _publick Good___, either _directly_, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a _Part_. Hence it plainly follows, "That to allow a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such _Rights_, before Civil Government be constituted, cannot in any particular Case be more detrimental to the _Publick_, than the Violation of them with Impunity." And as to the general Consequences, the universal Use of Force in _a State of Nature_, in pursuance of _perfect Rights_, seems exceedingly _advantageous_ to the _Whole_, by making every one dread any Attempts against the _perfect Rights_ of others. [Sidenote: _Right of War, and Punishment._] This is the _moral Effect_ which attends _proper Injury_, or a _Violation of the perfect Rights of others, viz_. A _Right_ to _War_, and all _Violence_ which is necessary to oblige the _Injurious_ to repair the Damage, and give Security against such Offences for the future. This is the sole Foundation of the Rights of _punishing_ Criminals, and of _violent Prosecutions_ of our Rights, in a _State of Nature_. And these Rights, naturally residing in the Persons injur'd, or their _voluntary_, or _invited_ Assistants, to use Force according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, being by the Consent of the _Persons injur'd_, transferr'd to the _Magistrate_ in a _Civil State_, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment. Instances of _perfect Rights_ are those to our _Lives_; to the _Fruits_ of our Labours; to demand Performance of _Contracts_ upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to _direct_ our own Actions either for _publick_, or _innocent private Good_, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure: and many others of like Nature. [Sidenote: _Imperfect Rights_.] Imperfect _Rights_ are _such as, when universally violated, would not necessarily make Men miserable_. These _Rights_ tend to the Improvement and Increase of _positive Good_ in any Society, but are not _absolutely_ necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any _Good_ which they had before. From this Description it appears, "That a violent Prosecution of such _Rights_ would generally occasion greater _Evil_ than the Violation of them." Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of _Kindness_, _Humanity_, _Gratitude_, which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain'd to perform them. Instances of _imperfect Rights_ are those which the _Poor_ have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which _all Men_ have to Offices of no Trouble or Expence to the Performer; which _Benefactors_ have to Returns of Gratitude, and such-like. The Violation of _imperfect Rights_ only argues a Man to have such weak _Benevolence_, as not to study advancing the _positive Good_ of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of _perfect Rights_ argues the _injurious Person_ to be _positively evil_ or _cruel_; or at least so _immoderately selfish_, as to be indifferent about the _positive Misery_ and _Ruin_ of others, when he imagines he can find his _Interest_ in it. In violating the _former_, we shew a weak Desire of _publick Happiness_, which every small View of _private Interest_ overbalances; but in violating the _latter_, we shew ourselves so intirely negligent of the _Misery_ of others, that Views of increasing our own _Good_ overcome all our Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the Absence of _Good_ is more easily borne than the Presence of _Misery_; so our _good Wishes_ toward the _positive Good_ of others, are weaker than our _Compassion_ toward their _Misery_. He then who violates _imperfect Rights_, shews that his _Self-Love_ overcomes only the Desire of _positive Good_ to others; but he who violates _perfect Rights_, betrays such a _selfish_ Desire of advancing his own _positive Good_, as overcomes all _Compassion_ toward the _Misery_ of others. [Sidenote: _External Rights_.] Beside these two sorts of _Rights_, there is a third call'd _External_; as when _the doing_, _possessing_, _or demanding of any Thing_, _is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another; but yet the universally denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in Pursuance of it, would do more Mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty_. And hence it appears, "That there can be no Right to use Force in Opposition even to _external Rights_, since it tends to the _universal Good_ to allow Force in Pursuance of them." Civil Societys substitute _Actions in Law_, instead of the Force allow'd in _the State of Nature_. Instances of _external Rights_ are these; that of a _wealthy Miser_ to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a _Covenant_ too burdensome on one Side; the Right of a _wealthy Heir_ to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking Advantage of a _positive Law_, contrary to what was _Equity_ antecedent to that Law; as when a _register'd Deed_ takes Place of one not register'd, altho' prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract. [Sidenote: _What Rights can be opposite_.] Now, whereas no _Action_, _Demand_, or _Possession_, can at once be either necessary to the _publick Good_, or conducive to it, and at the same time its _contrary_ be either necessary or conducive to the same End; it follows, "That there can be no Opposition of _perfect Rights_ among themselves, of _imperfect_ among themselves, or between _perfect_ and _imperfect Rights_." But it may often tend to the _publick Good_, to allow a _Right_ of _doing_, _possessing_, or _demanding_, and of using _Force_ in Pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more _humane_ and _kind_ in any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim'd his _Right_. But yet a violent Opposition to _these Rights_ would have been vastly more _pernicious_ than all the Inhumanity in the Use of them. And therefore, tho' _external Rights_ cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be opposite to _imperfect Rights_; but _imperfect Rights_, tho' violated, give no _Right_ to _Force_. Hence it appears, "That there can never be a _Right_ to _Force_ on both Sides, or a _just War_ on both Sides at the same time." [Sidenote: _Rights alienable and unalienable_.] VII. There is another important Difference of _Rights_, according as they are _Alienable_, or _Unalienable_. To determine what _Rights_ are _alienable_, and what not, we must take these two Marks: 1_st_. If the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our _Right_; and if it be so, then, 2_dly_. It must appear, that to transfer such _Rights_ may serve some valuable Purpose. By the _first_ Mark it appears, "That the _Right of private Judgment_, or of our _inward Sentiments_, is _unalienable_;" since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we ourselves, or any other Person pleases. So are also our _Internal Affections_, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the _second_ Mark it appears, "That our _Right_ of _serving_ God, in the manner which we think acceptable, is not _alienable_;" because it can never serve any valuable Purpose, to make Men worship him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a _direct Right_ over our _Lives_ or _Limbs_ is not _alienable_ to any Person; so that he might at Pleasure put us to Death, or maim us. We have indeed a _Right_ to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of Importance to the _Publick_; and it may often serve a most valuable End, to subject the Direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a _publick Good_; as _Soldiers_ do to their _General_, or to a _Council_ of _War_: and so far this _Right_ is _alienable_. These may serve as Instances to shew the Use of the two Marks of _alienable Rights_, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases. [Sidenote: _The Foundation of Property_.] VIII. That we may see the Foundation of some of the more _important Rights_ of _Mankind_, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their _Labour_ and _Industry_; and consequently, when once Men become so numerous, that the _natural Product_ of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a Necessity arises, for the Support of the increasing _System_, that such a _Tenour_ of Conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote _Industry_, and that Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary Effect. It is well known, that _general Benevolence_ alone, is not a Motive strong enough to _Industry_, to bear _Labour_ and _Toil_, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from _Self-Love_. For the strengthening therefore our Motives to _Industry_, we have the strongest Attractions of _Blood_, of _Friendship_, of _Gratitude_, and the additional Motives of _Honour_, and even of _external Interest_. _Self-Love_ is really as necessary to the _Good_ of the _Whole_, as _Benevolence_; as that _Attraction_ which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the _regular State_ of the _Whole_, as _Gravitation_. Without these additional Motives, _Self-Love_ would generally oppose the Motions of _Benevolence_, and concur with _Malice_, or influence us to the same Actions which _Malice_ would. "That Tenour of Action then, which would take away the stronger Ties of _Benevolence_, or the additional Motives of _Honour_ and _Advantage_, from our _Minds_, and so hinder us from pursuing _industriously_ that Course which really increases the _Good_ of the _Whole_, is _evil_; and we are oblig'd to shun it." First then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes away all Motives to _Industry_ from _Self-Love_, or the nearer _Ties_; and leaves us no other Motive than _general Benevolence_: nay, it exposes the _Industrious_ as a constant Prey to the _Slothful_, and sets _Self-Love_ against _Industry_. This is the Ground of our _Right of Dominion_ and _Property_ in the _Fruits_ of our _Labours_; without which _Right_, we could scarce hope for any _Industry_, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature. _Industry_ will be confin'd to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of _general Benevolence_, if we are not allow'd to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our Necessitys, either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the _Right_ which Men have to lay up for the _future_, the Goods which will not bespoil'd by it; of alienating them in _Trade_; of Donation to _Friends_, _Children_, _Relations_: otherwise we deprive _Industry_ of all the Motives of _Self-Love_, _Friendship_, _Gratitude_, and _natural Affection_. The same Foundation there is for the _Right_ of Disposition by _Testament_. The _Presumption_ of Disposition is the Ground of the _Right_ of Succession to the _Intestate_. The _external Right_ of the _Miser_ to his useless Hoards is founded also on this, That allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage _Industry_, and takeaway all the Pleasures of _Generosity_, _Honour_, _Charity_, which cease when Men can be forc'd to these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a _Miser_, and who is not. [Sidenote: _Right of Marriage_.] Marriage must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the _Males_ one of the strongest Motives to _publick Good_, viz. _natural Affection_; and discourage _Industry_, as has been shewn above. [Sidenote: _Commerce_.] The _Labour_ of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho' it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one Sort: Hence the _Right_ of _Commerce_, and _alienating_ our Goods; and also the _Rights_ from _Contracts_ and _Promises_, either to the _Goods_ acquir'd by others, or to their _Labours_. [Sidenote: _Right of Civil Government_.] The great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudiced _Arbitrators_, impower'd to decide the _Controversys_ which ordinarily arise, thro' the Partiality of _Self-love_, among Neighbours; as also from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the _publick Good_, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign _Injurys_; but also be arm'd with Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad: These Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the _Right_ Men have to constitute _Civil Government_, and to subject their _alienable Rights_ to the Disposal of their Governors, under such _Limitations_ as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their _Rights_, so far their Governors have an _external Right_, at least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no farther. [Sidenote: _Corollarys for comparing the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions_.] IX. These Instances may shew how our _moral Sense_, by a little Reflection upon the Tendencys of Actions, may adjust the _Rights_ of _Mankind_. Let us now apply the general Rules laid down above[76], for comparing the Degrees of _Virtue_ and _Vice_ in Actions, in a few Corollarys besides that one already deduc'd[77]. [Sidenote: _From Ability_.] 1. The Disappointment, in whole, or in part, of any Attempt, _Good_ or _Evil_, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the _moral Good_ or _Evil_; for as in _good_ Attempts, the _Moment_ of _Good_ is diminish'd or vanishes in such a Case, so does the _Ability_ likewise: The _Quotient_ then may still be the same. This holds equally in _evil_ Attempts. So that Actions are not to be judg'd _good_ or _evil_ by the Events, any farther than they might have been foreseen by the _Agent_ in _evil_ Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were _good_, in _good_ Actions; for then only they argue either _Love_ or _Hatred_ in the _Agent_. [Footnote 76: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 11, 12.] [Footnote 77: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 15. _Par._ 3.] [Sidenote: _Interest_.] 2. Secular _Rewards_ annex'd to _Virtue_, and actually influencing the _Agent_ farther than his _Benevolence_ would, diminish the _moral Good_ as far as they were necessary to move the _Agent_ to the Action, or to make him do more _Good_ than otherwise he would have done; for by increasing the _Interest_, to be subtracted, they diminish the _Benevolence_. But _additional Interests_, which were not necessary to have mov'd the _Agent_, such as the _Rewards_ of a _good Being_ for Actions which he would have undertaken without a Reward, do not diminish the _Virtue_. In this, however, no Mortal is capable of judging another: Nor do the Prospects of grateful Returns for Benefits which we would have conferr'd gratuitously, diminish the _Generosity_. This Corollary may be apply'd to the _Rewards_ of a _future State_, if any Person conceives them distinct from the Pleasures of _Virtue_ itself: If they be not conceiv'd as something distinct from those Pleasures, then the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence of a _virtuous Disposition_. 3. External _Advantage_ exciting us to Actions of _evil_ Tendency to others, if without this Prospect of _Advantage_ we would not have undertaken them, diminishes the _Evil_ of the Action; such as the Prospects of _great Rewards_, of avoiding _Tortures_, or even the _uneasy Solicitations_ of violent _selfish Passions_. This is commonly called the _Greatness of Temptation_. The Reason of this is the same with that in the former Case. We may here also remember again, that we are more uneasy upon the Presence of _Pain_, than upon the Absence of _Good_; and hence _Torture_ is a more extenuating Circumstance than _Bribes_, engaging us to _Evil_, because the Motives of private Interest are greater. [Sidenote: _Detriment_.] 4. The surmounting the uneasy Solicitations of the _selfish Passions_ increases the _Virtue_ of a _benevolent_ Action, and much more worldly Losses, Toil, &c. For now the _Interest_ becomes _negative_; the Subtraction of which increases the _Quantity_. 5. A malicious Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen _Disadvantages_ to the _Agent_, for the same Reason: particularly, [Sidenote: _Knowledge of Laws, how it affects Actions_.] 6. The Knowledge of a _Law_, prohibiting an _evil_ Action, increases the _Evil_ by increasing the _negative Interest_ to be subtracted; for then the _ill-natur'd_ Inclination must be so strong as to surmount all the selfish Motives from the Penaltys, and all the Motives of _Gratitude_ toward the _Lawgiver_. This is commonly call'd _sinning against Conscience_. 7. Offices of no _Toil_ or _Expence_ have little _Virtue_ generally, because the _Ability_ is very great, and there is no _contrary Interest_ surmounted. 8. But the refusing of them may be very _vitious_, as it argues an Absence of _good Affection_, and often produces a great enough Moment of _natural Evil_. And, [Sidenote: _Degree of Right_.] 9. In general, the fulfilling the _perfect Rights_ of others has little _Virtue_ in it: For thereby no new _Moment_ of _Good_ is produc'd; and the _Interest_ engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of _War_ in a _State of natural_ Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil Society. 10. But the _violating perfect_, or even _external Rights_, is always _exceedingly evil_, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequences of the Action; and the _selfish_ Motives, surmounted by this _vitious_ Inclination, are the same with those in the former Case. 11. The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices, which others claim from us by an _imperfect Right_; and generally, the stronger their _Right_ is, there is the less _Virtue_ in fulfilling it, but the greater _Vice_ in violating it. [Sidenote: _Strength of Ties_.] A stronger and less extensive Tie of _Benevolence_, in _equal Abilitys_, must produce a greater _Moment_ of _Good_ to the Object of it, in _equally good Characters_, than the weaker Ties. Thus, _natural Affection_, _Gratitude_, _Friendship_, have greater Effects than _general Benevolence_: Or, we do more Good to Friends, Children, Benefactors, than to Persons under no special Relation. 12. In _equal Moments_ of _Good_ produc'd by two _Agents_, when one acts from _general Be-_* _nevolence_ alone, and the other from a _nearer Tie_; there is greater _Virtue_ in the _Agent_, who produces _equal Good_ from the more extensive, but less passionate Attachment; and less _Virtue_, where there is the more violent, or passionate Attachment, which yet produces no more. The general Benevolence appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according to the Constitution of our moral Sense[78], than any particular Passion. [Footnote 78: See _Sect._ 3. _Art._ ix. _The Author all along supposes, that no Man acts without some_ Desire, _or_ Instinct, _or_ Affection, _or_ Appetite; _that of these_ Attachments _of the Will, some are calm and unpassionate, others are passionate; some are extensive, and others confined to one, or to a few. The former Sort in each of these Divisions, manifestly appears more amiable; and consequently_, cæteris paribus, _the Virtue is less, in any given Quantity of Good done from the violent, passionate, and narrow Attachment. A certain_ Remarker _thence argues, "That then the Virtue is highest, when there is no Desire, Affection or Attachment at all; or when we act solely from Reason, without any_ Affection _to any Thing." One may retort this Reasoning in a like Case. In any given_ Momentum _of Bodies, there the_ Velocity _is greater, where there is least_ Matter; _consequently, it is there greatest, where there is no_ Matter _at all_.] 13. But the Omission of the _good Offices_ of the stronger Ties, or Actions _contrary_ to them, have greater _Vice_ in them, than the like Omissions, or Actions, contrary to the weaker Ties; since our _Selfishness_ or _Malice_ must appear the greater, by the Strength of the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in co-operating with _Gratitude_, _natural Affection_, or _Friendship_, we evidence less _Virtue_ in any _given Moment_ of _Good_ produc'd, than in equally important Actions of _general Benevolence_: But _Ingratitude_ to a _Benefactor_, _Negligence_ of the _Interests_ of a _Friend_ or _Relation_, or Returns of _evil Offices_, are vastly more _odious_, than _equal Negligence_, or _evil Offices_ toward _Strangers_. [Sidenote: _What Offices to be prefer'd, when there appears any Opposition_.] 14. When we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of _Benevolence_, we are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclination; according to the wise Order of Nature, which has constituted these Attachments. Thus, we are rather to be _grateful_ than _liberal_; rather serve a _Friend_, or _Kinsman_, than a Stranger of only _equal Virtue_, when we cannot do both. 15. Or, more generally, since there can be no _Right_, _Claim_, or _Obligation_ to _Impossibilitys_; when two _Actions_ to be done by any Agent, would both tend to the Good of Mankind, but they cannot be perform'd both at once; that which occasions most _Good_ is to be done, if the Omission of the other occasions no prepollent _Evil_. If the Omission of either will occasion some _new natural Evil, that_ is to be omitted, whose Omission will occasion the least _Evil_. Thus if two Persons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we are to relieve the more _valuable_, when we cannot relieve both. _Ingratitude_, as it evidences a worse Temper than Neglect of _Beneficence_; so it raises worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and Suspicion of his Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an Act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be _grateful_, rather than _beneficent_, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion _new positive Evil_, or Continuance in a State of _Pain_, whereas the Omission of another would only prevent some _new positive Good_; since a State of _Pain_ is a greater Evil, than the Absence of Good, we are to follow _Compassion_, rather than _Kindness_; and relieve the _Distressed_, rather than increase the Pleasures of the _Easy_, when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should not suppose _contrary Obligations_, or _Dutys_; the more important Office is our _present Duty_, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no _moral Evil_. [Sidenote: _The Original of Government_.] X. From _Art._ vii. it follows, "That all human _Power_, or _Authority_, must consist in _a Right transferr'd to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others_; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an _external Right_ to do or command every thing." For where-ever any Invasion is made upon _unalienable Rights_, there must arise either a _perfect_, or _external Right_ to _Resistance_. The only Restraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such Cases, are, when they foresee that, thro' their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find that _Governors_, in the main very useful to the Publick, have by some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small to overbalance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the Ruin of others. _Unalienable Rights_ are _essential Limitations_ in all Governments. [Sidenote: _Absolute Government_.] But by _absolute Government_, either in _Prince_ or _Council_, or in _both jointly_, we understand _a Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State, or whole People; without any Reservation as to the Quantity of the Goods, Manner of Levying, or the Proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand_. But in all States this _tacit Trust_ is presuppos'd, "That the Power conferr'd shall be employ'd according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the publick Good." So that, whenever the Governors openly profess a Design of destroying the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the _essential Trust_, suppos'd in all Conveyance of _Civil Power_, is violated, and the _Grant_ thereby made void. [Sidenote: _Limited Government_.] A Prince, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously limited; _either when the Consent of the one may be necessary to the Validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expresly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly_: as when several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expresly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when, in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of _Election_ of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council, is determin'd, and the _Intention_ of their Assembling declar'd. In all such Cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very _Form of Government_, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern'd in such a manner, by a Prince or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of Government. So that there may be a very _regular State_, where there is no universal absolute Power, lodg'd either in one Person, or Council, or in any other Assembly beside that of the whole People associated into that State. To say, that upon a Change attempted in the very _Form of the Government_, by the _supreme Power_, the People have no Remedy according to the Constitution itself, will not prove that the _supreme Power_ has such a _Right_; unless we confound all Ideas of _Right_ with those of _external Force_. The only Remedy indeed in that Case, is an universal Insurrection against such _perfidious Trustees_. [Sidenote: _The Nature of Despotick Power_.] Despotick Power, is _that which Persons injur'd may acquire over those Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, they may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have done; or over those who stand oblig'd to a greater Value, than all their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to_. This Power itself is limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right to _Tortures_, _Prostitution_, or any Rights of the Governed which are _naturally unalienable_; or to any thing which is not of some Moment toward _Repair of Damage_, _Payment of Debt_, or _Security against future Offences_. The Characteristick of _Despotick Power_, is this, "That it is solely intended for the Good of the Governors, without any _tacit Trust_ of consulting the Good of the _Governed_." Despotick Government, in this Sense, is directly inconsistent with the Notion of Civil Government. From the Idea of _Right_, as above explain'd, we must necessarily conclude, "That there can be no _Right_, or _Limitation of Right_, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good." And therefore in Cases of _extreme Necessity_, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv'd from Ruin, it must certainly be _just_ and _good_ in limited Governors, or in any other Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own Preservation, beyond the Limits fix'd by the _Constitution_, in some _transitory Acts_, which are not to be made _Precedents_. And on the other hand, when an _equal Necessity_ to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg'd in their Governors, or may counteract them. This Privilege of _flagrant Necessity_ we all allow in Defense of the most perfect _private Rights_: And if _publick Rights_ are of more extensive Importance, so are also _publick Necessitys_. These Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can never overbalance the _Evils_ of violateing a tolerable Constitution, by _an arbitrary Act of Power_, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their _important Rights_ are secure from the _Cruelty_, _Avarice_, _Ambition_, or _Caprice_ of their Governors. Nor can any _Magistracy_ be safe, or effectual for the Ends of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of _Insurrections_. Whatever _temporary Acts_ therefore may be allow'd in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the _transitory Act_ of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a _Person_ or _Council_, _elected_ or _limited_ by themselves, that they should soon have Confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtain in all Communitys, since no _Assumer_ of Government can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the Satisfaction and Security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must follow, "That except when Men, for their _own Interest_, or out of _publick Love_, have by _Consent_ subjected their Actions, or their Goods, within certain Limits to the Disposal of others; no Mortal can have a _Right_ from his _superior Wisdom_, or _Goodness_, or any other _Quality_, to give Laws to others without their _Consent, express_ or _tacit_; or to dispose of the _Fruits_ of their Labours, or of any other _Right_ whatsoever." And therefore _superior Wisdom_, or _Goodness_, gives no _Right_ to Men to govern others. [Sidenote: _Divine Government founded on Wisdom and Goodness_.] But then with relation to the Deity, suppos'd _omniscient_ and _benevolent_, and secure from _Indigence_, the ordinary Cause of Injurys toward others; it must be _amiable_ in such a _Being_, to assume the Government of _weak_, _inconstant Creatures_, often misled by _Selfishness_; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from _publick Love_, as being contriv'd for the _Good_ of _the Whole_, and for the _greatest private Good_ consistent with it; and every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the _Divine Laws_, than by his own greatest Prudence and Circumspection. Hence we imagine, "That a _good_ and _wise_ God must have a _perfect Right_ to govern the _Universe_; and that all Mortals are oblig'd to _universal Obedience_." [Sidenote: _Divine Justice what_.] The _Justice_ of the Deity is only a Conception of his _universal impartial Benevolence_, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the _universal Good_, and enforce them with the most effectual Sanctions of _Rewards_ and _Punishments_. [Sidenote: _Creation not the Ground of God's Dominion_.] XI. Some imagine that the _Property_ the _Creator_ has in all his Works, must be the _true_ Foundation of his _Right_ to govern. Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the _publick Good_, that none should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods acquir'd by the Labour of another, which we call his _Property_, and hence we imagine that _Creation_ is the _only_ Foundation of God's _Dominion_, But if the Reason[79] of establishing the _Rights_ of _Property_ does not hold against a _perfectly wise_ and _benevolent Being_, I see no Reason why _Property_ should be necessary to his _Dominion_. Now the Reason does not hold: For an _infinitely wise_ and _good Being_ could never employ his assumed Authority to counteract the _universal Good_. The Tie of _Gratitude_ is stronger indeed than bare _Benevolence_; and therefore supposing two _equally wise_ and _good Beings_, the one our _Creator_, and the other not, we should think ourselves more oblig'd to obey our _Creator_. But supposing our _Creator malicious_, and a _good Being_ condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his _Right_ to govern would be perfectly good. But this is rather Matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of _Benevolence_ and _Property_ concur in the _one only true_ Deity, as far as we can know, join'd with _infinite Wisdom_ and _Power_. [Footnote 79: See _Art._. 10. _Par._ 6. _of this Section_.] [Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense the Effect of the Divine Goodness_.] XII. If it be here inquir'd, "Could not the Deity have given us a _different_ or _contrary Determination_ of _Mind, viz._ to _approve_ Actions upon another Foundation than _Benevolence_?" There seems nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But, as in the first Treatise[80], we resolv'd the Constitution of our present _Sense_ of _Beauty_ into the _divine Goodness_, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our _moral Sense_ to his _Goodness_. For if the Deity be really _benevolent_, and desires the Happiness of others, he could not _rationally_ act otherwise, or give us a _moral Sense_ upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own _benevolent Intentions_. For even upon the Supposition of a _contrary Sense_, every _rational Being_ must still have been solicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have suggested, that _universal Benevolence_, and a _social Temper_, or a _certain Course_ of external Actions, would most effectually promote the _external Good_ of every one, according to the Reasonings of Cumberland and Puffendorf; while at the same time this _perverted Sense_ of _Morality_ would have made us uneasy in such a Course, and inclin'd us to the quite contrary, _viz._ _Barbarity_, _Cruelty_, and _Fraud_; and _universal War_, according to Mr. Hobbes, would really have been our _natural State_; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miserable, and dissatisfy'd, when we follow'd the Directions of either. [Footnote 80: _Sect._ viii. _Art._ 2. _Prop._ 5.] [Sidenote: _Whence this universal Opinion of the Divine Goodness_.] XIII. It has often been taken for granted in _these Papers_, "That the Deity is _morally good_;" tho' the Reasoning is not at all built upon this Supposition. If we inquire into the Reason of the great Agreement of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demonstrative Arguments _à priori_, from the Idea of an _Independent Being_, to prove his _Goodness_. But there is abundant Probability, deduc'd from the whole _Frame_ of _Nature_, which seems, as far as we know, plainly contriv'd for the _Good_ of the _Whole_; and the casual Evils seem the necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design'd for prepollent _Good_. Nay, this very _moral Sense_, implanted in _rational Agents_, to approve and admire whatever Actions flow from a Study of the _Good_ of _others_, is one of the strongest Evidences of _Goodness_ in the Author of _Nature_. But these Reflections are not so universal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated. What then more probably leads _Mankind_ into that Opinion, is this: The obvious _Frame_ of the _World_ gives us Ideas of _boundless Wisdom_ and _Power_ in its Author. Such a _Being_ we cannot conceive _indigent_, and must conclude _happy_, and in the _best State_ possible, since he can still gratify himself. The _best State_ of _rational Agents_, and their _greatest_ and most _worthy Happiness_, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in _universal efficacious Benevolence_: and hence we conclude the Deity _benevolent_ in the most _universal impartial manner_. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of _Perfection_ more than _Benevolence_, and those _Capacitys_ or _Abilitys_ which are necessary to make it _effectual_; such as _Wisdom_ and _Power_: at least we can have no more lovely Conception of it. _FINIS_. Additions _and_ Corrections, &c. _This Edition having been inadvertently cast off, before the Author's Corrections were obtained, a few Sheets have been cancelled where it was necessary, and some few additional Paragraphs or Notes are here subjoined, with some few Corrections of the Expressions referred to their proper Pages and Lines, where the Reader may make a Mark_. P. 45. _upon the penult. Paragraph_, Note. 'Tis surprising to see the ingenious Author of _Alciphron_ alledging, that all Beauty observed is solely some _Use_ perceived or imagined; for no other Reason than this, that the Apprehension of the Use intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the Forms of Chairs, Doors, Tables, and some other Things of obvious Use; and that we like those Forms most, which are _fittest for the Use_. Whereas we see, that in these very Things _Similitude_ of Parts is regarded, where unlike Parts would be equally useful: Thus the Feet of a Chair would be of the same Use, tho' unlike, were they equally long; tho' one were strait, and the other bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: A Coffin-shape for a Door would bear a more manifest Aptitude to the human Shape, than that which Artists require. And then what is the _Use_ of these _Imitations of Nature_, or of its Works, in _Architecture_? Why should a Pillar please which has some of the Human Proportions? Is the _End_ or _Use_ of a Pillar the same as of a Man? Why the Imitation of other natural or well-proportioned Things in the Entablature? Is there then a _Sense of Imitation_, relishing it where there is no other Use than this, that it naturally pleases? Again; Is no Man pleased with the Shapes of any Animals, but those which he expects Use from? The Shapes of the Horse or the Ox may promise Use to the Owner; but is he the only Person who relishes the Beauty? And is there no Beauty discerned in Plants, in Flowers, in Animals, whose Use is to us unknown? But what is still more surprising, is his representing _Aristotle_ as giving the [Greek: epaineton], for the Notion of the [Greek: kalon]: when he has so often told us, "that the [Greek: kalon] is prior to it; that we love Praise from others, as it gives Testimony to, and confirms our Opinion of, our being possessed of Virtue, or the [Greek: kalon]; and that the superior Excellency of this, which we antecedently perceive, is the Reason why we love Praise." _See Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib._ i. _c._ 5. and often elsewhere. 'Tis true, that the [Greek: kalon] is laudable, and, as _Plato_ asserts, all-wise, [Greek: hêdy, kai ôphelimon], at last; and so does every one maintain who asserts a _Moral Sense_, in that very Assertion. And yet the Doctor has found out the Art of making this an Objection to a _Moral Sense_. P. 117. l. 3. _insert what follows_. As Mr. _Hobbes_ explains all the Sensations of Pity by our Fear of the like Evils, when by Imagination we place ourselves in the Case of the Sufferers; so others explain all Approbation and Condemnation of Actions in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination: We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an _imaginary private Advantage or Disadvantage_ in these Actions. But as his Account of Pity will never explain how the Sensation increases, according to the apprehended _Worth_ of the Sufferer, or according to the _Affection_ we formerly had to him; since the Sufferings of any Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our suffering the like: So this Explication will never account for our high Approbation of brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detrimental both to the Agent, and to those for whose Service they were intended; here there is no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor will it account for our Abhorrence of such Injuries as we are incapable of suffering. Sure, when a Man abhors the Attempt of the young _Tarquin_, he does not imagine that he has chang'd his Sex like _Cæneus_. And then, when one corrects his Imagination, by remembring his own Situation, and Circumstances, we find the moral Approbation and Condemnation continues as lively as it was before, tho' the Imagination of Advantage is gone. P. 148. l. 13. _Life_. Note. Cic. de Finib. lib. ii. c. 31. _Ista commendatic puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiæ, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio, indicat innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus, nec præmiorum mercedibus evocatam, &c._ P. 161. _After this Page subjoin_, Another Author thinks all this easily deducible from Self-Love. "Children are not only made of our Bodies, but resemble us in Body and Mind; they are rational Agents as we are, and we only love our own Likeness in them." Very good all this. What is _Likeness_? 'Tis not _individual Sameness_; 'tis only being included under one general or specifical Idea. Thus there is Likeness between us and other Mens Children, thus any Man is like any other, in some Respects; a Man is also like an Angel, and in some Respects like a Brute. Is there then a natural Disposition in every Man to _love his Like_, to wish well not only to his individual Self, but to any other like rational or sensitive Being? and this Disposition strongest, where there is the greatest Likeness in the more noble Qualities? If all this is called by the Name _Self-Love_; be it so: The highest Mystick needs no more-disinterested Principle; 'tis not confined to the Individual, but terminates ultimately on the Good of others, and may extend to all; since each one some way resembles each other. Nothing can be better than this Self-Love, nothing more generous. If any allege, That "Parents always derive Pleasure, often Honour, and sometimes Wealth, from the Wisdom and Prosperity of their Children, and hence all Parental Solicitude arises;" let us recollect what was said above; all these Motives cease upon Approach of Death, and yet the Affection is as strong then as ever. Let Parents examine their own Hearts, and see if these Views are the only Springs of their Affection, and that toward the most infirm, from whom there is least Hope. P. 243. l. 19. _subjoin_, Some have alleged, That "however the Sight of another's Misery some way or other gives us Pain, yet the very feeling of Compassion is also attended with Pleasure: This Pleasure is superior to the Pain of Sympathy, and hence we desire to raise Compassion in ourselves, and incline to indulge it." Were this truly the Case, the _Continuation of the Suffering_ would be the natural Desire of the Compassionate, in order to continue this State, not of pure Pleasure indeed, but of Pleasure superior to all Pains. P. 273. _subjoin at the End of the first Paragraph_, Some also object, That according to this Account, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and this is thought a great Absurdity. But 'tis manifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that, in which this Scheme places the highest Virtue, to wit, the _calm Motions of the Will_ toward the Good of others; if our common Accounts of Brutes are true, that they are merely led by particular Passions toward present Objects of Sense. Again, 'tis plain there is something in certain Tempers of Brutes[81], which engages our Liking, and some lower Good-will and Esteem, tho' we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we call the sweeter Dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of knowing Laws, or of being moved by their Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Punishments? Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or Punishments won't have these Effects upon them, which they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther rewarded or punished than by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of all this, That there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or Punishing of which, in Creatures void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no wise End of Government? [Footnote 81: _Cicero_ is not ashamed to say of some Brutes, _Videmus indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, desideria,----secreta à voluptate humanarum simulacra virtutum._. De Finib. lib. ii. c. 33.] _Small Alterations designed for this Edition_. Preface, p. 12. l. 15. Sense. _There are few Objects which are not_ thus p. 13. l. 11. pleased with _certain complex Forms_, the Author p. 14. l. 14. _our_ r. _some_ Treatise I. p. 3. l. 4. _Corporeal_ Substances. l. 9. raise a clear enough Idea p. 5. l. 5. from bottom of the Page. Objects _including_ many p. 6. l. 21. there _appears no_ Ground p. 17. l. 19. This _may seem probable, and hold pretty generally_. p. 22. l. 15. _minuter Parts, even of those_ which p. 26. l. 19. _frequently_ a perfect p. 40. l. 19. dele _in a moral Sense_. p. 47. l. 6, 7, of the Note, it is _below our Notice_. But p. 100. Note upon l. 16. See _Cicero de Nat. Deor_. lib. i. c. 27. p. 109. l. 15. this _pleasant Self-Approbation_; much p. 122. l. 5. from bott. who have scarce _any Dispositions of Piety, or thoughts of future Rewards_; and abhor p. 130. l. 5. Conduct, _that Virtue never fails to give Pleasure_. When p. 136. l. 8. from bott. be any _real Good-will or Kindness_ at all, &c. p. 150. l. 10, from bott. r. _Virtuous_ p. 152. l. 4. _dele_ only. Read, approve _only such_ Actions p. 157. l. 10, from bott. no _ultimate_ Good-will. l. 8, from bott. from _such_ Good-will p. 161. l. 11. No; say others, Children, &c. p. 166. l. 12. they _generally_ appear p. 169. l. 10, 11. _dele_ speculative p. 172. l. 15. the _manifest_ publick Evil p. 179. l. 26. for VII. r. VIII. p. 180. l. 23. _dele_ VIII. p. 183. l. 8. _dele_ IX. p. 184. l. 5. for X. read IX. p. 219. l. 16. descend _more strongly and constantly than it_ ascends l. 22. left it _more_ to Reflection p. 220. l. _penult_. read _a Multiplicity_ p. 228. l. 10. No; _we should distrust all Pretenders to such a Temper_, and hate p. 235. l. 17. This _strengthens the natural Modesty in civiliz'd Nations, as Habits and Education improve it_; so that p. 237. l. 14. Associations _of_ the Disaffected or Factious p. 239. l. 10. imagined _morally evil_ p. 242. l. 15. Compassion or _Curiosity_ might p. 275. l. 16. Wills. _Or that his Will is conformable to his Will_ l. 26. called _morally good_ p. 278. l. 19. State of Nature, r. _Natural Liberty_. Line ult. _idem_ p. 283. l. 11. that _the Power of transferring_ such Rights p. 299. l. 16. Since no _violent Usurper_ of Government l. 22. out of _regard to a publick Good_, have p. 301. l. 18. malicious, _as some ancient Hereticks did_, and p. 302. l. 20. Temper, _with a suitable Course of Actions_. Directions _to the_ Bookbinder. _In the_ Preface, _Cancel from_ p. 15 _to the End_. _In the_ Work, _Cancel from_ p. 9 _to_ 17. _From_ 29 _to_ 39. _From_ 57 _to_ 59. _From_ 173 _to_ 179. _From_ 185 _to_ 203. _From_ 217 _to_ 219. _From_ 221 _to_ 223. _From_ 253 _to_ 255. _From_ 287 _to_ 293. [End of _An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue_ by Francis Hutcheson]